Quasi-fideism and epistemic relativism

References

• Alston, W. P. 1996. “Belief, Acceptance, and Religious Faith.” In Faith, Freedom, and Rationality: Philosophy of Religion Today, edited by J. Jordan, and D. Howard-Snyder, 3–27. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
   Google Scholar
• Audi, R. 1991. “Faith, Belief, and Rationality.” Philosophical Perspectives 5: 213–239.
   Google Scholar
• Barrett, C. 1997. “Newman and Wittgenstein on the Rationality of Religious Belief.” In Newman and Conversion, edited by I. Ker, 89–99. Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Bennett-Hunter, G. 2019. “Wittgensteinian Quasi-Fideism and Interreligious Communication.” In Interpreting Interreligious Relations with Wittgenstein: Philosophy, Theology and Religious Studies, edited by G. Andrejč, and D. H. Weiss, 157–173. Leiden, Netherlands: Brill.
   Google Scholar
• Boncompagni, A. 2021. “Religious Hinges: Insights from Pragmatism,” manuscript.
   Google Scholar
• Bortolotti, L. 2018. “Delusion.” In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by E. Zalta. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/delusion/.
   Google Scholar
• Cavell, S. 1979. The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Coliva, A. 2010. Moore and Wittgenstein: Scepticism, Certainty, and Common Sense. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
   Google Scholar
• Coliva, A. 2015. Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
   Google Scholar
• Davidson, D. 1983. “A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge.” In Kant Oder Hegel?, edited by D. Henrich, 428–438. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.
   Google Scholar
• de Ridder, J. 2019. “Against Quasi-Fideism.” Faith and Philosophy 36: 223–243.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• di Ceglie, R. 2017. “Faith and Reason: A Response to Duncan Pritchard.” Philosophy 92: 231–247.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• di Ceglie, R. 2022. God, the Good, and The Spiritual Turn in Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Gascoigne, N. 2019. Rorty, Liberal Democracy, and Religious Certainty. London: Bloomsbury.
   Google Scholar
• Gomez-Alonso, M. 2021. “Wittgenstein, Religious Belief, and Hinge Epistemology.” Skepsis 12: 18–34.
   Google Scholar
• Hawthorne, J., and Y. Isaacs. 2017. “Misapprehensions About the Fine-Tuning Argument.” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 81: 133–155.
   Google Scholar
• Howard-Snyder, D. 2016. “Does Faith Entail Belief?” Faith and Philosophy 33: 142–162.
   Google Scholar
• Kienzler, W. 2006. “Wittgenstein and John Henry Newman on Certainty.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 71: 117–138.
   Google Scholar
• Kusch, M. 2016. “Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and Relativism.” In Analytic and Continental Philosophy: Methods and Perspectives, edited by S. Rinofner-Kreidl, and H. A. Wiltsche, 29–46. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
   Google Scholar
• Ljiljanaa, R., and K. Slavišab. 2017. “Religious Hinge Commitments: Developing Wittgensteinian Quasi-Fideism.” Belgrade Philosophical Annual 30: 235–256.
   Google Scholar
• McGinn, M. 1989. Sense and Certainty: A Dissolution of Scepticism. Oxford: Blackwell.
   Google Scholar
• Moore, G. E. 1925. “A Defence of Common Sense.” In Contemporary British Philosophy (2nd Series), edited by J. H. Muirhead, 191–224. London: Allen & Unwin.
   Google Scholar
• Moore, G. E. 1939. “Proof of an External World.” Proceedings of the British Academy 25: 273–300.
   Google Scholar
• Moyal-Sharrock, D. 2004. Understanding Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
   Google Scholar
• Newman, J. H. 1979 [1870]. An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
   Google Scholar
• Nielsen, K. 1967. “Wittgensteinian Fideism.” Philosophy 42: 237–254.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Phillips, D. Z. 1976. Religion Without Explanation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Pojman, L. 1986. “Faith Without Belief?” Faith and Philosophy 3: 157–176.
   Google Scholar
• Pritchard, D. H. 2010. “Epistemic Relativism, Epistemic Incommensurability and Wittgensteinian Epistemology.” In Blackwell Companion to Relativism, edited by S. Hales, 266–285. Oxford: Blackwell.
   Google Scholar
• Pritchard, D. H. 2011. “Wittgensteinian Quasi-Fideism.” Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Religion 4: 145–159.
   Google Scholar
• Pritchard, D. H. 2013. “Davidson on Radical Skepticism.” In Blackwell Companion to Donald Davidson, edited by E. LePore, and K. Ludwig, 521–533. Oxford: Blackwell.
   Google Scholar
• Pritchard, D. H. 2015a. Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Pritchard, D. H. 2015b. “Wittgenstein on Faith and Reason: The Influence of Newman.” In God, Truth and Other Enigmas, edited by M. Szatkowski, 141–164. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
   Google Scholar
• Pritchard, D. H. 2017a. “Faith and Reason.” Philosophy 81: 101–118.
   Google Scholar
• Pritchard, D. H. 2017b. “Wittgenstein on Hinge Commitments and Radical Scepticism in On Certainty.” In Blackwell Companion to Wittgenstein, edited by H.-J. Glock, and J. Hyman, 563–575. Oxford: Blackwell.
   Google Scholar
• Pritchard, D. H. 2018a. “Disagreement, of Belief and Otherwise.” In Voicing Dissent: The Ethics and Epistemology of Making Disagreement Public, edited by C. Johnson, 22–39. London: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Pritchard, D. H. 2018b. “Quasi-Fideism and Religious Conviction.” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 10: 51–66.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Pritchard, D. H. 2019. “Wittgensteinian Epistemology, Epistemic Vertigo, and Pyrrhonian Scepticism.” In Epistemology After Sextus Empiricus, edited by J. Vlasits, and K. M. Vogt, 172–192. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Pritchard, D. H. 2020. “Epistemic Vertigo.” In The Philosophy and Psychology of Ambivalence: Being of Two Minds, edited by B. Brogaard, and D. Gatzia, 110–128. London: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Pritchard, D. H. 2021a. “Ignorance and Inquiry.” American Philosophical Quarterly 58: 111–123.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Pritchard, D. H.. 2021b. “Ignorance and Normativity.” Philosophical Topics 49: 225–243.
   Google Scholar
• Pritchard, D. H. 2021c. “Wittgensteinian Hinge Epistemology and Deep Disagreement.” TOPOI 40: 1117–1125. doi:10.1007/s11245-018-9612-y.
   Google Scholar
• Pritchard, D. H. 2022. “Exploring Quasi-Fideism.” In Extending Hinge Epistemology, edited by D. Moyal-Sharrock, and C. Sandis, 26–48. London: Anthem.
   Google Scholar
• Schönbaumsfeld, G. 2016. The Illusion of Doubt. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Smith, N. 2021. “How to Hang a Door: Picking Hinges for Quasi-Fideism.” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 13: 51–82.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Strawson, P. F. 1985. Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties. New York: Columbia University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Williams, M. 1991. Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Scepticism. Oxford: Blackwell.
   Google Scholar
• Williams, M. 2007. “Why (Wittgensteinian) Contextualism is not Relativism.” Episteme 4: 93–114.
   Google Scholar
• Williams, M. 2021. “Fideism, Skepticism and ‘Hinge’ Epistemology,” manuscript.
   Google Scholar
• Wittgenstein, L. 1966. Wittgenstein’s Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief, edited by C. Barrett. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
   Google Scholar
• Wittgenstein, L. 1969. On Certainty [OC], edited by G. E. M. Anscombe, G. H. von Wright, D. Paul, and G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell.
   Google Scholar
• Wright, C. 2004. “Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free)?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78: 167–212.
   Google Scholar