Advanced search
Publication Cover
Australasian Journal of Philosophy Volume 96, 2018 - Issue 3
Submit an article Journal homepage
926
Views
9
CrossRef citations to date
0
Altmetric
Articles

Pain for the Moral Error Theory? A New Companions-in-Guilt Argument

Guy FletcherUniversity of EdinburghORCID Iconhttp://orcid.org/0000-0003-0957-5698
ORCID Icon
Pages 474-482 | Received 05 Apr 2017, Published online: 08 Oct 2017

References

  • Bedke, M.S. 2010. Might All Normativity Be Queer? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88/1: 41–58.
  • Bradford, G. In preparation. The Badness of Pain.
  • Cowie, C. 2014a. Why Companions in Guilt Arguments Won't Work, The Philosophical Quarterly 64/256: 407–22.
  • Cowie, C. 2014b. In Defence of Epistemic Instrumentalism about Epistemic Normativity, Synthese 191/16: 4003–17.
  • Cowie, C. 2016. Good News for Moral Error Theorists: A Master Argument Against the Companions in Guilt Strategy, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94/1: 115–30.
  • Cuneo, T. 2007. The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Darwall, S. 2002. Welfare and Rational Care, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
  • Das, R. 2017. Bad News for Moral Error Theorists: There Is No Master Argument Against Companions in Guilt Strategies, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95/1: 58–69.
  • Fantl, J. and M. McGrath 2007. On Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75/3: 558–89.
  • Finlay, S. 2008. The Error in the Error Theory, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86/3: 347–69.
  • Fletcher, G. 2009. Uneasy Companions, Ratio 22/3: 359–68.
  • Fletcher, G. In preparation. Is Well-Being Normative?
  • Foot, P. 1972. Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives, The Philosophical Review 81/3: 305–16.
  • Garner, R.T. 1990. On the Genuine Queerness of Moral Properties and Facts, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68/2: 137–46.
  • Hare, R.M. 1952. The Language of Morals, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  • Hawthorne, J. and Stanley, J. 2008. Knowledge and Action, The Journal of Philosophy 105/10: 571–90.
  • Heathwood, C. 2009. Moral and Epistemic Open Question Arguments, Philosophical Books 50/2: 83–98.
  • Horgan, T. and M. Timmons 1991. New Wave Moral Realism Meets Moral Twin Earth, Journal of Philosophical Research 16: 447–65.
  • Joyce, R. 2001. The Myth of Morality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Joyce, R. 2011. The Error in ‘The Error in the Error Theory’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89/3: 519–534.
  • Lillehammer, H. 2007. Companions in Guilt: Arguments for Ethical Objectivity, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
  • Mackie, J.L. 1977. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, London: Penguin Books.
  • Moore, G.E. 1903. Principia Ethica, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Olson, J. 2011. Error Theory and Reasons for Belief, in Reasons for Belief, ed. A. Reisner and A. Steglich-Peterson, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 75–93.
  • Olson, J. 2014. Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, and Defence, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Rowland, R. 2013. Moral Error Theory and the Argument from Epistemic Reasons, Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy 7/1: 1–24.
  • Rowland, R. 2016. Rescuing Companions in Guilt Arguments, The Philosophical Quarterly 66/262: 161–71.
  • Streumer, B. 2017. Unbelievable Errors: An Error Theory about All Normative Judgements, New York: Oxford University Press.

Reprints and Corporate Permissions

Please note: Selecting permissions does not provide access to the full text of the article, please see our help page How do I view content?

To request a reprint or corporate permissions for this article, please click on the relevant link below:

Order Reprints Request Corporate Permissions

Academic Permissions

Please note: Selecting permissions does not provide access to the full text of the article, please see our help page How do I view content?

Obtain permissions instantly via Rightslink by clicking on the button below:

Request Academic Permissions

If you are unable to obtain permissions via Rightslink, please complete and submit this Permissions form. For more information, please visit our Permissions help page.

Related research

People also read lists articles that other readers of this article have read.

Recommended articles lists articles that we recommend and is powered by our AI driven recommendation engine.

Cited by lists all citing articles based on Crossref citations.
Articles with the Crossref icon will open in a new tab.