- The definition of the Defense Department's term, “Launch Under Attack” (LUA) is the exact equivalent of “launch-on-warning.” But there is some confusion about this definition, because LUA is commonly understood by Russian military experts to mean the delivery of a retaliatory nuclear strike “in response to an actually delivered strike”— after nuclear detonations have been confirmed; see Valery Yarynich, C3: Nuclear Command, Control, Cooperation (Washington, D.C.: Center for Defense Information, 2003), pp. 28–30.
- Geoffrey Forden, “Reducing a Common Danger: Improving Russia's Early Warning System,” Cato Policy Analysis No. 399, May 3, 2001.
- According to the Center for Defense Information, from 1977 through 1984, early warning systems generated 20,784 false indications of missile attacks on the United States. More than 5 percent of these were serious enough to require a second look. “Accidental Nuclear War: A Rising Risk?” The Defense Monitor, vol. 15 no. 7 (1986).
- David Hoffman, “Cold War Doctrines Refuse to Die,” Washington Post, March 15, 1998, p. A1.
- Linn Sennot, “Overlapping False Alarms: Reason for Concern?” in Anatoly Gromyko and Martin Hellman, eds., Breakthrough: Emerging New Thinking (New York: Walker Publishing Company, 1988), pp. 39–44.
- Paul Bracken, “Instabilities in the Control of Nuclear Forces,” in Breakthrough: Emerging New Thinking, p. 24.
- Department of Defense Appropriations for 1974, Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 93rd Congress, 1st sess., part 7, p. 1,057.
- Yarynich, C3: Nuclear Command, Control, Cooperation, p. 158.
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
Volume 60, 2004 - Issue 3: Salvaging Nonproliferation