Problematic social situations and the “large‐number dilemma” a game‐theoretical analysisFootnote*

The paper draws on material from Raub and Voss (1986). Comments by Thomas Voss and suggestions by James Coleman are gratefully acknowledged. They are not responsible for any errors.

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