357
Views
0
CrossRef citations to date
0
Altmetric
Original Articles

The impact of terrorism on tax enforcement effectiveness: a case study of the Basque Country and Navarre

ORCID Icon
Pages 1425-1441 | Received 27 Feb 2019, Published online: 13 Feb 2020

REFERENCES

  • Abadie, A., & Gardeazabal, J. (2003). The economic costs of conflict: A case study of the Basque Country. American Economic Review, 93(1), 113–132. doi: 10.1257/000282803321455188
  • Abadie, A., & Gardeazabal, J. (2008). Terrorism and the world economy. European Economic Review, 52(1), 1–27. doi: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2007.08.005
  • Alexeev, M., Janeba, E., & Osborne, S. (2003). Taxation by state and organized crime: Harmony or conflict? Public Finance and Management, 4(3), 398–418.
  • Alexeev, M., Janeba, E., & Osborne, S. (2004). Taxation and evasion in the presence of extortion by organized crime. Journal of Comparative Economics, 32, 375–387. doi: 10.1016/j.jce.2004.04.002
  • Allingham, M. G., & Sandmo, A. (1972). Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis. Journal of Public Economics, 1, 323–338. doi: 10.1016/0047-2727(72)90010-2
  • Alm, J. (2000). Tax compliance and administration. In W. B. Hildreth & J. A. Richardson (Eds.), Handbook on taxation (pp. 741–768). New York: Marcel Dekker.
  • Andreoni, J. (1992). IRS as loan shark tax compliance with borrowing constraints. Journal of Public Economics, 49(1), 35–46. doi: 10.1016/0047-2727(92)90062-K
  • Bandyopadhyay, S., Sandler, T., & Younas, J. (2014). Foreign direct investment, aid, and terrorism. Oxford Economic Papers, 66(1), 25–50. doi: 10.1093/oep/gpt026
  • Bandyopadhyay, S., Sandler, T., & Younas, J. (2018). Trade and terrorism: A disaggregated approach. Journal of Peace Research, 55(5), 656–670. doi: 10.1177/0022343318763009
  • Barbería, J. L. (2004). El agujero negro de la lucha antiterrorista. El País, 21 November.
  • Blank, J. D., & Levin, D. Z. (2010). When is tax enforcement publicized? Virginia Tax Review, 30(1), 1–38.
  • Blomberg, S., Hess, G., & Orphanides, A. (2004). The macroeconomic consequences of terrorism. Journal of Monetary Economics, 51(5), 1007–1032. doi: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2004.04.001
  • Bornstein, F. (2004). ¿Deduce el impuesto revolucionario? Nueva Economia – El Mundo, 8 February.
  • Buckley, P. J., & Klemm, M. (1993). The decline of tourism in Northern Ireland: The causes. Tourism Management, 14(3), 184–194. doi: 10.1016/0261-5177(93)90019-H
  • Buesa, M. (2011). ETA. S.A. El dinero que mueve el terrorismo y los costes que genera. Barcelona: Planeta.
  • Buesa, M., & Baumert, T. (2013). Untangling ETA’s finance: An in-depth analysis of the Basque terrorist’s economic network and the money it handles. Defence and Peace Economics, 24(4), 317–338. doi: 10.1080/10242694.2012.710812
  • Cremer, H., & Gahvari, F. (2000). Tax evasion, fiscal competition and economic integration. European Economic Review, 44, 1633–1657. doi: 10.1016/S0014-2921(99)00025-2
  • De la Fuente, Á. (1999). La dinámica territorial de la población española: Un panorama y algunos resultados provisionales. Revista de Economía Aplicada, 20(7), 53–108.
  • De Leeuw, J., & Meijer, E. (2008). Introduction to multilevel analysis. In J. De Leeuw, & E. Meijer (Eds.), Handbook of multilevel analysis (pp. 1–75). New York: Springer.
  • Dorsett, R. (2013). The effect of the troubles on GDP in Northern Ireland. European Journal of Political Economy, 29(1), 119–133. doi: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2012.10.003
  • Drakos, K., & Kutan, A. M. (2003). Regional effects of terrorism on tourism in three Mediterranean countries. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 47(5), 621–641. doi: 10.1177/0022002703258198
  • Dreher, A., Krieger, T., & Meierrieks, D. (2011). Hit and (they will) run: The impact of terrorism on migration. Economics Letters, 113(1), 42–46. doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.05.044
  • Durán-Cabré, J. M., Esteller-Moré, A., & Salvadori, L. (2015). Empirical evidence on horizontal competition in tax enforcement. International Tax and Public Finance, 22(5), 834–860. doi: 10.1007/s10797-014-9333-0
  • Durán-Cabré, J. M., Esteller-Moré, A., & Salvadori, L. (2016). Empirical evidence on tax cooperation among sub-central administrations. Journal of Tax Administration, 2(2), 24–46.
  • Durán-Cabré, J. M., Esteller-Moré, A., & Salvadori, L. (2018). Does the tax administration play an unfair gamble with taxpayers? Evidence from survey data (Working Papers No. 2018/06). Institute for Fiscal Studies (IEF).
  • Eckstein, Z., & Tsiddon, D. (2004). Macroeconomic consequences of terror: Theory and the case of Israel. Journal of Monetary Economics, 51(1), 971–1002. doi: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2004.05.001
  • Eichenbaum, M., & Fisher, J. D. M. (2004). Fiscal policy in the aftermath of 9/11 (Working Paper No. 10430). Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).
  • Eldor, R., & Melnick, R. (2004). Financial markets and terrorism. European Journal of Political Economy, 20(2), 367–386. doi: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2004.03.002
  • Enders, W., & Olson, E. (2012). Measuring the economic costs of terrorism. In M. R. Garfinkel & S. Skaperdas (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of the economics of peace and conflict (pp. 362–387). New York: Oxford University Press.
  • Enders, W., & Sandler, T. (1991). Causality between transnational terrorism and tourism: The case of Spain. Terrorism, 14, 49–58. doi: 10.1080/10576109108435856
  • Enders, W., & Sandler, T. (1996). Terrorism and foreign direct investment in Spain and Greece. Kyklos, 49, 331–352. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6435.1996.tb01400.x
  • Frey, B. S., Luechinger, S., & Stutzer, A. (2007). Calculating tragedy: Assessing the costs of terrorism. Journal of Economic Surveys, 21(1), 1–24. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6419.2007.00505.x
  • Gaibulloev, K., & Sandler, T. (2019). What we have learned about terrorism since 9/11. Journal of Economic Literature, 57(2), 275–328. doi: 10.1257/jel.20181444
  • Gaibulloev, K., Sandler, T., & Sul, D. (2014). Dynamic panel analysis under cross-sectional dependence. Political Analysis, 22(2), 258–273. doi: 10.1093/pan/mpt029
  • Glaeser, E. L., & Shapiro, J. M. (2002). Cities and warfare: The impact of terrorism on urban form. Journal of Urban Economics, 51(2), 205–224. doi: 10.1006/juec.2001.2262
  • Goldstein, H. (2011). Multilevel statistical models. Chichester: Wiley.
  • Greene, W. H. (2002). Econometric analysis, 5th Ed. Pearson Education.
  • Gupta, S., Clements, B., Bhattacharya, R., & Chakravarti, S. (2004). Fiscal consequences of armed conflict and terrorism in low- and middle-income countries. European Journal of Political Economy, 20(2), 403–421. doi: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2003.12.001
  • Hedeker, D. (2008). Multilevel models for ordinal and nominal variables. In J. De Leeuw, & E. Meijer (Eds.), Handbook of multilevel analysis (pp. 239–276). New York: Springer.
  • Hobjin, B. (2002). What will homeland security cost? Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review, 8, 21–33.
  • Ito, H., & Lee, D. (2005). Assessing the impact of the September 11 terrorist attacks on U.S. airline demand. Journal of Economics and Business, 57, 75–95. doi: 10.1016/j.jeconbus.2004.06.003
  • Kleven, H. J., Knudsen, M. B., Kreiner, C. T., Pedersen, S., & Saez, M. (2011). Unwilling or unable to cheat? Evidence from a tax audit experiment in Denmark. Econometrica, 79(3), 651–692. doi: 10.3982/ECTA9113
  • Korta, J. M. (2004). Las Haciendas vascas crean un fichero especial para los chantajeados por ETA. El Mundo, 22 January.
  • Leonisio, R., Molina, F., & Muro, D. (2017). ETA’s terrorist campaign: From violence to politics, 1968–2015. Abingdon: Routledge.
  • Llussa, F., & Tavares, J. (2007a). The economics of terrorism: A synopsis. Economics of Peace and Security Journal, 2, 62–70.
  • Llussa, F., & Tavares, J. (2007b). The economics of terrorism: What I know, what I should know and the data I need. In P. Keefer & N. Loayza (Eds.), Terrorism, economic development, and political openness (pp. 233–296). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Lozano-Gracia, N., Piras, G., Ibáñez, A. M., & Hewings, G. J. D. (2010). The journey to safety: Conflict-driven migration flows in Colombia. International Regional Science Review, 33(2), 157–180. doi: 10.1177/0160017609336998
  • Mansoorian, A., & Myers, G. M. (1993). Attachment to home and efficient purchases of population in a fiscal externality economy. Journal of Public Economics, 52(1), 117–132. doi: 10.1016/0047-2727(93)90108-6
  • Mansoorian, A., & Myers, G. M. (1997). On the consequences of government objectives for economies with mobile populations. Journal of Public Economics, 63(2), 265–281. doi: 10.1016/S0047-2727(96)01587-3
  • Neumayer, E., & Plümper, T. (2016). Spatial spill-overs from terrorism on tourism: Western victims in Islamic destination countries. Public Choice, 169(3–4), 195–206. doi: 10.1007/s11127-016-0359-y
  • Nitsch, V., & Schumacher, D. (2004). Terrorism and international trade: An empirical investigation. European Journal of Political Economy, 20, 423–433. doi: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2003.12.009
  • Sanchez, W. A. (2008). Corsica: France’s petite security problem. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 31(7), 655–664. doi: 10.1080/10576100802144056
  • Sanso-Navarro, M., Sanz-Gracia, F., & Vera-Cabello, M. (2019). The demographic impact of terrorism: Evidence from municipalities in the Basque Country and Navarre. Regional Studies, 53(6), 838–848. doi: 10.1080/00343404.2018.1490010
  • Shaw, J., Slemrod, J., & Whiting, J. (2010). Administration and compliance. In J. Mirrlees, S. Adam, T. Besley, R. Blundell, S. Bond, R. Chote, M. Gammie, P. Johnson, G. Myles & J. Poterba (Eds.), Dimensions of tax design: The Mirrlees review (pp. 1100–1162). Oxford: Oxford University Press for Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS).
  • Silke, A. (1998). In defense of the realm: Financing loyalist terrorism in Northern Ireland – Part one: Extortion and blackmail. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 21(4), 331–361. doi: 10.1080/10576109808436073
  • Slemrod, J. (2007). Cheating ourselves: The economics of tax evasion. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21, 25–48. doi: 10.1257/jep.21.1.25
  • Slemrod, J. (2019). Tax compliance and enforcement. Journal of Economic Literature, 57(4), 904–954. doi: 10.1257/jel.20181437
  • Slemrod, J., Blumenthal, M., & Christian, C. (2001). Taxpayer response to an increased probability of audit: Evidence from a controlled experiment in Minnesota. Journal of Public Economics, 79(3), 455–483. doi: 10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00107-3
  • Slemrod, J., & Yitzhaki, S. (1987). The optimal size of a tax collection agency. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 89, 183–192. doi: 10.2307/3440063
  • Slemrod, J., & Yitzhaki, S. (2002). Tax avoidance, evasion, and administration. In A. J. Auerbach & M. S. Feldstein (Eds.), Handbook of public economics (Vol. 3, pp. 1423–1470). Amsterdam: Elsevier.
  • Tavares, J. (2004). The open society assesses its enemies: Shocks, disasters and terrorist attacks. Journal of Monetary Economics, 51(5), 1039–1070. doi: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2004.04.009
  • Wildasin, D. E. (2002). Local public finance in the aftermath of September 11. Journal of Urban Economics, 51, 225–237. doi: 10.1006/juec.2001.2263
  • Wooldridge, J. (2002). Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data. London: MIT Press.
  • World Bank. (2002). Fifteen months intifada, closures and Palestinian economic crisis: An assessment. Washington, DC: World Bank.
  • World Bank. (2003). Two years of intifada, closures and Palestinian economic crisis: An assessment. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Reprints and Corporate Permissions

Please note: Selecting permissions does not provide access to the full text of the article, please see our help page How do I view content?

To request a reprint or corporate permissions for this article, please click on the relevant link below:

Academic Permissions

Please note: Selecting permissions does not provide access to the full text of the article, please see our help page How do I view content?

Obtain permissions instantly via Rightslink by clicking on the button below:

If you are unable to obtain permissions via Rightslink, please complete and submit this Permissions form. For more information, please visit our Permissions help page.