Husserl and Heidegger on Intentionality and Being

References

• An earlier form of this paper was published in French under the title “Transcendance et intentionnalité: Heidegger et Husserl sur les prolégomènes d'une ontologie phénoménologique” in, Heidegger et l'idée de la phénoménologie, (Phaenomenologica 108), Boston-London-Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988, pp. 195–215. Translation by P. Buckley, S. Spileers and the author.
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• M. Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena, trans. T. Kisiel (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1985). All references with just page number are to this text (translation occasionally altered), followed by a noting of the original German text: Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs (Frankfurt a.M., Klostermann, 1979), GA 20. Other references to the Gesamtausgabe give the volume number followed by the year in which the lecture was delivered.
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• M. Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. A. Hofstadter (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1982) p. 57. Hereafter referred to in the text as BP. Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (Frankfurt a.M., Klostermann, 1975) GA 24 (1927), p. 80.
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• M. Heidegger, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, trans. M. Heim (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1984) pp. 150, 153, 165, 182. Hereafter referred to in the text as MFL. Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik (Frankfurt a. M., Klostermann, 1978); GA 26 (1928), pp. 189, 194, 211, 234.
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• See also BP, pp. 56 ff; GA 24 (1927), pp. 78 ff.
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• E. Husserl, Logical Investigations, “Investigation V”; § 17: “…one must distinguish…between the object as it is intended (der Gegenstand, so wie er intendiert ist) and simply the object which is intended” (der Gegenstand, welcher intendiert ist).
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• See also BP, Pi 68; GA 24 (1927), p. 96.
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• In the Basic Problems of Phenomenology, GA 24 (1927), Heidegger resumes and extends this analysis of the ontological significance of the internum in a discussion which is no longer dedicated to Husserl but rather to perception and the notion of position (Setzung) in Kant (see especially § 9b-c). This new analysis of “the perceivedness of the perceived” (Wahrgenommenheit des Wahrgenommenen) reveals profound resemblances to the course of 1925 (GA 20) on the fact that the “perceivedness of the perceived” or the “extantness of the extant” (Vorhandenheit des Vorhandenen) are revealed only on the basis of a comprehension of the being of Dasein. Notably, it is shown that this comprehension of the “extantness of the extant” is a “disclosedness of being” (Erschlossenheil des Seins) realized by the existential transcendence of Dasein.
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• See the parallel passage in BP, p. 69; GA 24 (1927), p. 97.
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• See MFL, pp. 150, 153, 165, 182; GA 26(1928), pp. 189, 194,211,234.
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• See also Br, pp. 65, 313; GA 24 (1927), pp. 91, 446.
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• See BP, p. 313; GA 24 (1927), p. 447. MFL, pp. 165, 196; GA 26 (1928), pp. 211, 253.
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• See BP, pp. 59–61, 65, 313; GA 24 (1927), pp. 83–85, 91, 446.
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• In a lecture course a short time before the publication of Ideas, Husserl defines what he calls the “distinctio phaenomenologica” as an essential moment of phenomenological reduction: see Husserliana XIII, p. 144 (1910/11).
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• See the way in which Heidegger presents the phenomenological “bracketing” (Einklammerung). “This bracketing of the entity…this reversal of perspective has rather the sense of making the being of the entity present”, (p. 99; GA 20 (1925), p. 136.
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• This view by Heidegger can be traced back at least to 1919–1921. See “Anmerkungen zu Karl Jaspers ‘Psychologie der Weltanschauungen’” in Wegmarken (GA 9), where Heidegger relates “intentio” (Bezugscharakter) to the character of performance (Vollzugscharakter: also often named Vollzugssinn) of intentionality (p. 22).
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• See for example BP, p. 63; GA 24 (1927), p. 89.
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• See for example MFL, pp. 135, 168; GA 26 (1928), pp. 170, 215.
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• See MFL, pp. 153, 135, 196; GA 26 (1928), pp. 194, 170, 253.
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• See BP, pp. 69–72; GA 24 (1927), pp. 98–102.
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• MFL, p. 196; GA 26 (1928), p. 253.
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• See BP, p. 64; GA 24 (1927), p. 90.
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• BP, p. 65; GA 24 (1927), p. 91. More precisely, this scholastic terminology evokes the remark made by Kant in the preface to the Critique of Practical Reason: “I will only remind the reader that, though freedom is certainly the ratio essendi of the moral law, the moral law is the ratio cognoscendi of freedom.” (A 6) At first sight, this is merely a matter of verbal association, however, it is neither purely fortuitous nor devoid of significance. Is not transcendence a freedom which at first is imposed upon Dasein in the form of a restraint? And are the constraints of the intentional relationship to beings not derived from a freely chosen relationship to being?
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• See BP, p. 66; GA 24 (1927), p. 92.
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• See for example the unpublished manuscript A V 5, p. 11 (1933).
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• See MFL, pp. 137 ff. 214; GA 26 (1928), pp. 173 ff, 277.
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• See a note by Heidegger in E. Husserl, Phänomenologische Psychologie (Husserliana IX), p. 274: “In general, does not a world belong to the essence of the pure ego?”. See ibid also p. 275, footnote aid p. 601.
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• For further development of this point see R. Bemet, “Die Frige nach dem Ursprung der Zeit bei Husserl und Heidegger” in: Heidegger Studies, vol.3/4 (1987/88), pp. 89–104.
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