Defeating the gang: The social dynamics of compliance in a rake‐off economyFootnote*

I thank Antonio Gay, Alan Kirman, Peter Mollgard and Mark Salmon for very useful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts; I moreover thank seminar audience at the Economics and Mathematics Workshop (Florence) and at the Macro Workshop (EUI), as well as participants to the Inter‐University Working Group on Irregular Economies. Finally, I am very grateful to two anonymous referees of this journal whose perceptive comments and criticisms have substantially improved the paper, and to Marco Sandri for his help in the preparation of the figures. The usual disclaimer applies.

References

• Allison , J. P. 1972 . Economics factors and the rate of crime . Land Economics , 48 : 193 – 196 .
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Becker , G. 1968 . Crime and punishment: An economic approach . Journal of Political Economy , 76 : 169 – 217 .
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Becker , G. 1991 . A note on restaurant pricing and other examples of social influences on price . Journal of Political Economy , 99 : 1109 – 1116 .
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Björnerstedt , J. and Weibull , J. W. 1995 . “ Nash equilibrium and evolution by imitation ” . In The Rational Foundations of Economic Behavior , Edited by: Arrow , K. J. London : Macmillan . forthcoming
   Google Scholar
• Buchanan , J. M. 1975 . The Limits of Liberty. Between Anarchy and Leviathan , Chicago : The University of Chicago Press .
   Google Scholar
• Casarrubea , G. and Blandano , P. 1991 . L’ educazione mafiosa. Strutture sociali e processi di identità , Palermo : Sellerio .
   Google Scholar
• Chow , S.‐N. and Hale , J. K. 1982 . Methods of Bifurcation Theory , Berlin : Springer .
   Google Scholar
• Cloninger , D. O. 1991 . Lethal police response as a crime deterrent: 57‐city study suggests a decrease in certain crimes . American Journal of Economics and Sociology , 50 : 59 – 69 .
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Conyers , J. 1979 . Criminology, economics and public policy, 1979 . Crime and Delinquency , 25 : 137 – 164 .
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Danzinger , S. and Wheeler , D. 1975 . The economics of crime: Punishment of income redistribution . Review of Social Economy , 33 : 113 – 131 .
   Google Scholar
• Deutsch , J. , Hakim , S. and Spiegel , U. 1990 . The effects of criminal experience on the incidence of crime . American Journal of Economics and Sociology , 49 : 1 – 5 .
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Ehrlich , I. 1973 . Participation in illegitimate activities: A theoretical and empirical investigation . Journal of Political Economy , 81 : 521 – 565 .
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Ehrlich , I. 1975 . The deterrent effect of capital punishment: A question of life and death . American Economic Review , 65 : 397 – 417 .
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Ehrlich , I. 1977 . Capital punishment and deterrence: Some further thoughts and additional evidence . Journal of Political Economy , 85 : 741 – 788 .
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Friedman , D. 1993 . Economically applicable evolutionary games , CentER Discussion Paper no. 9226 Tilburg University .
   Google Scholar
• Friedman , J. , Hakim , S. and Spiegel , U. 1989 . The difference between short and long run effects of police outlays on crime: Policing deters criminals initially, but later they may ‘learn by doing’ . American Journal of Economics and Sociology , 48 : 177 – 192 .
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Gambetta , D. 1988 . “ Mafia: The price of distrust ” . In Trust. Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations , Edited by: Gambetta , D. 158 – 175 . Oxford : Basil Blackwell .
   Google Scholar
• Gambetta , D. 1992 . La mafia siciliana , Torino : Einaudi .
   Google Scholar
• Giannola , A. 1987 . “ Struttura produttiva ed imprenditorialità ” . In L’ economia e il Mezzogiorno , Edited by: Giannola , A. 81 – 102 . Milan : Franco Angeli .
   Google Scholar
• Granovetter , M. 1978 . Threshold models of collective behavior . American Journal of Sociology , 83 : 1420 – 1443 .
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Granovetter , M. 1985 . Economic action and social structure: The problem of embeddedness . American Journal of Sociology , 91 : 481 – 510 .
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hofbauer , J. and Sigmund , K. 1988 . The Theory of Evolution and Dynamical Systems , Cambridge : Cambridge University Press .
   Google Scholar
• Jones , S. R. G. 1984 . The Economics of Conformism , Oxford : Basil Blackwell .
   Google Scholar
• Lewis , D. 1967 . Convention , Cambridge : Harvard University Press .
   Google Scholar
• Lucas , R. E. Jr. 1976 . Econometric policy evaluation: a critique . Carnegie Rochester Conferences on Public Policy , 1 : 19 – 46 .
   Google Scholar
• Lucas , R. E. Jr. 1986 . Adaptive behavior and economic theory . Journal of Business , 59 : S401 – S426 .
   Google Scholar
• McPheters , L. R. and Stronge , W. B. 1974 . Law enforcement expenditures and urban crime . National Tax Journal , 27 : 633 – 644 .
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Polo , M. 1995 . “ Internal cohesion and competition among criminal organisations ” . In The Economics of Organised Crime , Edited by: Fiorentini , G. and Peltzman , S. 87 – 109 . Cambridge : Cambridge University Press .
   Google Scholar
• Sacco , P. L. 1994 . Selection mechanisms in economics . Behavioral Science , 39 : 311 – 325 .
   Google Scholar
• Sacco , P. L. 1995 . “ Comment to M. Polo, Internal cohesion and competition among criminal organisations ” . In The Economics of Organised Crime , Edited by: Fiorentini , G. and Peltzman , S. 109 – 115 . Cambridge : Cambridge University Press .
   Google Scholar
• Schelling , T. C. 1978 . Micromotives and Macrobehavior , New York : Norton .
   Google Scholar
• Schelling , T. C. 1984 . Choice and Consequence. Perspectives of An Errant Economist , Cambridge : Harvard University Press .
   Google Scholar
• Schmidt , P. and Witte , A. 1984 . An Economic Analysis of Crime , New York : Academic Press .
   Google Scholar
• I thank Antonio Gay, Alan Kirman, Peter Mollgard and Mark Salmon for very useful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts; I moreover thank seminar audience at the Economics and Mathematics Workshop (Florence) and at the Macro Workshop (EUI), as well as participants to the Inter‐University Working Group on Irregular Economies. Finally, I am very grateful to two anonymous referees of this journal whose perceptive comments and criticisms have substantially improved the paper, and to Marco Sandri for his help in the preparation of the figures. The usual disclaimer applies.
   Google Scholar