How to deal with risks of AI suffering

References

• Agarwal, A., and S. Edelman. 2020. “Functionally Effective Conscious AI Without Suffering.” Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness 7 (1): 39–50. doi:10.1142/S2705078520300030.
   Google Scholar
• Alexander, S. 2022, August 8. “Why Not Slow AI Progress? [Substack Newsletter].” Astral Codex Ten. https://astralcodexten.substack.com/p/why-not-slow-ai-progress.
   Google Scholar
• Alexandrova, A. 2017. A Philosophy for the Science of Well-Being (Vol. 1). Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780199300518.001.0001.
   Google Scholar
• Armstrong, S., N. Bostrom, and C. Shulman. 2016. “Racing to the Precipice: A Model of Artificial Intelligence Development.” AI & SOCIETY 31 (2): 201–206. doi:10.1007/s00146-015-0590-y.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bayne, T. 2018. “On the Axiomatic Foundations of the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness.” Neuroscience of Consciousness 2018 (1), doi:10.1093/nc/niy007.
   Google Scholar
• Birch, J. 2017. “Animal Sentience and the Precautionary Principle.” Animal Sentience 2 (16), doi:10.51291/2377-7478.1200.
   Google Scholar
• Birch, J. 2022. “The Search for Invertebrate Consciousness.” Noûs 56 (1): 133–153. doi:10.1111/nous.12351.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Birch, J., and K. Andrews. 2023. What has Feelings? Aeon. https://aeon.co/essays/to-understand-ai-sentience-first-understand-it-in-animals.
   Google Scholar
• Birch, J., and H. Browning. 2021. “Neural Organoids and the Precautionary Principle.” The American Journal of Bioethics 21 (1): 56–58. doi:10.1080/15265161.2020.1845858.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Birch, J., S. Ginsburg, and E. Jablonka. 2020. “Unlimited Associative Learning and the Origins of Consciousness: A Primer and Some Predictions.” Biology & Philosophy 35 (6): 56. doi:10.1007/s10539-020-09772-0.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Block, N. 1981. “Psychologism and Behaviorism.” The Philosophical Review 90 (1): 5. doi:10.2307/2184371.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bolte, L., T. Vandemeulebroucke, and A. van Wynsberghe. 2022. “From an Ethics of Carefulness to an Ethics of Desirability: Going Beyond Current Ethics Approaches to Sustainable AI.” Sustainability 14 (8): Article 8. doi:10.3390/su14084472.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Cave, S., and S. S. ÓhÉigeartaigh. 2018. “An AI Race for Strategic Advantage: Rhetoric and Risks.” Proceedings of the 2018 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society, 36–40. doi:10.1145/3278721.3278780.
   Google Scholar
• Chalmers, D. J. 1996. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Vol. 4, 609–612. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Chalmers, D. J. 2023. Could a Large Language Model be Conscious? (arXiv:2303.07103). arXiv. doi:10.48550/arXiv.2303.07103.
   Google Scholar
• Chan, K. M. A. 2011. “Ethical Extensionism Under Uncertainty of Sentience: Duties to Non-Human Organisms Without Drawing a Line.” Environmental Values 20 (3): 323–346. doi:10.3197/096327111X13077055165983.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Chang, H. 2004. Inventing Temperature: Measurement and Scientific Progress. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0195171276.001.0001.
   Google Scholar
• Chappell, R. Y. 2022. “Pandemic Ethics and Status Quo Risk.” Public Health Ethics 15 (1): 64–73. doi:10.1093/phe/phab031.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Christiano, T., and S. Bajaj. 2022. “Democracy.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2022), edited by E. N. Zalta. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2022/entries/democracy/.
   Google Scholar
• Coelho Mollo, D. 2022. “Intelligent Behaviour.” Erkenntnis, 1–18. doi:10.1007/s10670-022-00552-8.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Crump, A., H. Browning, A. Schnell, C. Burn, and J. Birch. 2022. “Sentience in Decapod Crustaceans: A General Framework and Review of the Evidence.” Animal Sentience 7 (32), doi:10.51291/2377-7478.1691.
   Google Scholar
• Danaher, J. 2020. “Welcoming Robots into the Moral Circle: A Defence of Ethical Behaviourism.” Science and Engineering Ethics 26 (4): 2023–2049. doi:10.1007/s11948-019-00119-x.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Danaher, J. Forthcoming. Moral Uncertainty and Our Relationships with Unknown Minds. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics. https://philarchive.org/rec/DANMUA-2.
   Google Scholar
• Dennett, D. C. 1995. “Animal Consciousness: What Matters and Why?” Social Research: An International Quarterly 62: 691–710.
   Google Scholar
• Doerig, A., A. Schurger, and M. H. Herzog. 2021. “Hard Criteria for Empirical Theories of Consciousness.” Cognitive Neuroscience 12 (2): 41–62. doi:10.1080/17588928.2020.1772214.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Dung, L. 2022a. “Assessing Tests of Animal Consciousness.” Consciousness and Cognition 105: 103410. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2022.103410.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Dung, L. 2022b. “Does Illusionism Imply Skepticism of Animal Consciousness?” Synthese 200 (3): 238. doi:10.1007/s11229-022-03710-1.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Dung, L. 2022c. “Why the Epistemic Objection Against Using Sentience as Criterion of Moral Status is Flawed.” Science and Engineering Ethics 28 (6): 51. doi:10.1007/s11948-022-00408-y.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Dung, L. Forthcoming. “Preserving the Normative Significance of Sentience.” Journal of Consciousness Studies.
   Google Scholar
• Godfrey-Smith, P. 2016. “Mind, Matter, and Metabolism.” Journal of Philosophy 113 (10): 481–506. doi:10.5840/jphil20161131034.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Grace, K. 2022. “Let’s Think About Slowing Down AI.” EA Forum. https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/vwK3v3Mekf6Jjpeep/let-s-think-about-slowing-down-ai-1.
   Google Scholar
• Graziano, M. S. A., A. Guterstam, B. J. Bio, and A. I. Wilterson. 2020. “Toward a Standard Model of Consciousness: Reconciling the Attention Schema, Global Workspace, Higher-Order Thought, and Illusionist Theories.” Cognitive Neuropsychology 37 (3–4): 155–172. doi:10.1080/02643294.2019.1670630.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Gunkel, D. J. 2018. Robot Rights. The MIT Press. doi:10.7551/mitpress/11444.001.0001.
   Google Scholar
• Habermas, J. 1984. The Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. I: Reason and the Rationalization of Society. Beacon.
   Google Scholar
• Habermas, J. 1987. The Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. II: Lifeworld and System. Beacon.
   Google Scholar
• Herzog, M. H., M. Esfeld, and W. Gerstner. 2007. “Consciousness & the Small Network Argument.” Neural Networks 20 (9): 1054–1056. doi:10.1016/j.neunet.2007.09.001.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Irvine, E. 2012. Consciousness as a Scientific Concept: A Philosophy of Science Perspective. Dordrecht: Springer.
   Google Scholar
• Kammerer, F. 2019. “The Normative Challenge for Illusionist Views of Consciousness.” Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6. doi:10.3998/ergo.12405314.0006.032.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kammerer, F. 2022. “Ethics Without Sentience. Facing Up to the Probable Insignificance of Phenomenal Consciousness.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 29 (3-4): 180–204. https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.29.3.180
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Knutsson, S., and C. Munthe. 2017. “A Virtue of Precaution Regarding the Moral Status of Animals with Uncertain Sentience.” Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 30 (2): 213–224. doi:10.1007/s10806-017-9662-y.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kriegel, U. 2019. “The Value of Consciousness.” Analysis 79 (3): 503–520. doi:10.1093/analys/anz045.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Ladak, A. 2023. What would Qualify an Artificial Intelligence for Moral Standing? AI and Ethics. doi:10.1007/s43681-023-00260-1.
   Google Scholar
• Lau, H. 2022. In Consciousness we Trust: The Cognitive Neuroscience of Subjective Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• MacAskill, W., K. Bykvist, and T. Ord. 2020. Moral Uncertainty. 1st ed. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198722274.001.0001.
   Google Scholar
• Mandelbaum, E. 2022. “Everything and More: The Prospects of Whole Brain Emulation.” The Journal of Philosophy 119 (8): 444–459. doi:10.5840/jphil2022119830.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Massimini, M., and G. Tononi. 2018. Sizing up Consciousness (Vol. 1). Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198728443.001.0001.
   Google Scholar
• Metzinger, T. 2021. “Artificial Suffering: An Argument for a Global Moratorium on Synthetic Phenomenology.” Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness 8 (1): 43–66. doi:10.1142/S270507852150003X.
   Google Scholar
• Müller, V. C. 2016. “Autonomous Killer Robots Are Probably Good News.” In Drones and Responsibility: Legal, Philosophical and Socio-Technical Perspectives on the use of Remotely Controlled Weapons, edited by E. D. Nucci and F. S. de Sio, 67–81. London: Ashgate. https://philarchive.org/rec/MLLAKR.
   Google Scholar
• Müller, V. C. 2021. “Is it Time for Robot Rights? Moral Status in Artificial Entities.” Ethics and Information Technology 23 (4): 579–587. doi:10.1007/s10676-021-09596-w.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Nagel, T. 1974. “What is It Like to Be a Bat?” The Philosophical Review 83 (4): 435–450. doi:10.2307/2183914.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Negro, N. 2020. “Phenomenology-first Versus Third-Person Approaches in the Science of Consciousness: The Case of the Integrated Information Theory and the Unfolding Argument.” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19 (5): 979–996. doi:10.1007/s11097-020-09681-3.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Niikawa, T., Y. Hayashi, J. Shepherd, and T. Sawai. 2022. “Human Brain Organoids and Consciousness.” Neuroethics 15 (1): 5. doi:10.1007/s12152-022-09483-1.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Nordgren, A. 2023. “Pandemics and the Precautionary Principle: An Analysis Taking the Swedish Corona Commission’s Report as a Point of Departure.” Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 26: 163–173. doi:10.1007/s11019-023-10139-x.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Nussbaum, M. C. 2007. Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Prinz, J. 2003. “Level-Headed Mysterianism and Artificial Experience.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (4–5): 111–132.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Saad, B., and A. Bradley. 2022. “Digital Suffering: Why it’s a Problem and how to Prevent it.” Inquiry 0 (0): 1–36. doi:10.1080/0020174X.2022.2144442.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Sandberg, A. 2013. “Feasibility of Whole Brain Emulation.” In Philosophy and Theory of Artificial Intelligence, edited by V. C. Müller, 251–264. Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-31674-6_19.
   Google Scholar
• Schukraft, J. 2020. “Comparisons of Capacity for Welfare and Moral Status Across Species.” Rethink Priorities. https://rethinkpriorities.org/publications/comparisons-of-capacity-for-welfare-and-moral-status-across-species.
   Google Scholar
• Schwitzgebel, E. 2020. “Is There Something It’s Like to be a Garden Snail.” Philosophical Topics 48 (1): 39–63. doi:10.5840/philtopics20204813.
   Google Scholar
• Schwitzgebel, E., and M. Garza. 2015. “A Defense of the Rights of Artificial Intelligences.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 39 (1): 98–119. doi:10.1111/misp.12032.
   Google Scholar
• Searle, J. 2017. “Biological Naturalism.” In The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. 1st ed., 327–336, edited by S. Schneider and M. Velmans. Wiley. doi:10.1002/9781119132363.ch23.
   Google Scholar
• Seidenfeld, T. 1985. “Calibration, Coherence, and Scoring Rules.” Philosophy of Science 52 (2): 274–294. doi:10.1086/289244.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Seth, A. K., and T. Bayne. 2022. “Theories of Consciousness.” Nature Reviews Neuroscience 23 (7): Article 7. doi:10.1038/s41583-022-00587-4.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Shevlin, H. 2020. “General Intelligence: An Ecumenical Heuristic for Artificial Consciousness Research?” Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness, doi:10.17863/CAM.52059.
   Google Scholar
• Shevlin, H. 2021a. “How Could We Know When a Robot was a Moral Patient?” Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 30 (3): 459–471. doi:10.1017/S0963180120001012.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Shevlin, H. 2021b. “Non-Human Consciousness and the Specificity Problem: A Modest Theoretical Proposal.” Mind & Language 36 (2): 297–314. doi:10.1111/mila.12338.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Shriver, A. J. 2020. “The Role of Neuroscience in Precise, Precautionary, and Probabilistic Accounts of Sentience.” In Neuroethics and Nonhuman Animals, edited by L. S. M. Johnson, A. Fenton, and A. Shriver, 221–233. Springer International Publishing. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-31011-0_13.
   Google Scholar
• Shulman, C., and N. Bostrom. 2021. “Sharing the World with Digital Minds.” In Rethinking Moral Status, edited by S. Clarke, H. Zohny, and J. Savulescu, 306–326. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780192894076.003.0018.
   Google Scholar
• Singer, P. 2011. Practical Ethics. 3rd ed. Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511975950.
   Google Scholar
• Steel, D. 2014. Philosophy and the Precautionary Principle: Science, Evidence, and Environmental Policy. Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139939652.
   Google Scholar
• Steele, K., and H. O. Stefánsson. 2020. “Decision Theory.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2020), edited by E. N. Zalta. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2020/entries/decision-theory/.
   Google Scholar
• Tetlock, P. E., and D. Gardner. 2015. Superforecasting: The Art and Science of Prediction. New York: Crown.
   Google Scholar
• Tomasik, B. 2014. Do Artificial Reinforcement-Learning Agents Matter Morally? ArXiv:1410.8233 [Cs]. http://arxiv.org/abs/1410.8233.
   Google Scholar
• Tononi, G., and C. Koch. 2015. “Consciousness: Here, There and Everywhere?” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 370 (1668), doi:10.1098/rstb.2014.0167.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Tye, M. 2017. Tense Bees and Shell-Shocked Crabs: Are Animals Conscious? Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190278014.001.0001.
   Google Scholar
• Višak, T. 2022. Capacity for Welfare Across Species. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Wilkinson, H. 2022. “In Defense of Fanaticism.” Ethics 132 (2): 445–477. doi:10.1086/716869.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar