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Research Article

Attitudes and action: against de se exceptionalism

Lixiao LinArché Philosophical Research Centre, Department of Philosophy, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, UKCorrespondence[email protected]
ORCID Iconhttps://orcid.org/0000-0003-2535-1416View further author information
ORCID Icon
Received 24 Sep 2022, Accepted 07 Dec 2022, Published online: 28 Dec 2022

References

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