Don't care was made to care

References

• Haack , R.J. 1971 . No Need for Nonsense . this journal , 49 : 71 – 77 . Page references in the text are to this article. Overlapping criticisms may be found in E. Erwin: The Concept of Meaninglessness (1970).
   Google Scholar
• The point is elaborated in Goddard L. Nonsignificance this journal 1970 48 10 10
   Google Scholar
• Both here, and at other places in the paper, we have used quote marks to double as quotation functions. In fact the procedure of using English quotation marks both as functions and as name-forming is a familiar one, going back at least to Russell's earlier work. On the relevant quotation function ‘qa’ see e.g. Goddard Routley Nonsignificance this journal 1970 48 10 10 chapter 2
   Google Scholar
• Details are set out in Goddard Nonsignificance this journal 1970 48 10 10 and in L. Goddard and R. Routley: The Logic of Significance and Context, vol. 1 (1972).
   Google Scholar
• Goddard . 1970 . Nonsignificance . this journal , 48 : 10 – 10 .
   Google Scholar
• Quine , W.V.O. 1960 . Word and Object 229 – 229 . Quine is of course only one, and a fairly late member, of the succession of philosophers who have peddled this view. Philosophers tend to suffer especially badly from reduction neuroses.
   Google Scholar
• Quine , W.V.O. 1960 . Word and Object 229 – 229 .
   Google Scholar
• Quine , W.V.O. 1960 . Word and Object 229 – 229 .
   Google Scholar
• Routley , R. 1969 . The Need for Nonsense . this journal , 47 : 367 – 374 . The charge was that on this point Quine's philosophy is inconsistent, not Haack's misrepresentation of the charge (on p. 73). However we are prepared to enlarge the charge, to please Haack, to (i) Quine is committed to a distinction between nonsense and falsity in his discussion of quantified intensional statements, and (ii) Word and Object is inconsistent.
   Google Scholar
• Quine . 1960 . Word and Object 166 – 167 .
   Google Scholar
• Quine . 1960 . Word and Object 229 – 229 . 166–167
   Google Scholar
• We have the impression, too, that Quine cares a bit more about truths than about falsehoods. But not all that much more: see Routley R. Quine's proof that God Exists (unpublished)
   Google Scholar
• This is more clearly revealed in Quine's earlier writings, though the same thesis underlies craftier later work such as Word and Object
   Google Scholar
• Presley , C.F. 1962 . Arguments about Meaninglessness . British Journal for Philosophy of Science , : 225 – 234 .
   Google Scholar
• Erwin . 1970 . The Concept of Meaninglessness 135 – 136 .
   Google Scholar
• Erwin . 1970 . The Concept of Meaninglessness 135 – 136 .
   Google Scholar
• Erwin . 1970 . The Concept of Meaninglessness 134 – 134 . The further arguments, that ‘“meaninglessness” in the sense of “neither true nor false”’ should be abandoned, are presented on pages 136–8.
   Google Scholar
• As details in Goddard Routley The Logic of Significance and Context 1972 1 make plain
   Google Scholar
• Goddard and Routley . 1972 . The Logic of Significance and Context , 1
   Google Scholar
• Brady , R. “ Significance Logics ” . In Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic forthcoming; see also Goddard and Routley, op. cit.
   Google Scholar
• Goddard , L. 1970 . Nonsignificance . this journal , 48 : 10 – 10 .
   Google Scholar
• A set of detailed objection to both these positions, the rejection as ungrammatical position and the truth-valued reclassification line, may be found in Goddard Routley The Logic of Significance and Context 1972 1 chapter 4
   Google Scholar
• Details of the semantics of quantified significance logics are set out in Goddard Routley The Logic of Significance and Context 1972 1 chapter 7, and a way in which sense and reference can be defined in terms of the underlying significance theory is sketched in chapter 3.
   Google Scholar
• Goddard and Routley . 1972 . The Logic of Significance and Context , 1
   Google Scholar