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Australasian Journal of Philosophy Volume 51, 1973 - Issue 1
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Original Articles

Is there a good argument against the incorrigibility thesis?

Frank Jackson La Trobe University
Pages 51-62 | Received 01 Nov 1972, Published online: 18 Sep 2006

References

  • For careful discussions of how to define incorrigibility and related notions see Alston W. Varieties of Privileged Access American Philosophical Quarterly 1971 8 223 241 and G. Nakhnikian: ‘Incorrigibility’, Philosophical Quarterly 18 (1968) pp. 207–15.
  • Armstrong , D.M. 1963 . Is Introspective Knowledge Incorrigible? . Philosophical Review , LXII : 417 – 432 . p. 420; the argument also appears in his A Materialism Theory of the Mind (1968) p. 104.
  • A Materialist Theory of the Mind 104 – 105 . the argument also appears in ‘Is Introspective Knowledge Incorrigible?’, pp. 420–1.
  • Imlay , R.A. 1969 . Immediate Awareness . Dialogue , 8 : 228 – 242 . see pp. 235–6.
  • Locke , D. 1967 . Perception and Our Knowledge of the External World See p. 191.
  • Ayer , A.J. 1954 . “ Basic Propositions ” . In Philosophical Essays See pp. 63–4.
  • Ayer , A.J. 1954 . “ Basic Propositions ” . In Philosophical Essays 191 – 191 . n.2.
  • Chandler , J.H. 1970 . Incorrigibility and Classification . Australasian Journal of Philosophy , 48 : 101 – 106 . see p. 104.
  • Chandler , J.H. 1970 . Incorrigibility and Classification . Australasian Journal of Philosophy , 48 : 422 – 422 .
  • See e.g. , Armstrong Is Introspective Knowledge Incorrigible? Philosophical Review 1963 LXII 417 432 B. Medlin: Critical notice of Ayer's The Concept of a Person, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 42 (1964) pp. 412–31; J. J. C. Smart: Philosophy and Scientific Realism (1963) p. 100; J. L. Mackie: ‘Are There Any Incorrigible Empirical Statements?’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 41 (1963) pp. 12–28.
  • 1963 . Is Introspective Knowledge Incorrigible? . Philosophical Review , LXII : 417 – 432 . see pp. 422–3.
  • 1963 . Is Introspective Knowledge Incorrigible? . Philosophical Review , LXII : 423 – 423 .
  • 1963 . Is Introspective Knowledge Incorrigible? . Philosophical Review , LXII : 106 – 107 .
  • 1967 . Perception and Our Knowledge of the External World 86 – 86 .
  • 1956 . The Problem of Knowledge Ch.2. sec. VI.
  • The quotation is from the reprinted version in Logic and Language Flew A.G.N. 1961 second series see p. 138.
  • I think this is the argument being offered by Parsons Kathryn Pyne Mistaking Sensations Philosophical Review 1970 LXXIX in see pp. 201–2.

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