References
- Blome-Tillmann, M. 2014. Knowledge and Presuppositions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Blome-Tillmann, M. 2022. The Semantics of Knowledge Attributions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Derose, K. 2002. “Assertion, Knowledge, and Context.” Philosophical Review 111 (2): 167–203.
- Dretske, F. 1971. “Conclusive Reasons.” Australian Journal of Philosophy 49: 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048407112341001.
- Gerken, M. 2012. “Discursive Justification and Skepticism.” Synthese 189 (2): 373–394. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0076-0.
- Gerken, M. 2013. Epistemic Reasoning and the Mental. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, Innovations in Philosophy.
- Gerken, M. 2017. On Folk Epistemology. How we Think and Talk about Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gerken, M. 2018. “The New Evil Demon and the Devil in the Details.” In The Factive Turn in Epistemology, edited by V. Mitova, 102–122. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kennedy, C., and L. McNally. 2005. “Scale Structure, Degree Modification, and the Semantics of Gradable Predicates.” Language, 345–381. https://doi.org/10.1353/lan.2005.0071.
- MacFarlane, J. 2005. “The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions.” In Oxford Studies in Epistemology, vol. 1, edited by T. Gendler, and J. Hawthorne, 197–234. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Unger, P. 1975. Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.