Excluded coalitions and the distribution of power in parliaments

References

• Alonso-Meijide, J. M., and C. Bowles. 2005. “Generating Functions for Coalitional Power Indices: An Application to the IMF.” Annals of Operations Research 137: 21–44. doi:10.1007/s10479-005-2242-y.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Álvarez-Mozos, M., Z. Hellman, and E. Winter. 2013. “Spectrum Value for Coalitional Games.” Games and Economic Behavior 82: 132–142. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2013.06.011.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Aumann, R. J., and J. H. Drèze. 1974. “Cooperative Games with Coalition Structures.” International Journal of Game Theory 3: 217–237. doi:10.1007/BF01766876.
   Google Scholar
• Bailey, S. D., and S. Daws. 1998. The Procedure of the UN Security Council. 3rd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
   Google Scholar
• Banzhaf, J. F. 1965. “Weighted Voting Doesn’t Work: A Mathematical Analysis.” Rutgers Law Review 19: 317–343.
   Google Scholar
• Bilbao, J., J. Fernández, N. Jiménez, and J. López. 2002. “Voting Power in the European Union Enlargement.” European Journal of Operational Research 143: 181–196. doi:10.1016/S0377-2217(01)00334-4.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bindseil, U., and C. Hantke. 1997. “The Power Distribution in Decision Making among EU Member States.” European Journal of Political Economy 13: 171–185. doi:10.1016/S0176-2680(96)00039-0.
   Google Scholar
• Bundeswahlleiter (2013). Amtliches Endergebnis, http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de
   Google Scholar
• Carreras, F., and G. Owen. 1988. “Evaluation of the Catalonian Parliament 1980–1984.” Mathematical Social Sciences 15: 87–92. doi:10.1016/0165-4896(88)90032-7.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Casajus, A. 2009. “Outside Options, Component Efficiency, and Stability.” Games and Economic Behavior 65: 49–61. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2007.04.003.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Christian Democratic/Social Union (2013). Gemeinsam Erfolgreich Für Deutschland: Regierungsprogramm 2013–2017.
   Google Scholar
• Debus, M. 2008. “Parteienwettbewerb und Koalitionsbildung in den deutschen Bundesländern.” In Parteien und Parteiensysteme in den deutschen Ländern, edited by U. Jun, M. Haas, and O. Niedermayer, 57–78. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
   Google Scholar
• Deegan, J., and E. W. Packel. 1978. “A New Index of Power for Simple N-Person Games.” International Journal of Game Theory 7: 113–123. doi:10.1007/BF01753239.
   Google Scholar
• Dubey, P., and L. S. Shapley. 1979. “Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index.” Mathematics of Operations Research 4: 99–131. doi:10.1287/moor.4.2.99.
   Google Scholar
• Felsenthal, D. S., and M. Machover. 1998. The Measurement of Voting Power: Theory and Practice, Problems and Paradoxes. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
   Google Scholar
• Felsenthal, D. S., and M. Machover. 2001. “The Treaty of Nice and Qualified Majority Voting.” Social Choice and Welfare 18: 431–464. doi:10.1007/s003550100137.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Felsenthal, D. S., and M. Machover. 2005. “Voting Power Measurement: A Story of Misreinvention.” Social Choice and Welfare 25: 485–506. doi:10.1007/s00355-005-0015-9.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Free Democratic Party. 2013. Bürgerprogramm 2013: Damit Deutschland stark bleibt.
   Google Scholar
• Gambarelli, G. 1994. “Power Indices for Political and Financial Decision Making: A Review.” Annals of Operations Research 51: 163–173. doi:10.1007/BF02032761.
   Google Scholar
• Green Party. (2013). Grünes Wahlprogramm 2013: Kapitel A Teilhaben. Einmischen. Zukunft schaffen.
   Google Scholar
• Handelsblatt online (24.04.2013). Grüne Wähler Offen Für Schwarz-Grüne Koalition, http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/forsa-umfrage-gruene-waehler-offen-fuer-schwarz-gruene-koalition/8114258.html
   Google Scholar
• Harsanyi, J. C. 1963. “A Simplified Bargaining Model for the N-Person Cooperative Game.” International Economic Review 4: 194–220. doi:10.2307/2525487.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hiller, T. 2010. Analyse ausgewählter Problemstellungen der Organisations- und Personalwirtschaft mit Hilfe der kooperativen Spieltheorie. Wiesbaden: Springer Verlag.
   Google Scholar
• Hiller, T. 2013. “The Distribution of Power in Governing Coalitions of the German Laender.” Applied Economics Letters 20: 1155–1159. doi:10.1080/13504851.2013.797548.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hiller, T. 2014. “Coalition Statements and the Distribution of Power in German Government Coalitions: 1990–2009.” Applied Economics Quarterly 60: 145–157. doi:10.3790/aeq.60.3.145.
   Google Scholar
• Holler, M. J. 1982. “Forming Coalitions and Measuring Voting Power.” Political Studies 30: 262–271. doi:10.1111/post.1982.30.issue-2.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Holler, M. J., and E. W. Packel. 1983. “Power, Luck and the Right Index.” Journal of Economics 43: 21–29. doi:10.1007/BF01283881.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Housman, D. 2002. “Linear and Symmetric Allocation Methods for Partially Defined Cooperative Games.” International Journal of Game Theory 30: 377–404. doi:10.1007/s001820100086.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kalai, E., and D. Samet. 1987. “On Weighted Shapley Values.” International Journal of Game Theory 16: 205–222. doi:10.1007/BF01756292.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Laruelle, A., and M. Widgrén. 1998. “Is the Allocation of Voting Power among EU States Fair?” Public Choice 94: 317–339. doi:10.1023/A:1004965310450.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Leech, D. 1988. “The Relationship between Shareholding Concentration and Shareholder Voting Power in British Companies: A Study of the Application of Power Indices for Simple Games.” Management Science 34: 509–527. doi:10.1287/mnsc.34.4.509.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Left Party. 2013. 100 % Sozial.
   Google Scholar
• Myerson, R. B. 1977. “Graphs and Cooperation in Games.” Mathematics of Operations Research 2: 225–229. doi:10.1287/moor.2.3.225.
   Google Scholar
• Myerson, R. B. 1980. “Conference Structures and Fair Allocation Rules.” International Journal of Game Theory 9: 169–182. doi:10.1007/BF01781371.
   Google Scholar
• Niedermayer, O. (2006). Das Parteiensystem Deutschlands. In Die Parteiensysteme Westeuropas, edited by O. Niedermayer, R. Stöss, and M. Haas, 109–133. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
   Google Scholar
• Nowak, A. S., and T. Radzik. 1994. “A Solidarity Value for N-Person Transferable Utility Games.” International Journal of Game Theory 23: 43–48. doi:10.1007/BF01242845.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Owen, G. 1971. “Political Games.” Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 18: 345–355. doi:10.1002/(ISSN)1931-9193.
   Google Scholar
• Owen, G. 1977. “Values of Games with a Priori Unions.” In Essays in Mathematical Economics & Game Theory, edited by Henn, R., and O. Moeschlin, 76–88. Berlin: Springer Verlag.
   Google Scholar
• Penrose, L. S. 1946. “The Elementary Statistics of Majority Voting.” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 109: 53–57. doi:10.2307/2981392.
   Google Scholar
• Penrose, L. S. 1952. On the Objective Study of Crowd Behaviour. London: H. K. Lewis & Co.
   Google Scholar
• Rapoport, A., and E. Golan. 1985. “Assessment of Political Power in the Israeli Knesset.” The American Political Science Review 79: 673–692. doi:10.2307/1956837.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Riker, W. H. 1962. The Theory of Political Coalitions. New Haven: Yale University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Saalfeld, T. 2002. “The German Party System: Continuity and Change.” German Politics 11: 99–130. doi:10.1080/714001303.
   Google Scholar
• Saari, D. G., and K. Sieberg. 2001. “Some Surprising Properties of Power Indices.” Games and Economic Behavior 36: 241–263. doi:10.1006/game.2000.0819.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Shapley, L. S. 1953. “A Value for N-Person Games.” In Contributions to the Theory of Games, Vol. 2, edited by Kuhn, H. W., and A. W. Tucker, 307–317. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Shapley, L. S., and M. Shubik. 1954. “A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System.” American Political Science Review 48: 787–792. doi:10.2307/1951053.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Social Democratic Party of Germany. 2013. Das Wir entscheidet - Das Regierungsprogramm 2013–2017.
   Google Scholar
• Spiegel online (15.09.2013). Wahl-Umfragen: Sonntagsfrage Für Bundestagswahl Und Landtagswahlen, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/wahl-umfragen-sonntagsfrage-fuer-bundestagswahl-und-landtagswahlen-a-623633.html
   Google Scholar
• van den Brink, R., and G. van der Laan. 1998. “Axiomatizations of the Normalized Banzhaf Value and the Shapley Value.” Social Choice and Welfare 15: 567–582. doi:10.1007/s003550050125.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Wiese, H. 2007. “Measuring the Power of Parties within Government Coalitions.” International Game Theory Review 9: 307–322. doi:10.1142/S0219198907001412.
   Google Scholar
• Willson, S. J. 1993. “A Value for Partially Defined Cooperative Games.” International Journal of Game Theory 21: 371–384. doi:10.1007/BF01240152.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar