- Preface to William J. Richardson, S. J., Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1963) pp. xiv–xv.
- Dudley Shapere's phrase. Cf. his “Meaning and Scientific Change,” in Robert G. Colodny (ed.). Mind and Cosmos (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1966) p. 50.
- An account of this way is to be found in the essay “Phenomenology as the Science of Science” in Joseph J. Kockelmans and Theodore J. Kisiel, Phenomenology and the Natural Sciences (Evanston: Northwestern U.P., 1970) pp. 5–44.
- Edmund Husserl, Erste Philosophie (1923–24) Vol. II, Husserliana VIII, ed. R. Boehm (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1959) p. 358.
- Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Primacy of Perception and other essays, ed. James M. Edie (Evanston, Northwestern U.P., 1964) p. 29.
- Edmund Husserl, Phänomenologische Psychologie (1925), Husserliana IX, ed. Walter Biemal (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1962) p. 302.
- Cf. Philosophie der Arithmetik, ed. Lothar Eley, Husserliana XII (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1970) pp. 210–211n.
- Ibid., p. 119. This particular critique of Frege still holds, I believe, despite Husserl's general retraction of these pages in the Logical Investigations, transl. J. N. Findlay (New York: Humanities, 1970) vol. I, § 45, p. 179n. Cf. Marvin Farber, The Foundation of Phenomenology (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard U.P., 1943) p. 38.
- Op. cit., §§ 4. 54 and 71.
- The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, transl. David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern U.P., 1970) § 9g, p. 46. My free rendering of this passage.
- Ibid., Appendix I, p. 295.
- Ibid., § 2, p. 5. Menschliches Dasein is here translated as “life” by me in keeping with its ties with the life world.
- Eugen Fink. “The Phenomenological Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Contemporary Criticism,” in The Phenomenology of Husserl, transl. R. O. Elveton (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1970) pp. 73–147. esp. 77–83.
- The Primacy of Perception, p. 34.
- Cf.Kockelmans and Kisiel, op. cit., pp. 265–273.
- § 36, p. 139.
- Herbert Marcuse, “On Science and Phenomenology,” in Robert S. Cohen and Marx W. Wartofsky (editors), Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. H (New York: Humanities. 1965) p. 285.
- J. N. Mohanty, Edmund Husserl's Theory of Meaning (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1964) p. 145.
- John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (New York: Holt, 1938) pp. 19, 23, 245–6.
- Jean Cavaillès, “On Logic and the Theory of Science,” in Kockelmans and Kisiel, op. cit., pp. 351, 401–8.
- Ibid., pp. 404–9.
- Suzanne Bachelard, “Phenomenology and Mathematical Physics,” Ibid., p. 516.
- Theodore Kisiel, “Husserl on the History of Science,” Ibid., pp. 85–88. Cf. also the two essays by Jean Ladrière in this collection.
- Ibid., p. 408.
- Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, New Orleans, October 28–30, 1971.
- Crisis, pp. 372–3.
- Edmund Husserl. Erfahrung und Urteil (Hamburg: Claassen. 3, 1964) pp. 44, 239–240. Cf. Suzanne Bachelard, A Study of Husseri's Formal and Transcendental Logic, transl. Lester E. Embree (Evanston: Northwestern U.P., 1968) pp. 153–4; Robert Sokolowski, The Formation of Husserl's Concept of Constitution The Hague: Nijhoff, 1964) pp. 171–2. The need to methodically “zigzag” (e.g. Crisis, § 9g, p. 58) in analysing the sedimented strata is itself an affirmation of their intertwining and interplay.
- Perhaps even the term “teleology” no longer applies to Heidegger's later metaphor of the “woodpath” which abruptly trails off into the untrodden, which meanders within the wood without leading to anywhere outside. Cf. Hannah Arendt, “Martin Heidegger at Eighty,” The New York Review of Books XVII, No. 6 (October 21, 1971) pp. 50–54, esp. p. 51. Heidegger's description of his own Denkweg is thus described as “the attempt to walk a path of which I did not know where it would lead. I know only the most immediate short-range perspectives along that path, because they beckoned to me unceasingly, while the horizon shifted and darkened more than once.” On the Way to Language, transl. Peter D. Hertz (New York: Harper & Row, 1971) p. 6.
- Preface to Richardson, op. cit., pp. XIV–XV.
- New Scholasticism 42 (1968) 511–536. But he concludes by suggesting how a philosophy of science could be developed within a Heideggerian framework.
- Martin Heidegger, Zur Sache des Denkens (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1969) p. 82. “Yet I remained so struck by Husserl's work that in the following years I read it again and again without sufficient insight into just what fascinated me.”
- “Neuere Forschungen über Logik,” Literarische Rundschau für das katholische Deutschland 38 (1912) column 467.
- Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1957) pp. 11, 357.
- Logical Investigations I, § 11, p. 71.
- Ibid., §§ 6, 63. Cf. Gerd Brand, Gesellschaft und persönliche Geschichte (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1972) pp. 16 ff. Working out of the Husserlian tradition, this book bases itself precisely on the notion of rationality as Begründungszusammenhang.
- Ibid., § 8, p. 67. Compare Heidegger's review of Charles Sentroul's Kant und Aristoteles, in Literarische Rundschau für das katholische Deutschland 40 (1914), esp. column 332. Here (c. 331) Kant's problematic is said to belong to the philosophy of science. In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1925–9), Heidegger turns against his neo-Kantian upbringing by taking Kant's problematic as fundamentally metaphysical.
- The subtitle is Untersuchungen über die Grundfragen der Logik (Leipzig: Wilhelm Engelmann, 1908). Heidegger first cites this work in “Neuere Forschungen über Logik” (1912c. 5n. 2, along with Heinrich Rickert's Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis (Tübingen: Mohr, 2, 1904), where the issue of the goal of science is raised on pp. 1, 8, 28. 173. 204. Cf. also Heinrich Rickert, Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung (Tübingen: Mohr, 1902) pp. III. 31. 36. 49. 103. 117. 124. 139. 680.
- Iso Kern. Husserl und Kant (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1964) p. 33.
- Jonas Cohn, Voraussetzungen und Ziele des Erkennens, pp. 2–6, 318–334, 353–361, 404–5, 426, 451–2.
- “‘Doctrine of categories’ is the usual name of the discussion of the Being of beings.” On the Way to Language, p. 6.
- “Der Zeitbegriff in der Geschichtswissenschaft,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik 161 (1916) pp. 173–188; p. 173.
- Ibid., p. 175.
- Ibid., p. 176n.
- Ibid., p. 174.
- Ibid., p. 178.
- Ibid., p. 183.
- Sein und Zeit, p. 393.
- Cf. the first enclosure to Heidegger's letter of October 22, 1927, to Husserl, in Phänomenologische Psychologie, p. 601. Husserl's letters to Ingarden of the same period document the beginnings of his disenchantment with Heidegger. April 9, 1927: “You simply must go to Marburg to experience at first hand Prof. Heidegger's great and earnest originality.” November 19, 1927: “Heidegger has become my close friend and I consider myself one of his admirers, which makes me regret all the more that his work (and his lectures as well) in method and content appear to be essentially different from mine, and at least at the moment none of our mutual students have provided any bridge between us. A great deal is at stake for future philosophy on how and whether he works his way through to an understanding of my general intuitions. Unfortunately, I had nothing to do with his philosophical formation, he evidently had already developed his unique style when he studied my writings. He is now a power house, absolutely honest and ambitious, directed simply to the things themselves. Every great onesidedness, that of genuinely self-made thinkers, blazes the trail to what is new. Let us hope so.” December 26. 1927: “I allow myself to become depressed by the kind of impact that my publications have and by the fact that my better students overlook the depth dimension that I point to and, instead of finishing what I have started, time and again prefer to go their own way. So also Heidegger, this natural power of a genius, who carries all the youth away with him, so that they now consider (which is not at all his opinion) my methodic style to be out of date and my results to be part of a passing era. And this from one of the closest of my personal friends.
- …The new article for the Encyclopaedia Britannica has cost me great deal of effort, chiefly because I again thought through from the ground up my basic direction and took into account the fact that Heidegger, as I now must believe, has not understood this direction and thus the entire sense of the method of phenomenological reduction.” Edmund Husserl, Briefe an Roman Ingarden (The Hague: Nijhoff. 1968) pp. 39. 41. 42. 43.
- Martin Heidegger, The Essence of Reasons, transl. Terrence Malick (Evanston: Northwestern U.P., 1969) pp. 24–6. We revert to this issue of the factual content of science in view of Aron Gurwitsch's suggestion that phenomenology no longer takes science as a fact but as a problem. Cf. his “Comments on the Paper by Herbert Marcuse,” Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, ed. Robert S. Cohen and Marx W. Wartofsky (New York: Humanities, 1965) vol. II, 291–306.
- Ibid., pp. 118–9.
- Martin Heidegger, Der Satz vom Grund (Pfullingen: Neske, 1957) p. 125; An Introduction to Metaphysics, transl. Ralph Manheim (New Haven: Yale U.P., 1959) p. 60.
- Sein und Zeit, p. 150. The English translation of this text translates Vorhabe, Vorsicht and Vorgriff as “fore-having,” “fore-sight” and “fore-conception”.
- Ibid., p. 151.
- “Neuere Forschungen über Logik,” c. 521.
- Sein und Zeit. p. 363. Cf. Martin Heidegger, What is a Thing? transl. W. B. Barton, Jr., and Vera Deutsch Chicago: Regnery, 1967) pp. 65–6.
- Ibid., p. 357.
- “Der Zeitbegriff in der Geschichtswissenschaft” p. 176n. Sein und Zeit, p. 362; What is a Thing? pp. 66–8; Holzwege (Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 3, 1957) p. 70. In this way Heidegger retains the basic insight of Kant's philosophy of science.
- Sein und Zeit, p. 363. The Husserlian terminology of “theme” and “object” has been amplified in particular by the school of Aron Gurwitsch. Cf. his The Field of Consciousness (Pittsburgh: Duquesne U.P., 1964) and Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology (Evanston: Northwestern U.P., 1966) pp. 182ff. Also Richard M. Zaner, The Way of Phenomenology (New York: Pegasus, 1970) pp. 115–7.
- What is a Thing? p. 73; Holzwege, p. 72.
- Erste Philosophie II, pp. 249–250. This manuscript dates from 1921, i.e. during the time of Heidegger's assistantship to Husserl.
- Sein und Zeit, pp. 9–11.
- Cf. Theodore Kisiel; “Zu einer Hermeneutik naturwissenschaftlicher Entdeckung,” Zeitschrift für allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie II (1971), no. 3. An earlier and shorter English version of this text is to be found in David Carr and Edward Casey (ed.), The Phenomenological Horizon (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1972). cf. esp. note 10.
- What is a Thing?, pp. 91–5.
- A brief summary of his reading of the origin of modernity in relation to science may at least suggest the overall style of his account.
- In the medieval period of truth founded on faith, natural knowledge did not have its own grounds or independent foundations. With the rejection of the tradition, a new freedom toward self-grounding arose. Man no longer conceives of himself as a creature, but as a subject who freely proposes his objects to himself. The certitudes of faith are replaced by the self-certitude of the human subject. Everything becomes subject to the absolutely certain axiom of the Cogito and Volo. Because man falls back strictly on his own resources, the mathematical posits itself as the authoritative principle of knowledge and binds itself to self-imposed obligations. The spirit of modernity thereby becomes the spirit of the mathesis universalis, the System. Man now creates his own order: he proposes to himself what is to be known, determines in advance the principles he needs to reach this goal, assures his way by means of the controls of calculative thinking. Within the mathematical project, the dimension of the point of view becomes absolutized into a worldview. The how becomes all-important, method usurps science. Scientific research becomes an indispensable form of the planning and conquest that enter into fulfillment of the worldview. The newly declared freedom of modernity manifests itself in the form of the thought experiments of idealization, what Einstein later characterized as the free invention of hypothesizing. The scientist enters into the Zeitgeist of the will to power. Not that the individual scientist acts outside of all controls. The axiom of the Cogito and Volo manifests itself more in the fact that the final tribunal for the paradigms of science lies in the scientific community, which sometimes exerts a communal dogmatism that smacks of the old ecclesiastical dogmatism of the middle ages.
- This Zeitgeist of modernity now leaves its mark on the what, how and conceptual medium of science. Scientific domains are objectively secured, sharply divided and distributed to distinct disciplines for their control and regulation. The objectifying approach adjusts and reworks a domain in order to be able to “count on” it. The clear and distinct categories of the subject-object relation permit self-assured speculation on the one hand, experimental confirmation on the other. Facts themselves are sharply defined through measurement in order to subject them to the rigorous control of the formalized schemes necessitated by the subject-object relation. The spirit of confirmation overshadows its circuit with the inaugurating project to the point that science is defined in terms of its context of justification. The vagaries of the context of discovery are systematically excluded or explained away in terms of the “free invention” of the scientific “genius”.
- Zur Sache des Denkens, pp. 69–70.
- Perceptive readers may have already noticed a certain overlap in Heidegger's conception of the mathematical and the hermeneutical. I have tried to clarify this in a paper entitled “The Mathematical and the Hermeneutical: On Heidegger's Notion of the Apriori,” read at the Heidegger Conference meeting at DePaul University in Chicago on March 25, 1972.
- Martin Heidegger, Vorträge und Aufsätze (Pfullingen: Neske, 1954) pp. 67–8.
Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology
Volume 4, 1973 - Issue 3