The Advent of Husserl's Phenomenology

References

• Cited by Marvin Farber in his The Foundation of Phenomenology (Revised 3rd edition, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1967), p. 17. Italics ours.
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• Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (Translated with an introduction by David Carr, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), pp. 91–94.
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• Franz Brentano, Die vier Phasen der Philosophie und ihr augenblicker Stand (Edited by Oskar Kraus, Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1926), pp. 1–32.
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• Franz Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, (Edited by Oskar Kraus; English translation edited by Linda L. McAlister, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), p. 21.
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• Ibid., pp. 44–64 (Book I: Chapter III).
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• Ibid., pp. 77–100 (Book II: Chapter I).
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• Theodore de Boer, The Development of Husserl's Thought, (Translated by Theodore Plantinga, Phaenomenologica 76, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978), p. 57. This brief synopsis has been gleaned from de Boer's work.
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• Edmund Husserl, “The Task and the Significance of the Logical Investigations” (Translated by J.N. Mohanty, J.N. Mohanly (ed.), Readings on Edmund Husserl's “Logical Investigations”, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), p. 200.
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• Ibid., p. 200.
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• Ibid., pp. 202–203. De Boer contends that the interpretation of the Logical Investigations given by Husserl in these 1925 reflections contains two anachronistic interpretations. The first is that ideal objects are noematic, not eidetic meanings. This anachronistic view is found only subsequently in the Formal and Transcendental Logic. The second anachronistic interpretation is to interpret the correlation between the individual significative acts and the ideal object as “constitutive” rather than “instantiative”, Cf. De Boer, The Development of Husserl's Thought, pp. 296–297. Even if De Boer is correct, it does not make Husserl's 1925 assessment of Brentano's influence on him anachronistic as far as we can judge.
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• Ibid., p. 205.
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• Ibid., p. 207.
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• Ibid., p. 207.
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• Ibid., p. 209.
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• Ibid., p. 211.
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• Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement (Phaenomenologica 5, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), Vol.1: p. 101.
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• Ibid., p. 66.
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• Richard Cobb-Stevens, James and Husserl (Phaenomenologica 60, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), p. 4.
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• Ibid., p. 4.
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• Ibid., p. 179.
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• J.P. Day, “John Stuart Mill”, A Critical History of Philosophy (Edited by D.J. O'Connor; New York: Macmillan Press, 1964), pp. 346–47.
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• Edmund Husserl, “On the Concept of Number: Psychological Analyses”, Husserl: Shorter Works (Translated by Dallas Willard, Edited by Peter McCormick and Frederick A. Elliston, Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press and the Harvester Press, 1981), p. l 17.
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• Edmund Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik (1890–1901), Husserlian Band XII (Edited by Lothar Eley, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), pp. 66–71, 73–74.
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• Day, op. cit., pp. 345, 346.
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• Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik, p. 91.
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• Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations (Translated by J.N. Findlay, New York: The Humanities Press, 1970), Volume I: p. l 13.
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• Ibid., pp. 115–117.
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• Ibid., pp. 363–383.
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• Ibid., p. 369.
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• Because of this transformation we prefer to use, and shall use henceforth, the term “eidetic phenomenology” rather than “descriptive” or even “eidetic psychology” in order to avoid any possible misunderstanding.
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• For this survey we are heavily indebted to Iso Kern's 1963 historical and systematic investigation of Husserl's relations to Kant and Neo-Kantianism (Iso Kern, Husserl und Kant, Phaenomenologica 16, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964). Further investigations have gone beyond the question of a direct relationship of Husserl to Kant and post-Kantianism. Certain aspects of the ongoing debate between Kantians and phenomenologists can be found in Kant and Phenomenology (1984) (Edited by Thomas M. Seebohm and Joseph J. Kockelmans, Washington D.C.: Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology & University Press of America, 1984).
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• Brentano, Die vier Phasen der Philosophie, pp. 10–21.
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• Franz Brentano, Von Dasein Gottes (Edited by Alfred Kastil, Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1929), p. 91.
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• Ibid., pp. l 13–114.
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• Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik, pp. 32–33.
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• Ibid., pp. 40–42.
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• Ibid., pp. 42–43.
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• Husserl, Ms. FIII 1/1476. Cited by Karl Schumann, Husserl-Chronik (Husserliana, Band I, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), pp. 25–26.
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• Kern, Husserl und Kant, p. 13. In 1894 Frege wrote a scathing review of Husserl's Philosophie der Arithmetik in which he charged Husserl with sheer logical psychologism. (Gottlob Frege, “Review of Dr. E. Husserl's “Philosophy of Arithmetik”, Readings on Edmund Husserl's “Logical Investigations”: pp. 6–21). Commentators, among whom Dagfinn Føllesdal and J.N. Mohanty are the most prominent, have disagreed over the role Frege's criticism played in Husserl's abandonment of empirical descriptive psychology and his formulation of eidetic phenomenology. The best view of this debate is presented by J.N. Mohanty's “Husserl and Frege: A New Look at their Relationship” with a response by Føllesdal in Husserl, Intentionality, and Cognitive Science (Edited by Hubert L. Dreyfus in collaboration with Harrison Hall, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1982), pp. 43–56.
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• Iso Kern has made a magisterial study of Husserl's relationship to Kant, Neo-Kantianism, and Natorp in particular in his Husserl und Kant (Phaenomenologica 16, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964).
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• Edmund Husserl, “A Reply to a Critic of My Refutation of Logical Psychologism”, Readings on Edmund Husserl's “Logical Investigations” (Translated by Dallas Willard), p. 36.
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• Ibid., p. 37.
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• Ibid., p. 38.
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• Husserl, Logical Investigations, I: p. 218.
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• Ibid., I: p. 73.
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• Ibid., I: p. 223.
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• Ibid., I: pp. 73, 223–224; II: pp. 839–842.
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• Ibid., I: p. 224.
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• Ibid., I: p. 205.
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• Ibid., I: p. 209. Manfred Sommer has made a sustained examination of Husserl's relation to early Positivism, including Avenarius and Mach, in his Husserl und die frühe Positivismus (Philosophische Abhandlungen 53, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1985). Although Sommer himself has not done so, it would be instructive to seek a rapprochment between Husserlian phenomenology and Analytic Philosophy through Avenarius and Mach. Both were studied and discussed in the early 1920s by the Vienna Circle. The Vienna Circle continued Mach's endeavors to eliminate transcendent metaphysics, to clarify the meaning of empirical scientific propositions, and sought a hitherto unattained clarity and preciseness in scientific language through logico-linguistic analysis and thus to establish a new or logical Positivism (Empiricism).
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• Cf., R.D. Rollinger, “Husserl and Cornelius, Husserl Studies 8 (1991), pp. 33–56.
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