The unity of moral attitudes: recipe semantics and credal exaptationFootnote^*

* This paper benefitted from comments by Adam Thompson, Derek Baker, David Faraci, Tristram McPherson, William Melanson, and two anonymous referees, as well as audiences at the Philosopher’s Cocoon and Minds Online conferences.

References

• Anderson, Michael. 2010. “Neural Reuse: A Fundamental Organizational Principle of the Brain.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4): 245–266.10.1017/S0140525X10000853
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Ayer, Alfred J. 1936. Language, Truth and Logic. London: Victor Gollancz.
   Google Scholar
• Baker, Derek, and Jack Woods. 2015. “How Expressivists Can and Should Explain Inconsistency.” Ethics 125 (2): 391–424.10.1086/678371
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Björnsson, Gunnar, and Tristram McPherson. 2014. “Moral Attitudes for Non-Cognitivists: Solving the Specification Problem.” Mind 123 (489): 1–38.10.1093/mind/fzu031
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Blackburn, Simon. 1984. Spreading the Word. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Blackburn, Simon. 1988. “Attitudes and Contents.” Ethics 98 (3): 501–517.10.1086/292968
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Blumson, Ben. 2012. “Mental Maps.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2): 413–434.10.1111/phpr.2012.85.issue-2
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Boehm, Christopher. 2012. Moral Origins: The Evolution of Virtue, Altruism, and Shame. New York: Basic Books.
   Google Scholar
• Dretske, Fred. 1995. Naturalizing the Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• d’Errico, Francesco, and Chris Stringer. 2011. “Evolution, Revolution or Saltation Scenario for the Emergence of Modern Cultures?” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 366 (1567): 1060–1069.10.1098/rstb.2010.0340
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Field, Hartry. 1978. “Mental Representation.” Erkenntnis 13 (1): 9–61.10.1007/BF00160888
   Google Scholar
• Fodor, Jerry. 1998. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/0198236360.001.0001
   Google Scholar
• Fodor, Jerry. 2008. Lot 2: The Language of Thought Revisited. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199548774.001.0001
   Google Scholar
• Fodor, Jerry, and Zenon Pylyshyn. 1988. “Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture.” Cognition 28 (1–2): 3–71.10.1016/0010-0277(88)90031-5
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Geach, Peter. 1965. “Assertion.” The Philosophical Review 74 (4): 449–465.10.2307/2183123
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Gibbard, Allan. 1990. Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Gibbard, Allan. 2003. Thinking How to Live. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Gould, Stephen J., and Elisabeth Vrba. 1982. “Exaptation – A Missing Term in the Science of Form.” Paleobiology 8 (1): 4–15.10.1017/S0094837300004310
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Henn, Brenna, Luigi Cavalli-Sforza, and Marcus Feldman. 2012. “The Great Human Expansion.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 109 (44): 17758–17764.10.1073/pnas.1212380109
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Horgan, Terry, and Mark Timmons. 2006. “Cognitivist Expressivism.” In Metaethics after Moore, edited by Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons, 255–298. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269914.001.0001
   Google Scholar
• Horgan, Terry, and Mark Timmons. 2009. “Expressivism and Contrary-Forming Negation.” Philosophical Issues 19 (1): 92–112.10.1111/phis.2009.19.issue-1
   Google Scholar
• Joyce, Richard. 2001. The Myth of Morality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9780511487101
   Google Scholar
• Joyce, Richard. 2007. The Evolution of Morality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Klein, Richard. 2008. “Out of Africa and the Evolution of Human Behavior.” Evolutionary Anthropology: Issues, News, and Reviews 17 (6): 267–281.10.1002/evan.20181
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Mackie, John L. 1977. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. New York: Penguin Books.
   Google Scholar
• Merli, David. 2008. “Expressivism and the Limits of Moral Disagreement.” Journal of Ethics 12 (1): 25–55.
   Google Scholar
• Millikan, Ruth. 1984. Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Papineau, David. 1984. “Representation and Explanation.” Philosophy of Science 51 (4): 550–572.10.1086/289205
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Powell, Adam, Stephan Shennan, and Mark Thomas. 2009. “Late Pleistocene Demography and the Appearance of Modern Human Behavior.” Science 324 (5932): 1298–1301.10.1126/science.1170165
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Pulvermüller, Friedemann. 2002. The Neuroscience of Language: On Brain Circuits of Words and Serial Order. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Quine, Willard V. O. 1960. Word and Object. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Ridge, Michael. 2014. Impassioned Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199682669.001.0001
   Google Scholar
• von Rohr, Rudolf, Judith Burkart Claudia, and Carel van Schaik. 2011. “Evolutionary Precursors of Social Norms in Chimpanzees: A New Approach.” Biology and Philosophy 26 (1): 1–30.10.1007/s10539-010-9240-4
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• van Roojen, Mark. 1996. “Expressivism and Irrationality.” The Philosophical Review 105 (3): 311–335.10.2307/2185703
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Schroeder, Mark. 2008. Being For: Evaluating the Semantic Program of Expressivism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534654.001.0001
   Google Scholar
• Schroeder, Mark. 2013. “Tempered Expressivism.” In Oxford Studies in Metaethics 8, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, 283–314. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Schroeter, Laura. 2014. “Normative Concepts: A Connectedness Model.” Philosophers’ Imprint 14 (25), 1–26.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Schwartz, Jeremy, and Christopher Hom. 2015. “Why the Negation Problem Is Not a Problem for Expressivism.” Noûs 49 (4): 824–845.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Searle, John. 1962. “Meaning and Speech Acts.” The Philosophical Review 71 (4): 423–432.10.2307/2183455
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Shiller, Derek. 2016. “A Primitive Solution to the Negation Problem.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (3): 725–740.10.1007/s10677-015-9670-9
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Shiller, Derek. 2017. “The Problem of Other Attitudes.” American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2): 141–152.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Sinclair, Neil. 2011. “Moral Expressivism and Sentential Negation.” Philosophical Studies 152 (3): 385–411.10.1007/s11098-009-9484-5
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Sinclair, Neil. 2012. “Metaethics, Teleosemantics and the Function of Moral Judgements.” Biology and Philosophy 27 (5): 639–662.10.1007/s10539-012-9316-4
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Sterelny, Kim. 2011. “From Hominins to Humans: How Sapiens Became Behaviourally Modern.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 366 (1566): 809–822.10.1098/rstb.2010.0301
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Stevenson, Charles L. 1937. “The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms.” Mind 46 (181): 14–31.10.1093/mind/XLVI.181.14
   Google Scholar
• Stich, Stephen P. 1983. From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Tomasello, Michael, Alicia Melis, Claudio Tennie, Emily Wyman, and Esther Herrmann. 2012. “Two Key Steps in the Evolution of Human Cooperation: The Interdependence Hypothesis.” Current Anthropology 53 (6): 673–692.10.1086/668207
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Tomasello, Michael. 2016. A Natural History of Human Morality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.10.4159/9780674915855
   Google Scholar
• Toppinen, Teemu. 2013. “Believing in Expressivism.” In Oxford Studies in Metaethics 8, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, 252–282. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Unwin, Nicholas. 1999. “Quasi-Realism, Negation and the Frege-Geach Problem.” The Philosophical Quarterly 49 (196): 337–352.10.1111/phiq.1999.49.issue-196
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar