Early Heidegger and Wittgenstein: The Necessity of a Comprehension of Being

References

• Sein und Zeit, 8th ed. (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1957). Hereafter, SZ. We will confine our attention, as the title of this piece suggests, to the early Heidegger, i.e. principally the Heidegger of SZ, and the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, translated by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961).
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• SZ, pp. 33, 54, 214–215. Throughout we are translating Aussage as “assertion,” unless otherwise noted. All translations are my own.
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• Vom Wesen der Wahrheit, 3rd ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1954), pp. 11–12. Hereafter, WW.
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• SZ, p. 220.
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• “…nur durch diese Offenständigheit des Verhaltens die richtigkeit (Wahrheit) der Aussage möglich wird…” (WW, p. 12).
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• Vom Wesen des Grundes, 4th ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1953), p. 13. Hereafter, WG.
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• SZ p. 216.
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• SZ, pp. 85–86.
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• WG, pp. 12–13.
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• SZ, pp. 32–33, 154, 218–219.
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• SZ, pp. 33, 158.
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• SZ, pp. 33, 154–155, 159.
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• SZ, p. 160.
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• SZ, pp. 153, 158, 224.
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• “Das in der Vorhabe gehaltene Seiende, der Hammer zum Beispiel, ist zunächst zuhänden als Zeug. Wird dieses Seiende ‘Gegenstand’ einer Aussage, dann vollzieht sich mit dem Aussageansatz im vorhinein ein Umschlag in der Vorhabe. Das zuhandene Womit des Zutunhabens, der Verrichtung, wird zum “Worüber’ der aufzeigenden Aussage. Die Vorsicht zielt auf ein Vorhandenes am Zuhandenen. Durch die Hin-sicht und für sie wird das Zuhandene als Zuhandenes verhüllt.” (SZ, pp. 157–158).
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• SZ, pp. 84–88, 148–151.
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• SZ, pp. 33, 158.
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• “So kann die Aussage ihre ontologische Herkunft aus der verstehenden Auslegung nicht verleugnen. Das ursprüngliche ‘Als’ der unsichtig verstehenden Auslegung (ερυηνεία) nennen wir das existenzial-hermeneutische ‘Als’ im Unterschied vom apophantischen ‘Als’ der Aussage. (SZ, p. 158).
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• SZ, p. 69.
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• SZ, p. 84.
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• SZ, p. 84.
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• SZ, pp. 68, 83–84, 145–151.
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• SZ, p. 84.
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• SZ, p. 158.
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• SZ, pp. 69, 83, 158.
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• SZ, pp. 68–69, 138, 356–364.
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• SZ, p. 153.
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• SZ, p. 8.
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• SZ, p. 152.
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• SZ, p. 150.
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• SZ, p. 149.
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• SZ, p. 150.
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• SZ, p. 150.
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• SZ, p. 153.
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• Tractatus, 4.1212.
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• Tractatus, 6. 53.
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• Tractatus, 6. 53.
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• SZ, pp. 25–26.
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• Identität und Differenz (Pfullingen: Neske, 1957), pp. 46–47.
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• Tractatus, 4.115.
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• “What any picture, of whatever form, must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it—correctly or incorrectly—in any way at all is logical form, i.e. the form of reality.” (Tractatus, 2.18).
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• “Propositions can represent the whole of reality, but they cannot represent what they have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it—logical form.” (Tractatus, 4.12).
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• Tractatus, 4.121.
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• Tractatus, 6.44. The nature of the mystical in Wittgenstein is, of course, a much mooted point. Stenius, for example, distinguishes between two types of things that cannot be said: “…that which can be shown in language but not said, and that which can neither be shown nor said.” (Wittgenstein's Tractatus: A Critical Exposition of its Main Lines of Thought (Oxford: Blackwell, 1960), p. 223). He interprets Wittgenstein as meaning that the latter is nonsense unworthy of our attention (pp. 222–226). George Pitcher is also of the same opinion. See, The Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1964), pp. 161–162; as is James Morrison, Meaning and Truth in Wittgenstein's Tractatus (The Hague: Mouton, 1968), pp. 137–145. Other commentators interpret the role of the mystical in Wittgenstein's thought much more positively, and this is the interpretation which we are following. See for example Alexander Maslow, Wittgenstein's Tractatus (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961), pp. 154–162; G.E.M. Anscombe, An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus (New York: Harper and Row, 1959), pp. 161–173; Eddy Zemack, “Wittgenstein's Philosophy of the Mystical,” Essays On Wittgenstein's Tractatus, edited by I.M. Copi and R.W. Beard (New York: Macmillan, 1966), pp. 359–375; and Jürgen Habermas, “Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften,” Philosophische Rundschau, Beiheft V, 1967, p. 129.
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• Tractatus, 5.552.
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• See for example Ingvar Horgby, “The Double Awareness in Heidegger and Wittgenstein,” Inquiry, II (1959), 235–264.
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• Tractatus, 5.552. We are here following the translation of the German so by “thus” which is given by Anscombe, op. cit., p. 165.
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• Tractatus, 3.221.
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• Tractatus, 2.02.
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• Tractatus, 3.261.
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• Tractatus, 2.021.
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• We are here following the interpretation of Anscombe, op. cit., p. 165.
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• Tractatus, 3.221.
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• Tractatus, 3.221.
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• Tractatus, 5.552.
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• On this point see for example Anscombe, op. cit., p. 165.
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• Tractatus, 6.44.
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• Tractatus, 6.522.
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• This lecture has been published in the Philosophical Review, LXXIV (1965), 8.
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• “Einzig der Mensch unter allem Seienden erfährt, angeruffen von der Stimme des Seins, das Wunder aller Wunder: Dass Seiendes ist.” Was ist Metaphysik? 7th ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1949), pp. 46–47.
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• In conversation with Waismann concerning Heidegger which occurred in the same year as the lecture on ethics, Wittgenstein also mentions the “amazement that something is.” The whole tenor of the conversation is one of deep appreciation for the task that Heidegger was attempting and should be read in full. Space permits us to quote only the following here: “Ich dann mir wohl denken, was Heidegger mit Sein und Angst meint. Der Mensch hat den Trieb, gegen die Grenzen der Sprache anzurennen. Denken Sie z.B. an das Erstaunen, dass et was existiert. Das Erstaunen kann nicht in Form einer Frage ausgedrückt werden, und es gibt auch gar keine Antwort. Alles, was wir sagen mögen, kann a priori nur Unsinn sein. Trozdem rennen wir gegen die Grenze der Sprache an…Aber die Tendenz, das Anrennen, deutet auf etwas hin.” Friedrich Waismann: Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis, edited by B. F. McGuinness (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967), pp. 68–69.
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• “Gleichwohol sagt schon Parmenides in Früzeit des Denkens ἔoτι γαρ εἶναι: Es ist nämlich Sein. In diesem Wort verbirgt sich das anfängliche Geheimis für alles Denkens.” Über den Humanismus (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1947), p. 22.
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• “Logic is prior to every experience—that something is thus.” Tractatus, 5.552.
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• This seems to be the force of the argument of the last sentence in 5.552 and the statements of the next section, 5.5521: “It (logic) is prior to the question ‘How?’ not prior to the question ‘What?’ (5.552). And if this were not so, how could we apply logic? We might put it in this way: if there would be a logic even if there were no world, how then could there be a logic given that there is a world?” (5.5521). He seems to be saying that the primordial grasp that the world is is necessary if there is to be any logic at all.
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