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Articles

Conditioning Factors for Re-election and Incumbency Advantage after a Natural Disaster: Evidence from a Large-scale Earthquake

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Pages 1575-1592 | Received 02 Apr 2020, Accepted 25 Jan 2021, Published online: 25 Feb 2021

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