The law of small numbers: investigating the benefits of restricted auctions for public procurement

References

• Amaral, M., S. Saussier, and A. Yvrande-Billon. 2009. “Auction Procedures and Competition in Public Services: The Case of Urban Public Transport in France and London.” Utilities Policy 17 (2): 166–175. doi:10.1016/j.jup.2008.07.006.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Amaral, M., S. Saussier, and A. Yvrande-Billon. 2013. “(Potential) Number of Bidders and Winning Bids: Evidence from the London Bus Tendering Model.” Journal of Transport, Economics and Policy 47 (1): 17–34.
   Google Scholar
• Bajari, P., S. Houghton, and S. Tadelis. 2014. “Bidding for Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Adaptation Costs.” American Economic Review 104 (4): 1288–1319. doi:10.1257/aer.104.4.1288.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bajari, P., R. McMillan, and S. Tadelis. 2009. “Auctions versus Negotiations in Procurement: An Empirical Analysis.” J Law Econ Organ 25 (2): 372–399. doi:10.1093/jleo/ewn002.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bajari, P., and S. Tadelis. 2001. “Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts.” RAND Journal of Economics 32 (3): 387–407. doi:10.2307/2696361.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Boehm, F., and J. Olaya. 2006. “Corruption in Public Contracting Auctions: The Role of Transparency in Bidding Processes.” Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 77 (4): 431–452. doi:10.1111/apce.2006.77.issue-4.
   Google Scholar
• Brown, T. L., and M. Potoski. 2003. “Contract Management Capacity in Municipal and County Governments.” Public Administration Review 63 (2): 153–164. doi:10.1111/puar.2003.63.issue-2.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Brown, T. L., M. Potoski, and D. M. Van Slyke. 2010. “Contracting for Complex Products.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 20 (suppl 1): i41–i58. doi:10.1093/jopart/mup034.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bulow, J., and P. Klemperer. 1996. “Auctions versus Negotiations.” American Economic Review 86 (1): 180–194.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Burguet, R., and Y.-K. Che. 2004. “Competitive Procurement with Corruption.” RAND Journal of Economics 35 (1): 50–68. doi:10.2307/1593729.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Calzolari, G., and G. Spagnolo (2009). Relational Contracts and Competitive Screening. CEPR Discussion Paper No. 7434.
   Google Scholar
• Chong, E., C. Staropoli, and A. Yvrande. 2011. “Auction vs. Negotiation: Looking for New Empirical Evidences.” In In the Manufacturing of Markets: Legal, Political and Economic Dynamics Eds. E. Brousseau, J-M Glachant, Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Coviello, D., A. Guglielmo, and Giancarlo. 2017. “The Effect of Discretion on Procurement Performance.” Forthcoming in Management Science.
   Google Scholar
• De Silva, D. G., G. Kosmopoulou, and C. Lamarche. 2009. “The Effect of Information on the Bidding and Survival of Entrants in Procurement Auctions.” Journal of Public Economics 93 (1–2): 56–72. doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.05.001.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Decarolis, F. 2014. “Awarding Price, Contract Performance and Bids Screening: Evidence from Procurement Auctions.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 6 (1): 108–132.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Demsetz, H. 1968. “Why Regulate Utilities?” Journal of Law and Economics 11: 55–66. doi:10.1086/466643.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Doni, N. 2006. “The Importance of Reputation in Awarding Public Contracts.” Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 77 (4): 401–429. doi:10.1111/apce.2006.77.issue-4.
   Google Scholar
• European Commission. 2010. Evaluation of SMEs’ Access to Public Procurement Markets in the Eu, Final Report for the European Commission, DG Enterprise and Industry, September.
   Google Scholar
• Evenett, S. J., and B. M. Hoekman. 2005. “Government Procurement: Market Access, Transparency, and Multilateral Trade Rules.” European Journal of Political Economy 21 (1): 163–183. doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2004.01.001.
   Google Scholar
• Girth, A. M. 2014. “A Closer Look at Contract Accountability: Exploring the Determinants of Sanctions for Unsatisfactory Contract Performance.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 24 (2): 317–348. doi:10.1093/jopart/mus033.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Guasch, J. 2004. Granting and Renegotiating Infrastructure Concession: Doing It Right. Washington DC, USA: The World Bank.
   Google Scholar
• Hallwood, C. P. 1996. “A Market in Action: Fuzzy Information and Trade-Offs between Operating Rules in the Invited Tender-Bid Procurement Auction.” Journal of Economic Studies 23 (3): 34–43. doi:10.1108/01443589610124381.
   Google Scholar
• Heckman, J. J. 1979. “Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error.” Econometrica 47 (1): 153–162. doi:10.2307/1912352.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Heijboer, G., and J. Telgen. 2002. “Choosing the Open or Restricted Procedure: A Bif Deal or A Big Deal?” Journal of Public Procurement 2 (2): 187–215.
   Google Scholar
• Heinrich, C. J. 1999. “Do Government Bureaucrats Make Effective Use of Performance Management Information?” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 9 (3): 363–394. doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jpart.a024415.
   Google Scholar
• Hong, H., and M. Shum. 2002. “Increasing Competition and the Winner’s Curse: Evidence from Procurement.” Review of Economic Studies 69 (4): 871–898. doi:10.1111/roes.2002.69.issue-4.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kelman, S. 1990. Procurement and Public Management: The Fear of Discretion and the Quality of Government Performance. Washington, DC: AEI Press, 213.
   Google Scholar
• Kim, I. 1998. “A Model of Selective Tendering: Does Bidding Competition Deter Opportunism by Contractors?” The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 38 (4): 907–925. doi:10.1016/S1062-9769(99)80139-2.
   Google Scholar
• Kim, K. S., T. L. Knotts, and S. C. Jones. 2008. “Characterizing Viability of Small Manufacturing Enterprises (SME) in the Market.” Expert Systems Applications 128–134. doi:10.1016/j.eswa.2006.08.009.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• OECD (2010). Public procurement in EU member states - the regulation of contract below the EU thresholds and in areas not covered by the detailed rules of the eu directives.
   Google Scholar
• Ohashi, H. 2009. “Effects of Transparency in Procurement Practices on Government Expenditure: A Case Study of Municipal Public Works.” Review of Industrial Organization 34 (3): 267–285. doi:10.1007/s11151-009-9208-1.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Pandey, S. K., and P. G. Scott. 2002. “Red Tape: A Review and Assessment of Concepts and Measures.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 12 (4): 553–580. doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jpart.a003547.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Spagnolo, G. 2012. “Reputation, Competition, and Entry in Procurement.” International Journal of Industrial Organization 30 (3): 291–296. doi:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2012.01.001.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Williamson, O. E. 1983. “Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange.” The American Economic Review 73 (4): 519–540.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Williamson, O. E. 1991. “Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives.” Administrative Science Quarterly 36: 269–296. doi:10.2307/2393356.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Wooldridge, J. M. 2001. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, Cambridge: MIT Press, 776. (ISBN 978-0-262-23219-7, LCCN 2001044263)
   Google Scholar