References
- Admiralty . 1952 . The U-boat War in the Atlantic II (London, (also published as a single volume by HMSO); subsequently referred to as Hessler, 1,2
- 1942 . Professor Klaus Friedland, ‘Raiding Merchant Shipping: U-boats in the North Atlantic’, public lecture (unpublished), King's College, London, 8 Nov. 1990, notes some of these expedients such as single engine running and storing fuel in drinking water tanks
- 1992 . Men of War: Great Naval Leaders of World War II 89 – 92 . King has an apologist in Robert Love. See his essay on King in, edited by Stephen Howarth (London
- 1983 . Axis Submarine Successes 1939–1945 487 London 261 tons in the whole North Atlantic, abstracted from Jürgen Rohwer
- 20 May 1942 . 20 May , On an annual normalisation of the monthly figure. PRO, CAB86/1 AU(2)41
- 22 May 1941 . 22 May , PRO CAB86/1 AU(9)41
- Hessler II, 13.
- Hessler II, 16. Although the figure (generally in excess of 300 tons per boat per sea-day) was twice earlier exceeded during the war, these occurred at a time when there were far fewer boats at sea, and thus the higher efficiency did not necessarily translate into higher total sinkings. Generally in this earlier phase their targets were independents close to the newly acquired Biscay bases
- All submarines were sunk by the surface escort whose growing strength was noted by the Germans. Hessler II, 33.
- Hessler II, 55. Note the discrepancy in assessed number of merchant ships sunk and the true figure.
- Hessler II, 56.
- The Intelligence Revolution: a Historical Perspective Professor Jürgen Rohwer, in Les Marines de Guerre du Dreadnought au Nucélaire, Service Historique de la Marine (Paris, 1990), Section 5.1
- Although November is a particularly poor month for the Allies, the worst convoy losses of that month are attributable to October in this analysis, because this is the month in which the operations against the convoys began, and the analysis considers each as an integral whole.
- PRO CAB 120/71.
- 1943 . In mid-May the frequency of meetings opened up to fortnightly, then later monthly. PRO CAB86/2
- November 1942 . November , The level of losses in was also not to be exceeded for the remainder of the war
- Hessler II, 68 which also makes the unreferenced remark that a later German analysis considers the surface escort numerous but not efficient in pursuit.
- Hessler II, 69.
- Sinking of HMS Firedrake and the Battle for Convoy ONl53 105 – 111 . In any case many of the Ultra decrypts achieved in this early period were insufficiently timely to be of use. When convoy ON 153 was attacked by 13 submarines from 15 to 21 December, very little of the appropriate traffic was available at the time. An examination of the footnotes in by David Syrett in The American Neptune, spring 1991;pp. makes it clear that hardly any signals were decrypted during the attack; many not until early January, thus limiting the utility of Ultra in this case to post event analysis and for historical purposes. This article illustrates how Ultra may be used in reconstructing convoyactions
- F.H. Hinsley et al, British Intelligence in the Second World War, Vol. II (London, 1981), 553
- 78 – 9 . Hessler II
- October and December, 65; February, 68. The average group size remained constant at 12 boats per operation.
- Axis Submarine Successes Patrick Stephens . The attribution of a sinking to a convoy is a fine point. The view might be taken that the loss of stragglers (usually the biggest marginal category) should not be attributed as a convoy loss. But these were often attacked by submarines attempting to close the convoy in question. This appears to be the implicit view adopted by Professor Jürgen Rohwer in his (, 1983) and is used here. The attribution of dispersed ships and, more rarely, rompers (those ahead of the convoy) is probably more arguable but these are much less common and thus their inclusion is potentially less controversial. In any case, by this stage of the campaign, end-to-end escort was the norm in most important areas and thus the loss of dispersed ships was virtually nil
- June 1941 2 A figure generated in as necessary for a ‘mortal blow to Great Britain’ assuming some limited replacement shipping from the U.S.A. Hessler II; p. quoting German Naval Staff Study PG 32619, 8
- The faster HX convoy caught up with the slower SC one.
- Middlebrook , Martin . 1976 . Convoy: the Battle for Convoys SC122 and HX229 London (and Jürgen Rohwer, The Critical Convoy Battles of March 1943: the Battle for HX229/SC122 (London, 1977). Middlebrook in an approach which he has since made virtually his own is especially strong on the human aspect, but without indulging in sentimentality. The Rohwer work is probably of more use to naval historians
- The Safe and Timely arrival of Convoy SC 130, 15–25 May 1943 The former is described in another David Syrett article, in The American Neptune, summer 1992
- The first use of these did not, however, take place until the SC convoy after the SC122/HX229 action.
- A notable feature of operations in this period is that smaller proportions of submarines were able to gain attacking positions. In the action against HX229/SC122 only 19 out of 40 submarines made attacks.
- On bad months for the Allies during the period of this paper, three escorts might be sunk. The average was around one. The Germans lost more submarines during convoy attacks, and very many more in total.
- Beesly , Patrick . 1977 . Very Special Intelligence Hamish Hamilton . (203
- 1957 . Defeat of the Enemy Attack on Shipping Admiralty (Volume IB, Plan 15