Private ordering: A comparative institutional analysis of hostage gamesFootnote*

We thank Maarten Duijvendak, Gideon Keren, Peter Marsden, and Chris Snijders for their helpful suggestions. Visiting appointments of Jeroen Weesie at the Department of Sociology, Harvard University, and of Werner Raub at the Department of Sociology, University of Chicago, provided useful support in preparing the paper and are gratefully acknowledged. Financial support was provided by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) under Grant PGS 50–370 and by the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). The order of authorship was established by pseudo‐randomization.

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