Taking Emergentism Seriously

References

• Bennett, K. 2003. Why the Exclusion Problem Seems Intractable and How, Just Maybe, to Tract It, Noûs 37/3: 471–97. doi: 10.1111/1468-0068.00447
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bishop, R.C. 2006. The Hidden Premiss in the Causal Argument for Physicalism, Analysis 66/289: 44–52. doi: 10.1093/analys/66.1.44
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bishop, R.C. 2012. Excluding the Causal Exclusion Argument against Non-Reductive Physicalism, Journal of Consciousness Studies 19/5–6 : 57–74.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Carey, B. 2011. Overdetermination and the Exclusion Problem, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89/2: 251–62. doi: 10.1080/00048401003745993
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Chalmers, D. 1996. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory, New York: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Crane, T. 2001. Elements of Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Crisp, T.M. and T.A. Warfield 2001. Kim’s Master Argument, Noûs 35/2: 304–16. doi: 10.1111/0029-4624.00299
   Google Scholar
• Davidson, D. 1980. Mental Events, in his Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: Clarendon Press: 207–27.
   Google Scholar
• Dowe, P. 2000. Physical Causation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Dowe, P. 2008. Causal Processes, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/causation-process
   Google Scholar
• Gibb, S. 2010. Closure Principles and the Laws of Conservation of Energy and Momentum, Dialectica 64/3: 363–84. doi: 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2010.01237.x
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Gibbons, J. 2006. Mental Causation without Downward Causation, The Philosophical Review 115/1: 79–103. doi: 10.1215/00318108-2005-003
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Heil, J. 2013. Philosophy of Mind: A Contemporary Introduction, 3rd edn, New York: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Hill, C.S. 1991. Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Howell, R. 2009. Emergentism and Supervenience Physicalism, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87/1: 83–98. doi: 10.1080/00048400802215398
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kim, J. 1992. ‘Downward Causation’ in Emergentism and Non-Reductive Physicalism, in Emergence or Reduction? Essays on the Prospects of Nonreductive Physicalism, ed. A. Beckermann, H. Flohr, and J. Kim, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter: 119–38.
   Google Scholar
• Kim, J. 1998. Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Kim, J. 2005. Physicalism, or Something Near Enough, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Kutach, D. 2007. The Physical Foundations of Causation, in Causation, Physics, and the Constitution of Reality: Russell’s Republic Revisited, ed. H. Price and R. Corry, Oxford: Clarendon Press: 327–50.
   Google Scholar
• Lange, M. 2017. Because without Cause: Non-Causal Explanations in Science and Mathematics, New York: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Leibniz, G.W. 1704 (1981). New Essays on Human Understanding, ed. P. Remnant and J. Bennett, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Lewis, D. 1966. An Argument for the Identity Theory, The Journal of Philosophy 63/1: 17–25. doi: 10.2307/2024524
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lewis, D. 1973. Causation, The Journal of Philosophy 70/17: 556–67. doi: 10.2307/2025310
   Google Scholar
• Lewis, D. 2000. Causation as Influence, The Journal of Philosophy 97/4: 182–97. doi: 10.2307/2678389
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• List, C. and P. Menzies 2009. Nonreductive Physicalism and the Limits of the Exclusion Principle, The Journal of Philosophy 106/9: 475–502. doi: 10.5840/jphil2009106936
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Loar, B. 2002. Phenomenal States, in Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, ed. D.J. Chalmers, New York: Oxford University Press: 296–311.
   Google Scholar
• Loewer, B. 2007. Mental Causation, or Something Near Enough, in Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, ed. B.P. McLaughlin and J. Cohen, Oxford: Blackwell: 243–64.
   Google Scholar
• Lowe, E.J. 2000. Causal Closure Principles and Emergentism, Philosophy 75/4: 571–85. doi: 10.1017/S003181910000067X
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• McLaughlin, B.P. 1992. The Rise and Fall of British Emergentism, in Emergence or Reduction? Essays on the Prospects of Nonreductive Physicalism, ed. A. Beckermann, H. Flohr, and J. Kim, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter: 49–93.
   Google Scholar
• McLaughlin, B. 2001. In Defense of New Wave Materialism: A Response to Horgan and Tienson, in Physicalism and Its Discontents, ed. C. Gillett and B. Loewer, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 319–30.
   Google Scholar
• McLaughlin, B.P. 2008. Emergence and Supervenience, in Emergence: Contemporary Readings in Philosophy and Science, ed. M. Bedau, and P. Humphreys, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press: 81–97.
   Google Scholar
• O’Connor, T. and H.Y. Wong 2015. Emergent Properties, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2015 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/properties-emergent
   Google Scholar
• Papineau, D. 2001. The Rise of Physicalism, in Physicalism and Its Discontents, ed. C. Gillett and B. Loewer, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 3–36.
   Google Scholar
• Papineau, D. 2013. Causation Is Macroscopic but Not Irreducible, in Mental Causation and Ontology, ed. S.C. Gibb, E.J. Lowe, and R.D. Ingthorsson, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 126–52.
   Google Scholar
• Paul, L.A. 2007. Constitutive Overdetermination, in Causation and Explanation, ed. J.K. Campbell, M. O’Rourke, and H.S. Silverstein, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press: 265–90.
   Google Scholar
• Raatikainen, P. 2010. Causation, Exclusion, and the Special Sciences, Erkenntnis 73/3: 349–63. doi: 10.1007/s10670-010-9236-0
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Robb, D. and J. Heil 2014. Mental Causation, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/mental-causation
   Google Scholar
• Russell, B. 1913. On the Notion of Cause, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 13/1: 1–26. doi: 10.1093/aristotelian/13.1.1
   Google Scholar
• Salmon, W. 1984. Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Schafer, J. 2003. Overdetermining Causes, Philosophical Studies 114/1–2: 23–45. doi: 10.1023/A:1024457117218
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Shoemaker, S. 2007. Physical Realization, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
   Google Scholar
• Sider, T. 2003. What’s So Bad about Overdetermination? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67/3: 719–26. doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00321.x
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Spinoza, B. 1677 (1985). Ethics, ed. E. Curley, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Thomasson, A. 1998. A Nonreductivist Solution to Mental Causation, Philosophical Studies 89/2–3: 181–95. doi: 10.1023/A:1004280812099
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Wilson, J. 2013. Nonlinearity and Metaphysical Emergence, in Metaphysics and Science, ed. S. Mumford and M. Tugby, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 201–29.
   Google Scholar
• Wilson, J. 2016. Metaphysical Emergence: Weak and Strong, in Metaphysics in Contemporary Physics, ed. T. Bigaj and C. Wüthrich, Leiden: Brill Rodopi: 345–402.
   Google Scholar
• Woodward, J. 2003. Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation, New York: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Woodward, J. 2008. Mental Causation and Neural Mechanisms, in Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation, ed. J. Hohwy and J. Kallestrup Oxford: Oxford University Press: 218–62.
   Google Scholar
• Woodward, J. 2015. Interventionism and Causal Exclusion, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91/2: 303–47. doi: 10.1111/phpr.12095
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Yablo, S. 1992. Mental Causation, The Philosophical Review 101/2: 245–80. doi: 10.2307/2185535
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Zhong, L. 2011. Can Counterfactuals Solve the Exclusion Problem? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83/1: 129–47. doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00415.x
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Zhong, L. 2014. Sophisticated Exclusion and Sophisticated Causation, The Journal of Philosophy 111/7: 341–60. doi: 10.5840/jphil2014111724
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Zhong, L. 2017. Semantic Normativity and Semantic Causality, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94/3: 626–45. doi: 10.1111/phpr.12231
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar