Husserl's Intersubjective Transformation of Transcendental Philosophy

References

• On several occasions, Husserl has called attention to the lecture-course Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie from 1910/11 (now in Hua XIII/111–194), as the place where intersubjectivity was assigned a decisive role for the first time (Hua XVII/250, V/150, XIII/245, VIII/433, XIV/307). Although his reflections in Ideen I (from 1913) appear strictly egological, Husserl was already at that time aware of the significance of intersubjectivity, and he later wrote, that he originally had planned that his presentation in Ideen I were to be complemented by the reflections on intersubjectivity to be found in Ideen II. However, these reflections were only published posthumously (Hua V/150).
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• This study is based on research undertaken at the Husserl-Archives in Louvain. I am grateful to Prof. S. Ijsseling for the permission to consult and quote from Husserl's unpublished manuscripts.
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• Cf. K.-O. Apel, Transformation der Philosophie I-II (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1973), pp. I/60, II/315; J. Habermas, Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1985), p. 178.
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• This formulation, which is from Husserl's London-lectures in 1922, can be found in K. Schuhmann, Husserls Staatsphilosophie (Freiburg: Karl Alber, 1988), p. 56.
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• Cf. H. Zeltner, “Das Ich und die Anderen. Husserls Beitrag zur Grundlegung der Sozialphilosophie” Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 13 (1959), pp. 309–10; M. Theunissen, Der Andere (Berlin; Walter de Gruyter, 1977), § 19–28; A. Schütz, “Das Problem der transzendentalen Intersubjektivität bei Husserl” Philosophische Rundschau 5 (1957), p. 107; p. Ricoeur, “Phenomenology and Hermeneutics” in Thompson (ed.), Hermeneutics & the Human Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 124–25; U. Rohr-Dietschi, Zur Genese des Selbstbewuβtseins (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1974), pp. 144–150. I will not go into an analysis of Husserl's concept of constitution in this article, but simply refer to my presentations in D. Zahavi, Intentionalität und Konstitution—Eine Einführung in Husserls Logische Untersuchungen (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 1992); D. Zahavi: “Réduction et constitution dans la phénoménologie du dernier Husserl” Philosophiques XX/2 (1993), pp. 363–381 or D. Zahavi: “Beyond Realism and Idealism. Husserl's Late Concept of Constitution” Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 29 (1994), pp. 44–62; and to the detailed analysis of the constitution of the Other in D. Zahavi: Husserl und die transzendentale Intersubjektivität—Eine Antwort auf die sprachpragmatische Kritik (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996).
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• This approach can also be found in Sartre, who in L'être et le néant (Paris: Tel Gallimard, 1976) writes that the disclosure of our being-for-the-other takes place through a radicalized cogito-reflection (cf. for instance pp. 265, 289, 314, 319, 329).
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• Cf. A. Schütz, “Das Problem der transzendentalen Intersubjektivität bei Husserl” Philosophische Rundschau 5 (1957), pp. 81–107.
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• However, I do find Husserl's account in the Cartesianische Meditation less aporetic than normally assumed. In this I lean on I. Yamaguchi, Passive Synthesis und Intersubjektivität bei Edmund Husserl (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982); and R. Boehm, “Zur Phänomenologie der Gemeinschaft. Edmund Husserls Grundgedanken” in Würtenberger (ed.), Phänomenologie, Rechtsphilosophie, Jurisprudenz (Frankfurt a.M.: 1969), pp. 1–26.
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• Whereas the guaranty in every single case is fallible—what I took to be a valid experience of another could turn out to be a hallucination—this is not the case when it comes to the fundamental connection between intersubjective experienceability and transcendence. Such an experienceability is of course not to be interpreted as a mere epistemic criterion for the assumption of a mind-independent reality, since this would be a relapse into the objectivism that were suspended by the effectuation of the epoché.
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• For an account of the relationship between respectively the mere intentional and the real object see D. Zahavi, “Constitution and ontology. Some remarks on Husserl's ontological position in the Logical Investigations” Husserl Studies 9 (1992), pp. 111–124.
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• That every experience of an Other implies the validity of the Other's experience should not be misunderstood. Of course, Husserl is neither claiming that it is no longer possible to speak of disagreement or dissent (but only that all disagreement presupposes a common world), nor that our experience of an Other is always accompanied by a thematic representation of the Other's object of experience (which K. Arp claims in “Intentionality and the public world: Husserl's treatment of objectivity in the Cartesian Meditations” Husserl Studies 7 (1991), p. 91). Husserl's claim is merely that the validity of the Other's experience is implicitly accepted when we experience her, and that this furnishes our own object of experience with the validity, that it can also be experienced by another subject, that it is a common intersubjective object and consequently transcendent. This can take place without any explicit representation of the content of the Other's experience (Hua VI/308, XIII/469).
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• For a more detailed account of Husserl's phenomenology of the body see D. Zahavi, “Husserl's phenomenology of the body” Études Phénoménologiques 19 (1994), pp. 63–84.
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• B. Waidenfels, “Erfahrung des Fremden in Husserls Phänomenologie” Phänomenologische Forschungen 22 (1989), p. 56.
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• A finiteness which according to Husserl is hidden until the co-being (Mitsein) of the Other is taken into account (Ms. C 17 32a). Death gains a meaning for me through the Others (Hua XV/452).
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• A similar kind of argumentation can be found in D. Carr, “The ‘Fifth Meditation’ and Husserl's Cartesianism” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 34 (1973), pp. 14–35. Carr claims that Husserl's incorporation of transcendental intersubjectivity led to a radical revision of his earlier concept of philosophy, insofar as the nos cogitamus does not possess the same kind of infallible apodictical certainty as the ego cogito (pp. 32–35). However, this is a truth with modifications, which will be obvious in a moment.
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• An extensive presentation can be found in D. Zahavi, Husserl und die transzendentale Intersubjektivitität—Eine Antwort auf die sprachpragmatische Kritik.
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• This interpretation can be supported by Dorion Cairns’ account of a conversation with Husserl, June 4, 1932—D. Cairns, Conversations with Husserl and Fink (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), pp. 82–83.
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• It must be emphasized that the relation between the three kinds of intersubjectivity is a relationship of founding.
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• For a more detailed account of Husserl's use of Leibniz see R. Cristin, “Phänomenologie und Monadologie. Husserl und Leibniz” Studia Leibnitiana XXII/2 (1990), pp. 163–174.
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• A. Schütz, Collected Papers I (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), p. 167.
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• E. Marbach (Das Problem des Ich in der Phänomenologie Husserls (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), chap. 5) argues that it was exactly Husserl's insight into the necessity of construing a transcendental theory of intersubjectivity, which made him abandon the non-egological theory of consciousness, which he had advocated in Logische Untersuchungen. As long as there were no ego as principle of unity, there were merely experiences, and it were consequently impossible to differentiate between one's own and the Other's experiences. In a similar way, A. Gurwitsch has claimed that his own non-egological theory of consciousness made the problem of transcendental intersubjectivity superfluous. If there is no transcendental ego, but merely an empirical, then the relation between ego and Other must be an empirical-mundane problem (A. Schütz & A. Gurwitsch: Briefwechsel 1939–1959 (München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1985), p. 369).
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• Of course, Husserl would deny that this uniqueness—which refutes a number of ‘substantial’ misinterpretations of his position—is merely a contingent linguistic fact. Quite to the contrary, we are dealing with a transcendental necessity, which is ultimately connected with the problem of individuation. ‘I am’ is for the ego that thinks it, the intentional ground. It is, as Husserl says, the primal fact that I as a philosopher must never overlook (Hua XVII/243–44, XIV/307, XXIX/165).
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• A position which E. Fink mistakenly has advocated in a number of his otherwise very knowledgeable articles. Cf. for instance E. Fink, Nähe und Distanz (München: Karl Alber, 1976), p. 223; and Fink's remarks to the English version of Schütz’ article “Das Problem der transzendentalen Intersubjektivität bei Husserl” in A. Schütz, Collected Papers III (The Hague: Martinus Nijhaff, 1975), p. 86. See also D. Zahavi, ‘The Self-Pluralisation of the Primal Life. A Problem in Fink's Husserl-Interpretation” Recherches Husserliennes 2 (1994), pp. 3–18.
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• Just as Heidegger (cf. Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (Frankfurt a.M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989), pp. 360, 377, 426) and Merleau-Ponty (cf. Phénoménologie de la perception (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1945), p. 428).
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• As Merleau-Ponty remarks apropos Husserl's idea concerning the intersubjective structure of transcendental subjectivity: “Now if the transcendental is intersubjectivity, how can the borders of the transcendental and the empirical help becoming indistinct? For along with the other person, all the other person sees of me—all my facticity—is reintegrated into subjectivity, or at least posited as an indispensable element of its definition. Thus the transcendental descends into history. Or as we might put it, the historical is no longer an external relation between two or more absolutely autonomous subjects but has an interior and is an inherent aspect of their very definition. They no longer know themselves to be subjects simply in relation to their individual selves, but in relation to one another as well.” (Merleau-Ponty, Signes (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1960), p. 134). It is actually possible to find numerous similarities between Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, and it is worth noticing, that Merleau-Ponty, who already before World War II gained access to Husserl's unpublished manuscripts (cf. H.L. Van Breda, “Maurice Merleau-Ponty et les Archives-Husserl à Louvain” Revue de métaphysique et de morale 67 (1962), pp. 410–430), often interpreted Husserl in a way which was not in accordance with the prevailing view. For instance, when he claimed that Husserl took the problem of historicity more seriously than Heidegger (Merleau-Ponty, Merleau-Ponty à la Sorbonne (Cynara, 1988), pp. 421–422).
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• Cf. G. Brand, “Die Normalität des und der Anderen und die Anomalität einer Erfahrungsgemeinschaft bei Edmund Husserl” in Sprondel & Grathoff (eds.), Alfred Schütz und die Idee des Alltags in den Sozialwissenschaften (Stuttgart: 1979), p. 118.
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• To give a concrete example: our constitution of colors is not impeded by the fact that there are blind people, who are unable to perceive them (Hua I/154, XV/48). For a more extended treatment of this problem, see for instance Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität I text 14: “Solipsistische und intersubjektive Normalität und Konstitution von Objektivität”, Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität III text 10: “Die Welt der Normalen und das Problem der Beteiligung der Anomalen an der Weltkonstitution” and text 11: “Apodiktische Struktur der transzendentalen Subjektivität. Problem der transzendentalen Konstitution der Welt von der Normalität aus”.
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• Although the mathematical-physicalistic description of the object, which is valid for all rational subjects, is the most objective, Husserl emphasizes that this kind of description is completely irrelevant in our daily practical life. There we are not occupied with scientific objects, but with tools and values, with pictures, statues, gardens, houses, tables etc. (Hua IV/27). Furthermore our practical interest is led by practical concerns. That which is sufficient in our daily life, counts as the thing in itself (Hua XI/23).
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• Cf. Merleau-Ponty (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1960), p. 121. In connection with his reflections on the constitutive function of language, Husserl also touches on its seductive power (Hua VI/372). Instead of living and acting responsibly according to evidence, we can be, and most often are, seduced by the assumptions and structures of comprehension and apperception which are imbedded in language (cf. Hua IV/269). Husserl's analysis has much in common with Heidegger's analysis of idle talk (Gerede) in Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1986), §35.
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• This does not imply, however, that there are no apodictical truths whatsoever, but only that that which can be corrected is always open for further corrections.
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• Thus, S. Strasser was right, when he wrote that the publication of Husserl's manuscripts on intersubjectivity has uncovered surprising material, which has shown, that all current views about the content of Husserl's philosophy were inadequate (S. Strasser, “Grundgedanken der Sozialonlologie Edmund Husserls” Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 29 (1975), p. 33).
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