References
- M. Heidegger, The Concept of Time, trans. W. McNeill, Oxford: Blackwell, 1992, p. 22. References to this work will be given parenthetically in the text with “CT” referring to the English translation, and with “BZ” referring to the original German text contained within the same volume. The first German edition of the lecture, Der Begriff der Zeit. Vortrag vor der Marburger Theologenschaft Juli 1924, was edited by Hartmut Tietjen and published by Niemeyer (Tübingen) in 1989.
- The first volume of this series was originally published in French in 1994 as: La technique et le temps, 1. La faute d'Epiméthée, Paris: Éditions Galilée, 1994. It was translated by Richard Beardsworth and George Collins as: Technics and Time, 1. The Fault of Epimetheus, Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1998. The German translation by Ronald Voullié and Gabriele Ricke appeared in May 2009. The second volume: La technique et le temps, 2. La désorientation, Paris: Éditions Galilée appeared in 1996 and is translated by Stephen Barker as: Technics and Time, 2. Disorientation, Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 2008. The third volume: La technique et le temps, 3. Le temps du cinema et la question du mal-être, Paris: Éditions Galilée appeared in 2001 and is as yet untranslated. My references to the first volume in the original French will be given parenthetically with page numbers in the text and indicated by “tt”, with the English translation as “TT”.
- Heidegger's early phenomenology provides a constant point of reference throughout Stiegler's second volume Technics and Time, 2. Disorientation; however, the interpretation of Heidegger in this volume is exactly the one which Stiegler articulates in the first. This second volume culminates with a critique of Husserl's On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time. The formula which structures Stiegler's reading of Husserl is much the same as that applied to Heidegger in the first volume. While it is beyond the scope of this essay, the application of its results to the second volume could provide a point of departure for assessing Stiegler's reading of Husserl.
- M. Heidegger, Le concept de temps, trans. M. Haar and M. B. De Launay in: Martin Heidegger, Paris: Cahiers de l'Herne, 1983. The English translator of Stiegler's text explains in a note that, although McNeill has translated Jeweiligkeit as ‘specificity’, he is following Haar and De Launany's translation as it is the basis for Stiegler's reading and that it “has the merit of stressing the temporal aspect of the German word” (TT, 288). Unfortunately, the temporal sense which ‘perpetuity’ conveys, i.e. perpetual continuity, is the exact opposite of the actual sense of temporal particularity designated by this term.
- M. Heidegger, Ontology—The Hermeneutics of Facticity, trans. J. van Buren, Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1999, p. 5. The original German was first published as: Ontologie (Hermeneutik der Faktizität), Gesamtausgabe Bd. 63, Hrg. K. Bröcker-Oltmanns, Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1988.
- M. Heidegger, Introduction to Phenomenological Research, trans. D. O. Dahlstrom, Bloomingtion: Indiana Univ. Press, 2005, p. 221. The original German was first published as: Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung, Gesamtausgabe Bd. 17, Hrg. F.-W. von Herrmann, Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1994.
- The singular importance of the term Jeweiligkeit in this period and particularly in this lecture has been stressed by Theodore Kisiel who also offers the following very convincing suggestions for its translation: “at-the-time-ness, particular whileness, temporal particularity”. Cf. The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, p. 500.
- M. Heidegger, Phänomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks: Theorie der Philosophischen Begriffsbildung, Gesamtausgabe Bd. 59, Hrg. C. Strube, Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1993, p. 174 (my translation). In this lecture course, Heidegger first uses the word facticity in a terminological sense. Moreover, with its extended treatment of the role of destruction in relation to phenomenology and its account of the implications which this relation has for thinking the meaning and scope of philosophy itself, this lecture course should be viewed as the key for comprehending the actual radicality of Heidegger's thought in his early Freiburg period.
- Rather than an opposed what and who, the central category in this lecture is explicitly that of the how. Stiegler reads the 1924 lecture from the perspective of Heidegger's later existential analytic and fails to properly contextualize the 1924 lecture in light of Heidegger's earlier lectures in which he developed a phenomenological method in which destruction and retrieval can be seen as the central elements. Rather than the extraction of a who from facticity, Heidegger's choice to frame the question of time in terms of a how should be seen in light of Heidegger's earlier lectures in which this word is employed terminologically: “The being of factical life is distinctive in that it is in the how of the being of its being-possible.“ M. Heidegger, Ontology—The Hermeneutics of Facticity, p. 12. “Past—present and future are not dimensions shoved next to one another, but instead determine the how of existence in a unitary way.” M. Heidegger, Introduction to Phenomenological Research, p. 242.
- Cf. F. Raffoul, “Factical Life and the Need for Philosophy“, in: F. Raffoul and E. S. Nelson (eds.), Rethinking Facticity, Albany: SUNY Press, 2008; M. de Beistegui, The New Heidegger, London: Continuum, Chapter 1 (“A Matter of Life”), 2005; B. D. Crowe, Heidegger's Religious Origins: Destruction and Authenticity, Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 2006; J. van Buren, “The Earliest Heidegger: A New Field of Research”, in: H. Dreyfus and M. Wrathall (eds.), A Companion to Heidegger, Oxford: Blackwell, 2005.