Bibliography
- Bartholomew, D. (1985). Preamble to a Phenomenology of Music. Journal of Musicological Research, 5, 319–360.
- Bartholomew, D. (1991). Whole/Part Relations in Music: An Exploratory Study. Journal of Aesthetic Education, 25, 175–191.
- Clifton, T. (1983). Music as Heard. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Gordon, E. (1997). Learning Sequences in Music. Chicago: GIA Publications.
- Gordon, E. (1998). Introduction to Research and the Psychology of Music. Chicago: GIA Publications.
- Fraisse, P. (1957). Psychologie du Temps. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
- Hintikka, J. (1995). The Phenomenological Dimension. In B. Smith & D. Woodruff Smith (Eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Husserl (pp. 78–105). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Husserl, E. (1968). Logische Untersuchungen. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer.
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- Kandel, E.R. (Ed.) (2000). Principles of Neural Science. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Levinson, J. (1997). Music in the Moment. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Lewin, D. (1986). Music Theory, Phenomenology, and Modes of Perception. Music Perception, 3, 327–392.
- McAdoo, N. (1997). Hearing Musical Works in their Entirety. British Journal of Aesthetics, 37, 66–74.
- Mellor, D.H. (1998). Real Time II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Miller, I. (1984). Husserl, Perception, and Temporal Awareness. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press.
- Mohanty, J.N. (1995). The Development of Husserl's Thought. In B. Smith & D. Woodruff Smith (Eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Husserl (pp. 45–77). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Orlik, F. (1994). ‘Inneres Zeitbewuβtsein’ und ‘attentionale Modifikation’—Ein Beitrag zur Klärung des Verhältnisses von Zeit und musikalischer Gestalt im Anschluβ an Husserl. Archiv für Musikwissenschaft, 51, 253–273.
- Perrett, R.W. (1999). Musical Unity and Sentential Unity. British Journal of Aesthetics, 39, 97–111.
- Repp, B.H. et al. (1999). ‘Music In The Moment’: A Discussion. Music Perception, 16, 463–494.
- Smith, F.J. (1979). The Experiencing of Musical Sound—Prelude to a Phenomenology of Music. New York: Gordon & Breach.
References
- My translation of ‘Wenn z.B. der Anfang einer bekannten Melodie ertönt, so erregt er bestimmte Intentionen, die in der schrittweisen Ausgestaltung der Melodie ihre Erfüllung finden. Ähnliches findet auch dann statt, wenn uns die Melodie fremd ist. Die im Melodischen obwaltenden Gesetzmäβigkeiten bedingen Intentionen, die zwar der vollen gegenständlichen Bestimmtheit ermangeln, aber doch auch Erfüllungen finden oder finden können’ (Husserl, 1968, vol. II/2, p. 39).
- See, for instance, Husserl (1985), p. 33.
- Husserl (2000), p. 19.
- My translation of ‘beim Anschlagen höre ich ihn als jetzt, beim Forttönen hat er aber ein immer neues Jetzt, und das jeweilig vorangehende verwandelt sich in ein Vergangenes' (Husserl, 2000, p. 19).
- For Husserl's critique of Brentano see Husserl (2000), pp. 8–16. For a detailed discussion of McTaggart's argument see Mellor (1998), ch. 7.
- Husserl (2000), p. 35.
- Husserl (2000), p. 92.
- Husserl (2000), pp. 29–30.
- Husserl (2000), pp. 20, 24, 25,43 & 101.
- My translation of ‘Jede Wahrnehmung hat ihren retentionalen und protentionalen Hof. […] Jede Empfindung hat ihre Intentionen, die vom Jetzt auf ein neues Jetzt usw. führen: die Intention auf Zukunft, und andererseits die Intention auf Vergangenheit’ (Husserl, 2000, p. 91).
- My translation of ‘Also tatsächlich ist das Wahrnehmen einer Melodie ein zeitlich ausgebreiteter, sich allmählich und stetig entfaltender Akt, […] und dieser Akt hat einen immer neu und neuen Punkt des “Jetzt”, und in diesem Jetzt wird etwas als Jetzt gegenständlich (jetzt gehörter Ton), während zugleich ein Soeben-vergangen, und wieder ein Noch-weiter-vergangen in einigen Gliedern gegenständlich ist; und vielleicht auch ein oder das andere gegenständlich als “künftig”’ (Husserl, 1985, pp. 33–34).
- This also works for the perception of a single tone of long duration and its various phases; see Husserl (2000), pp. 55–57 & 73.
- The convention with respect to the square brackets used here is to be understood as follows: every step forward in time is symbolised by bracketing; and left brackets to the immediate left of right brackets cancel out. Thus, the protension]]A[[gets a []]A[[]=]A[next and then turns into []A[]= A, i.e. into a primal impression.
- Indeed this is enough of a reconstruction of Husserl's theory for our purposes. The full picture, however, would be a little more complex. For to reconstruct our sense of the passage of time, it is not enough that the retention [A] I am having at the time t2 is related to the primal impression A I had at t1. Indeed [A] has to encompass all the retensions and protensions I had at t1 as well—see Miller (1984), ch. 7.
- SeeHusserl (2000), p. 25.
- Husserl (2000), p. 25.
- Much has been written on this issue. Just as an example, see Miller (1984), ch. 8.
- McAdoo (1997), p. 66.
- McAdoo (1997), passim.
- See standard textbooks of neurophysiology (sensory level) and psychology (level of perception) like Kandel (2000) and Fraisse (1957).
- Mohanty (1995), p. 60.
- Levinson (1997), p. 16. As already emphasised, the comparison between the auditory and the visual system should at most be understood as a metaphor and not as a literal one.
- Levinson (1997), p. 17, fn. 7.
- Levinson (1997), p. 17, fn. 7.
- Levinson (1997), p. 13.
- See, e.g., Husserl (1985), pp. 6 & 16.
- SeeHusserl (2000), p. 30.
- SeeHusserl (1985), p. 5.
- SeeLevinson (1997), pp. 48 & 87. To be a little more accurate, Levinson refers to the English psychologist and musician Edmund Gurney as the father of his approach and then takes Meyer to stand in a Gumeyan tradition.
- Levinson (1997), pp. 38–39.
- Levinson (1997), p. 17.
- Levinson (1997), p. ix.
- Levinson (1997), p. 18.
- SeeLevinson (1997), p. xi.
- Gordon (1997), p. 5. The comparison between music and language will be picked up again in section 5.
- Levinson, Music in the Moment, p. 16.
- Personal communication, October 2001.
- Gordon (1997), p. 8.
- Gordon (1997), p. 4 (accentuation in the original).
- Bartholomew (1991), pp. 188–190. Indeed there are several other works coming to similar conclusions. See, for example, Smith (1979), Clifton (1983), Bartholomew (1985), Lewin (1986), and Orlik (1994).
- See Gordon (1997), p. 98, e.g.
- Gordon (1997), pp. 203ff.
- Gordon (1997), pp. 55ff. & 145, respectively.
- See Gordon (1997), pp. 111–115, for investigations on the test's validity and for further references.
- SeeGordon (1998), p. 111.
- See Repp et al. (1999), pp. 477–480.
- Personal communication, May 2003. See Levinson (1997), ch. 7–9.
- See, for instance, Miller (1984), ch. 1. I have chosen this ‘standard interpretation’ for it is an economic way to introduce the relevant ideas. Whether it is a full and completely accurate interpretation of Husserl is a controversial question and not at issue here. See, e.g., Hintikka (1995).
- Miller (1984), pp. 137–139.
- SeePerrett (1999).
- Perrett (1999), p. 110.
- Repp et al. (1999), pp. 480–485.