References
- cf. Gadamer, ‘Max Scheler—der Verschwender,’ p. 14 and Scheler, Späte Schriften, Gesammelte Schriften (G.W.) IX, p. 362.
- This information comes from Heidegger's 1964 letter to Manfred Frings, the editor of Scheler's Collected Works, which is cited in Frings' Nachwort to volume IX of the Collected Works (p.362). We know from Scheler's own correspondence at the time that he had found a lot to interest him in Heidegger's ‘very meaningful but strange’ book (letter to Märit Furtwängler written in July 1927, quoted in Mader, W., Max Scheler, p. 123).
- Heidegger, ‘In Memory of Max Scheler,’ p.159.
- Cf. Maria Scheler's Nachwort to Schriften aus dem Nachlaß I, G.W. X, pp. 507–8.
- All of these fragments are gathered in Volume IX of the Collected Works (Späte Schriften), published in 1975, pp.254–340. Pages 259–69 have been translated by Thomas Sheehan under the title ‘Reality and Resistance: On Being and Time, Section 43,’ in Listening, 12 (1977), pp.61–73. Maria Scheler also recalled that Scheler lectured in Cologne in 1927–28 on Heidegger's notion of homo curans (see G.W. IX, p.362).
- “Reality and Resistance,” p.72 (G.W. IX, pp.268–69).
- Ibid, p.63 (G.W. IX, p.260). Scheler goes on to claim that it is eros rather than dread which furnishes us with a growth of participation in being (G.W. IX, p.272).
- G.W. IX, p.292.
- Ibid., p.296.
- The revulsion which that aspect of Heidegger's thought occasioned is illumined by biographical details of Scheler's later years which reveal an almost childlike piety and yearning to belong to a maternal ‘church,’ focus of devotion and of trust. Without this, as he confided to Märit Furtwängler, he could not come to terms with the conflicts which his restless nature occasioned. He continued to visit the Benedictine monasteries of Beuron and Maria Laach in those years when he had supposedly left the community of faith, and a visit to Rome in 1924 was like a spiritual homecoming for him. He felt that his religious life had not disappeared but was being transformed in the direction of his metaphysics (cf. Mader, op. cit., pp.101–2 and Nota, Max Scheler. The Man and his Work, p.148). ‘Faith alone’ was never sufficient for him. On different occasions in 1923 and 1926 he asserted that he could never separate himself from the Church (cf. Nota, op. cit., pp.146–53). The sense of ‘solidarity’ which critics have regarded as his most ‘Catholic’ notion, was not just a theoretical concept: Scheler felt a need to ‘belong’ to a spiritual home and the Catholic Church seems to have been that home, in spite of his difficulties with her teaching and discipline. He had always had difficulties with what he termed the ‘masculinisation’ of religion in Protestantism, not only in suspicion of the role of the Blessed Virgin, but also by the disappearance of the church as mother (G.W. IX, p. 159).
- G.W. IX, p.283.
- Ibid., p.296.
- Ibid., p.286.
- Ibid., pp.284–85. It had always been Scheler's contention that ‘man as an individual being is given to himself last of all’ (‘Reality and Resistance,’ p.64—G.W. IX, p.261). This is dealt with at length in Scheler's early essay ‘Die Idole der Selbsterkenntnis.’ (G.W. III, pp.213–92), translated by David Lachtermann in Selected Philosophical Essays pp.3–97 as ‘The Idols of Self-Knowledge.’
- G.W. IX, p.294 and also p.284.
- ‘Der Philosophie des Alltags ist eine Philosophie des Sonntags entgegenzusetzen. Der Sonntag wirft seine Lichter vor und zurück auf den Alltag. Wir leben von Sonntag her auf den Sonntag. Die Sorge is nur Mittel von Sonntag zu Sonntag.’ Ibid., p.294.
- In some of these references, it is interesting to note Scheler's reaction in his jottings to Being and Time: “A moi” (G.W. IX, p.309), referring to p.47 of Being and Time; ‘gegen mich’ (Ibid, p.316) referring to p. 131, in which Scheler assumes that his theory of the ground of being is under attack.
- Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik, G 26, p.215.
- Cf. Ibid., pp.254,257.
- Logik, G 21, p.84. R.H. Lotze, the idealist metaphysician (1817–1881), had relied on the philosophy of value to complete and perfect the empirical world of facts and laws. His philosophy of God rested on the striving for highest values, and the supposition that these values were actually real. Heidegger expressed his views about the philosophy of values more extensively in his lectures on Nietzsche, delivered between 1936 and 1940, and in the ‘Letter on Humanism,’ dating from 1946. In the latter, Heidegger repeated the charge of blasphemy (cf. Wegmarken, G 9, p. 179), explaining that by making God a value—even the highest one—we reduce him to being an object of our doing and valuing. In his lectures on Nietzsche, he points out that Nietzsche's version of value is a perfect example of constant ‘presence to hand’ (Vorhandensein), where being is forgotten and that although he engages in a critique of value, he intends merely to substitute deficient values with other, higher ones. So Nietzsche's metaphysics will be as nihilistic as all the others, since it will feign the accessibility of Being through moral correctness (of whatever sort) and through value (cf. Holzwege, G 5, pp.244–45 and Nietzsche, II, pp.335–98).
- Letter to Ingarden, quoted in Spiegelberg, H., The Phenomenological Movement, vol I, p.230.
- Cf., for example, Emad, P., Heidegger and the Phenomenology of Value, Torey, Glen Ellyn 1981 and Bonola, M., ‘Heidegger e Scheler: il mondo, l'uomo e il problema dell'essenza,’ in Aut Aut, 1984, pp.39–55.
- Some critics have drawn attention to the intellectual nature of the emotions in Scheler. Arnold Gehlen, in an appreciation of Scheler's project, admits that Scheler's view of spirit was fundamentally an intellectual one (cf. ‘Rückblick auf die Anthropologie Schelers,’ in Max Scheler im Gegenwartsgeschehen der Philosophie, p. 183 and also Henry, Michel, The Essence of Manifestation, pp.571–86). Scheler's placing of the actual seat of the value a priori in the ‘value-cognition or value intuition [WertErschauung]’ that comes to the fore in feeling lends weight to this judgement even when he adds that it is not the sort of cognition which comes to the fore in perception or thinking (see Formalism, p.68 (G. W. 11, p.87)).
- On the Eternal in Man, p.98 (G.W. V, p.93).
- Cf. ‘Nothingness and Being. A Schelerian Comment,’ in Research in Phenomenology 7 (1979), p.183–5.
- ‘The Anomaly of the World: From Scheler to Heidegger,’ in Man and World 29 (1991), p.79. Scheler stresses this aspect of man in Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos (1927) p.44, although a similar theme, humility in the face of reality as a pre-condition for essential knowledge as opposed to knowledge of mastery or control had been part of his thought during his phenomenological period (see his description of the ‘moral upsurge’ in philosophical knowledge in On the Eternal in Man, pp.89–98 (G.W. V, pp.83–92)).
- Formalism, pp.184–7 (G.W. II, p.193–5).
- Frings, M., ‘Heidegger and Scheler,’ in Philosophy Today 12 (1968), p.29.
- Formalism, p. 144 (G.W. II p. 158).
- Ibid., p.388 (G.W. II, p.387).
- Schriften aus dem Nachlaß III, G.W. XII, p. 182.
- Opinions vary as to the status—creative or constitutive?—granted by Scheler to this role of foundation on the part of the divine and absolute. For a good discussion of this issue in Scheler, see Lambertino, A., Max Scheler. Fondazione fenomenologica dell'etica dei valori, pp.514–6.
- Cf Schalow, F., art. cit., p.85.
Bibliography
- Bonola, M., ‘Heidegger e Scheler: il mondo, l'uomo e il problema dell'essenza.’ in Aut Aut, 1984, pp.39–55.
- Emad, P., Heidegger and the Phenomenology of Value, Torey, Glen Ellyn 1981.
- Frings, M. S., ‘Heidegger and Scheler.’ in Philosophy Today, 12 (1968), pp.21–30.
- Frings, M. S., ‘Nothingness and Being. A Schelerian Comment.’ in Research in Phenomenology, 7 (1979), pp.182–89.
- Gadamer, H.G., “Max Scheler—der Verschwender,” in Max Scheler im Gegenwartsgeschehen der Philosophie (ed. Paul Good). Francke, Berne 1975, pp.11–18.
- Gehlen, A., ‘Rückblick auf die Anthropologie Schelers,’ in Max Scheler im Gegenwartsgeschehender Philosophie (ed. P. Good), Francke, Berne 1975, pp. 179–88.
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- Heidegger, M., Gesamtausgabe, Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 1976.
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- Henry, M., The Essence of Manifestation (translated by G. Etzkorn) Nijhoff, The Hague 1973.
- Hering, J., ‘De Max Scheler á Hans Reiner. Remarques,’ in Revue d'histoire et de philosophie religieuses, 40 (1960), pp. 152–64.
- Lambertino, A., Max Scheler. Fondazione fenomenologica dell'etica dei valori, La Nuova Italia, Florence 1977.
- Mader, W., Max Scheler, Rowohlt, Hamburg 1980.
- Nota, J., Max Scheler. The Man and his Work, (translated by T. Plantinga and J. Nota) Franciscan Herald, Chicago 1983.
- Schalow, F., “The Anomaly of the World: From Scheler to Heidegger,” in Man and World, 24 (1991), pp.75–87.
- Scheler, M., Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, English translation by Manfred S. Frings and Roger Funk, Northwestern University Press, Evanston. 1973.
- Scheler, M., Gesammelte Werke I-XI, Francke Verlag, Berne 1954–1979, XII, Bouvier, Bonn 1987.
- Scheler, M., On the Eternal in Man, translated by Bernard Noble, with foreword by August Brunner, SCM Press, London 1960.
- Scheler, M., ‘The Idols of Self-Knowledge,’ ‘Idealism and Realism,’ ‘The Theory of the Three Facts,’ ‘Phenomenology and the Theory of Cognition’ translated, with an Introduction, by David Lachtermann in Selected Philosophical Essays, Northwestern University Press, Evanston 1973.
- Scheler, M., ‘Reality and Resistance: On Being and Time, Section 43,’ in Listening, 12 (1977), pp.61–73.
- Spiegelberg, H., The Phenomenological Movement (in 2 volumes) Nijhoff, The Hague 1960.