Deflationary Theories of Properties and Their Ontology

References

• Armour-Garb, Bradley and James A. Woodbridge 2015. Pretense and Pathology: Philosophical Fictionalism and Its Applications, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Azzouni, Jody 2004. Deflating Existential Consequence: A Case for Nominalism, New York: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Balaguer, Mark 2009. Fictionalism, Theft, and the Story of Mathematics, Philosophia Mathematica 17/2: 131–62.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Båve, Arvid 2015. A Deflationist Error Theory of Properties, Dialectica 69/1: 23–59.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Boolos, George 1984. To Be Is to Be a Value of a Variable (or to Be Some Values of Some Variables), The Journal of Philosophy 81/8: 430–49.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Button, Tim 2014. The Weight of Truth: Lessons for Minimalists from Russell’s Gray’s Elegy Argument, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114/3: 261–89.
   Google Scholar
• Craig, William and Robert L. Vaught 1958. Finite Axiomatizability Using Additional Predicates, The Journal of Symbolic Logic 23/3: 289–308.
   Google Scholar
• Devitt, Michael 1980. ‘Ostrich Nominalism’ or ‘Mirage Realism’? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 61/4: 433–9.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Dixon, T. Scott 2018. Upward Grounding, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97/1: 48–78.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Field, Hartry 1994. Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content, Mind 103/411: 249–85.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hofweber, Thomas 2006. Inexpressible Properties and Propositions, in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Vol. 2, ed. Dean Zimmerman, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 155–206.
   Google Scholar
• Hofweber, Thomas 2016. Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Horwich, Paul 1998a. Meaning, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
   Google Scholar
• Horwich, Paul 1998b. Truth (2^nd edn), New York: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Imaguire, Guido 2018. Priority Nominalism: Grounding Ostrich Nominalism as a Solution to the Problem of Universals, Cham: Springer International.
   Google Scholar
• Jones, N.K. 2018. Nominalist Realism, Noûs 52/4: 808–35.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kleene, S.C. 1952. Finite Axiomatizability of Theories in the Predicate Calculus Using Additional Predicate Symbols, Memoirs of the American Mathematical Society 10: 27–68.
   Google Scholar
• Lewis, David 1985. Languages and Language, in The Philosophy of Language, ed. A.P. Martinich, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 381–400.
   Google Scholar
• Linnebo, Øystein 2012. Metaontological Minimalism, Philosophy Compass 7/2: 139–51.
   Google Scholar
• Linnebo, Øystein 2017. Plural Quantification, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017 Edition), ed. E.N. Zalta, URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/plural-quant
   Google Scholar
• Parsons, Charles 1983. Sets and Classes, in his Mathematics in Philosophy: Selected Essays, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press: 209–20.
   Google Scholar
• Parsons, Josh 1999. There Is No ‘Truthmaker’ Argument Against Nominalism, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77/3: 325–34.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Quine, Willard Van Orman 1960. Word and Object, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Schindler, Thomas and Julian J. Schlöder ms. The Proper Formulation of the Minimalist Theory of Truth.
   Google Scholar
• Schiffer, Stephen 2003. The Things We Mean, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Schulte, Peter 2019. Grounding Nominalism, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100/2: 482–505.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Trueman, Robert 2021. Properties and Propositions: The Metaphysics of Higher-Order Logic, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Van Cleve, James 1994. Predication without Universals? A Fling with Ostrich Nominalism, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54/3: 577–90.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• van Inwagen, Peter 2004. A Theory of Properties, in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Vol.1, ed. Dean Zimmerman, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 107–38.
   Google Scholar
• Williamson, Timothy 2013. Modal Logic as Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar