Interpreting Plato Phenomenologically: Relationality and Being in Heidegger's Sophist

References

• I would like to thank Sean D. Kirkland and James McGuirk for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. I would like to dedicate this article to the memory of Franco Volpi.
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• See D.A. Hyland. Questioning Platonism: Continental Interpretations of Plato, Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004: pp. 17–83; F.J. Gonzalez. “Confronting Heidegger on Logos and Being in Plato's Sophist”, in Platon und Aristoteles—sub ratione veritatis: Festschrift für Wolfgang Wieland. eds. by G. Damschen, R. Enskat, & A.J. Vigo, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2003: pp. 102–33; F.J. Gonzalez. “Dialectic as Philosophical Embarrassment: Heidegger's Critique of Plato's Method” in Journal of the History of Philosophy, vol. 40 (3), 2002: pp. 361–389; F.J. Gonzalez. “Why Heidegger's Hermeneutics Is Not a ‘Diahermeneutics’” in Philosophy Today (45) 2001: pp. 138–152; F.J. Gonzalez. “On the way to Sophia: Heidegger on Plato's Dialectic, in Research in Phenomenology, vol. 27, (1997): pp. 16–60; C.H. Zuckert. Postmodern Platos: Nietzsche, Heidegger, Gadamer, Strauss, Derrida, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996, pp.: 33–70.
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• Plato, Sophist 255c-d. trans. N.P. White in Plato: Complete Works, ed. by J.M. Cooper & D.S. Hutchinson, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997. Referred to hereafter as Sophist with standard pagination.
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• Sophist, 241d.
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• Plato, Sophist, 237a. Cf. Parmenides, Fragments VII & VIII, in The Presocratic Philosophers, eds. G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven & M. S. Schofield, 2nd edn., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999: pp. 248–249.
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• Plato, Sophist, 252e.
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• M. Heidegger. Platon: Sophistes. ed. by I. Schüssler, Gesamtausgabe Bd.19, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1992, p. 486; Plato's Sophist. trans. R. Rojcewicz & A. Schuwer, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997, p. 336. (Referred to hereafter as GA 19 with the German pagination followed by the English).
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• M. Heidegger, GA 19, pp. 541–548/375–379.
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• Sophist, 255e 4–6. “And we're going to say that it [heteron] pervades all of them, since each of them is different from the others, not because of its own nature but because of sharing in the type of the different.”
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• Cf. M. Heidegger, GA 19, pp. 566–567/393–393.
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• Ibid. pp. 558–569/386–394.
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• Ibid. pp. 542–548/375–379.
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• Ibid, pp. 544–545/377 “…there resides in the structure of the ἕτερoν itself a still more original character, one which Plato does not here establish firmly, the τρóς τι. In every case, the other is possible only as other-than. In this other there resides precisely the τρóς, the “relation-to.” […] For, Plato here, and in the later dialogues as well, does not allow the τρóς τι to attain the fundamental and universal significance, which should properly and substantively pertain to it in relation to ταὐτóν and ἕτερoν. In the Philebus, e.g., it is clear that Plato is indeed aware of the πρóς τι but does not genuinely see it in its categorial function and in its primary position prior to the ἕτερoν. He says there Tαûτα γὰρ oὐκ εἶναι πρóς τι καλά, ἀλλ’ ἀεì καλὰ καθ’ αὑτά, cf. Philebus, 51c6f), “these beings are not beautiful relationally,” i.e., beautiful in view of something else, “but are always beautiful, in themselves.” Here, in the Sophist, Plato claims the πρóς τι only for the ἕτερoν itself, as a conceptual determination of it, and does not set the πρóς τι off against the ἕτερoν as an original apriori, prior to the ἕτερoν itself.”
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• Ibid. p. 558/386–387.
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• Ibid. pp. 544–545/377.
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• Ibid. p. 548/379.
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• Ibid. pp. 640–641/446–447.
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• M. Heidegger. Sein und Zeit. ed. by F.-W. von Herrmann, 17th edn, Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1993, p. 160; Being and Time. trans. J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, New York: Harper & Row, 1962, p. 203. (Referred to hereafter as Sein und Zeit with the German pagination followed by the English). On the difference between logos and logic, see also GA 19, p. 578/400.
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• M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 161/203–204.
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• M. Heidegger, GA 19, pp. 581–582/403.
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• Ibid, p. 584/404. See also ibid, p. 595/412.
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• M. Heidegger, GA 19, p. 596/412.
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• M. Heidegger. Unterwegs zur Sprache. ed. by F.-W. von Herrmann, Gesamtausgabe Bd.12, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1985, pp. 176, 187–188; On the Way to Language. trans. P. D. Hertz, New York: Harper & Row, 1971, pp. 73, 82–83.
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• Sophist, 255c8-e1.
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• M. Heidegger, GA 19, p. 430/297.
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• M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, pp. 32–39/55–63.
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• Ibid, p. 34/58. See also GA 17, p. 35/26.
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• Ibid, pp. 219–220/261–263.
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• Ibid. pp. 214–230/256–273. Regarding Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle's use of the term pros ti, see also M. Heidegger, GA 18, pp. 323–324; pp. 389–390.
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• M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, pp. 148–166/188–210.
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• M. Heidegger. Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie. ed. by F-W. von Herrmann, 2nd edn, Gesamtausgabe Bd.24, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989, pp. 295–300; Basic Problems of Phenomenology. trans. A. Hofstadter, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988, pp. 207–210. (Referred to hereafter as GA 24 with the German pagination followed by the English).
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• Sein und Zeit, p. 193/238. This reference clearly shows that arguments as to whether Heidegger prioritizes praxis over the ria tend to overlook the fact that these very modes of comportment are themselves only possible for a being whose very being is defined by the movedness of ‘care’ itself. On the very distinction between praxis and the ria, see Sein und Zeit, viz. p. 69/99.
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• M. Heidegger. Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles. Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung. eds. by W. Bröcker & K. Bröcker-Oltmanns, Gesamtausgabe Bd.61, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1994, pp. 89–99. Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Initiation into Phenomenological Research. trans. R. Rojcewicz, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001, pp. 67–75 (Hereafter GA 61).
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• M. Heidegger, GA 19, pp. 466–467/323 (trans. modified).
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• M. Heidegger, GA 61, p. 88/66.
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• M. Heidegger, GA 19, p. 594/411.
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• M. Heidegger, Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie. ed. by B. Heimbuchel, Gesamtausgabe Bd. 56/57, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1987, pp. 109–110; Towards the Definition of Philosophy. trans. T. Sadler, London & New York: Continuum Books, 2000, pp. 92–93. On this point, see F.-W. von Herrmann's Hermeneutik und Reflexion: Der Begriff der Phänomenologie bei Heidegger und Husserl, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2000, pp. 92.
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• M. Heidegger, GA 19, p. 557/385–386.
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• Aristotle, Politics 1253a 9–10 and at 1332b 5. Cf. M. Heidegger, GA 18, p. 46f. See also GA 21, p. 3.
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• M. Heidegger, GA 61, pp. 18–19/13.
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• Ibid, pp. 558–561/386–389.
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• M. Heidegger Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt—Endlichkeit—Einsamkeit. ed. F-W von Hermann, Gesamtausgabe Bd. 29/30, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983, p. 216; The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, trans. W. McNeill & N. Walker, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995, p. 143.
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• M. Heidegger Einleitung in die Philosophie. eds. by O. Saame & I. Saame-Speidel, Gesamtausgabe Bd.27, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1996, pp. 214–217. See also Heidegger's Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz. ed. by K. Held, Gesamtausgabe Bd.26, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1990, pp. 203–252 (viz. pp. 181–189; 235–238); The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic. trans. M. Heim, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984, pp. 159–195 (viz. pp. 143–149; 181–185).
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• M. Heidegger, GA 24, pp. 82–93/58–66. See also GA 26, p. 170
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• This criticism, as Heidegger articulates it, comes down to the fact that Plato failed to develop a more telling analysis of movedness in the Sophist. According to Plato, ‘movedness’ (kin¯sis) and ‘rest’ (stasis) cannot partake in (metalambanein) each other and in fact exclude one another (enantiôtata allelôis) (cf. 250a–252d6–10): when one is present the other must be absent; and not only on the level of predication. In Heidegger's own words, “rest is, as Aristotle discovered, not an ἐναντίoν in relation to motion, something opposed to motion, but, on the contrary, precisely requires motion. Rest is nothing else than a determinate limit case of motion, an eminent possibility of what is in motion with regard to its possible being” (M. Heidegger, GA 19, p. 516/357). For further evidence of Heidegger's prioritization of Aristotle's ontological discovery of movedness over Plato's arguably ontic treatment, see also M. Heidegger, GA 18, p. 288; pp. 302–303; GA 19, p. 85/59.
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• M. Heidegger, GA 19, p. 555/384.
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• Ibid, p. 579/401. It should be noted that this section of the Sophist course, §79, touches briefly upon the issue of temporality; however, the temporality of movedness itself (the self-temporalising nature of being-moved) is always in the background.
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• M. Heidegger, GA 19, p. 545/377.
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• Ibid.
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• Ibid, p. 544/377.
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• Cf. M. Heidegger, GA 61, pp. 84–130/64–97.
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• M. Heidegger, GA 19, p. 543/376.
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• Ibid, pp. 544–545/377.
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• Cf. M. Heidegger, GA 18, p. 234. “Das Denken ist nichts anderes als dieses πρóς, das Denken verlangt seinem Sein nach: offen sein zum Anderen, sein Sein kann nicht verstanden werden, primär gesehen werden, wenn nicht das Wozu da ist…”
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• M. Heidegger, GA 24, pp. 26–27/19–20.
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• Another example of this repeated criticism of Plato's seemingly ontical understanding of ‘movedness’ and ‘rest’ is again found in Heidegger's Sophist course when Heidegger, clearly under the influence of Aristotle, comments upon the intimate relationship between ‘movedness’ (kin sis) and ‘rest’ (stasis). Heidegger writes: “Here the distinction is clear between the essentially still ontical treatment of motion and rest in Plato versus the ontological treatment in Aristotle. Although Plato later says (256bff.) that there is a certain κoινωνία between κίνησις and στάσις—i.e., insofar as they are different, determined by the ἕτερoν—he does not yet see the genuine connection, the peculiar substantive κoινωνία between motion and rest. In order to understand that κoινωνία, we may not take motion and rest, as Plato does, purely ontically. Only if we ask about the Being of being-in-motion and about the Being of being-at-rest will we be able to understand it. […] this analysis of motion can be carried out only if the being-in-motion is seen and explicated, something for which Plato had neither the means nor the potential” (GA 19, p. 516/357).
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• Sophist 247e. “I'm saying that a thing really is if it has any capacity at all, either by nature to do something to something else or to have even the smallest thing done to it by even the most trivial thing, even if it only happens once. I'll take it as a definition that those which are amount to nothing other than capacity.”
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• Heidegger, GA 19, p. 486/336. See also GA 19, pp. 478–479/331 & GA 22, p. 143.
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• Heidegger, GA 19, p. 475/329.
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• Heidegger, GA 19, p. 476/329. Plato, Sophist 257b-c.
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• Heidegger Die Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie. ed. by F.K. Blust, Gesamtausgabe Bd.22, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2004, p. 269 (my translation).
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• Cf. Heidegger. Aristoteles, Metaphysik 1–3. Von Wesen und Wirklichkeit der Kraft. ed. by H. Hüni, Gesamtausgabe Bd.33, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1981, pp. 26–28; Aristotle's Metaphysics 1–3: On the Essence and Actuality of Force. trans. W. Brogan & P. Warnek Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995, p. 22. My reading of the ‘ontological difference’ is markedly different from Drew Hyland's interpretation, which argues that the ‘ontological difference’ is present in the Platonic dialogues themselves and that Plato does not overlook this all-important distinction. See Drew Hyland's “First of All Came Chaos” in Heidegger and Greek Philosophy: Interpretive Essays, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006, pp. 9–22 (viz. 20–21).
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• This term is fully thematised soon after Being and Time, see GA 24, pp. 322–469/227–330; GA 9, pp. 123–175/97–135.
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• Cf. GA 34, pp. 200–240/145–171.
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• GA 19, p. 552/382. See also pp. 368–370/254–256; p. 641/446.
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• GA 19, p. 552/382.
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• GA 26, p. 236/183.
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• Cf. GA 19, pp. 552–553/382.
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• GA 14, p. 12/8.
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• GA 19, pp. 638–641/444–446.
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• GA 24, pp. 101–102/72.
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• M. Heidegger Seminare. ed. by C. Ochwadt, Gesamtausgabe Bd.15, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1986, p. 399; Four Seminars trans F. Raffoul & A. Mitchell, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003, p. 80.
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• Sein und Zeit, pp. 42–43/68.
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• M. Heidegger. Ontologie. Hermeneutik der Faktizität. ed. by K. Bröcker-Oltmanns, Gesamtausgabe Bd.63, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1995, pp. 47–49; pp. 84–88. Ontology. The Hermeneutics of Facticity. trans. J. van Buren, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999, pp. 37–39; pp. 65–67. See also, Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs. by P. Jaeger, Gesamtausgabe Bd.20, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1994, p. 206; History of the Concept of Time. Prolegomena. trans T. Kisiel, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985, p. 153. (Due to necessary limitations, I have intentionally chosen not to address the temporal specificity or particularity of these terms, nor have I discussed their evolution in Heidegger's thought).
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• Sein und Zeit, pp. 250–267/294–311.
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• Sein und Zeit, p. 134/173.
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• E. Husserl. Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge (Hua 1). ed. S. Strasser, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973, pp. 124–130. Cartesian Mediations: An Introduction to Phenomenology. trans. by D. Cairns, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967, pp. 92–99.
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• Cf. M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, pp. 267–301/312–348.
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• Ibid, p. 38/62.
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• Ibid, p. 61/88
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• Ibid, pp. 12–18/32–39; pp. 196–200/241–244.
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• Ibid, p. 12/32.
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• Ibid, p. 134/173.
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• Regarding this precise critique, see David Webb's fine article: “Continuity and Difference in Heidegger's Sophist,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy, vol. 38, 2000, pp. 145–169.
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• M. Heidegger, GA 19, p. 453/313.
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• D.A. Hyland, Questioning Platonism: Continental Interpretations of Plato, Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004, pp. 17–83.
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• “Du nennst Plato. Er steht bei mir in Griffnähe; aber erst muβ ich noch mit einigen Fragen ins Reine kommen, bis ich mir die Freude erlaube, ihn noch einmal ganz neu zu lesen.” Hannah Arendt/Martin Heidegger, Briefe 1925–1975. ed. by U. Ludz, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1998, p. 125. Letters 1925–1975—Hannah Arendt and Martin Heidegger, ed. by U. Ludz, trans. A. Shields, New York: Harcourt Inc, 2004, p. 102.
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• In Being and Time the terms used are Schweigen and Verschwiegenheit, translated into English as “keeping silent” and “reticence”. However, in later texts Heidegger uses the neologism Erschweigen or Erschweigung to emphasize the process of a targeted, pronounced or revealing silence; terms which are rendered as a “telling silence” or a “reticence in silence”. For example, see M. Heidegger, GA 6 1, p. 423; 208. See also GA 65, pp. 78–80; 54–56.
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• Sein und Zeit, p. 275/320.
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• Ibid., p. 277/334.
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• Ibid., p. 338/387.
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