Prime ministers, the vote of confidence and the management of coalition terminations between elections

References

• Baron, David P., and John A. Ferejohn (1989). ‘Bargaining in Legislatures’, American Political Science Review, 83:4, 1181–206.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Becher, Michael, and Flemming Juul Christiansen (2015). ‘Dissolution Threats and Legislative Bargaining’, American Journal of Political Science, 59:3, 641–55.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Becher, Michael, Sylvain Brouard, and Isabelle Guinaudeau (2017). ‘Prime Ministers and the Electoral Cost of Using the Confidence Vote in Legislative Bargaining: Evidence from France’, West European Politics, 40:2, 252–74.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bergman, Torbjörn, Wolfgang C. Müller, Kaare Strøm, and Magnus Blomgren (2003). ‘Democratic Delegation and Accountability: Cross National Patterns’, in Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang C. Müller, and Torbjörn Bergman (eds.), Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 109–221.
   Google Scholar
• Box-Steffensmeier, J. M., and Bradford S. Jones (2004). Event History Modeling: A Guide for Social Scientists. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Browne, Eric C., John P. Frendreis, and Dennis W. Gleiber (1986). ‘The Process of Cabinet Dissolution: An Exponential Model of Duration and Stability in Western Democracies’, American Journal of Political Science, 30:3, 628–50.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Diermeier, Daniel, and Timothy J. Feddersen (1998). ‘Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure’, American Political Science Review, 92:3, 611–21.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Druckman, James N., and Michael F. Thies (2002). ‘The Importance of Concurrence: The Impact of Bicameralism on Government Formation and Duration’, American Journal of Political Science, 46:4, 760–71.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Evans, Georgina, and Petra Schleiter (2020). ‘The Vote of Confidence: Measuring Executive Bargaining Power in Parliamentary Democracies’, Working Paper. Retrieved from https://drive.google.com/file/d/1mD_I58SvSf97vSoMMC93iNWcr5FtJMSn/view
   Google Scholar
• Fernandes, Jorge M., and Pedro C. Magalhães (2016). ‘Government Survival in Semi‐Presidential Regimes’, European Journal of Political Research, 55:1, 61–80.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Fine, Jason P., and Robert J. Gray (1999). ‘A Proportional Hazards Model for the Subdistribution of a Competing Risk’, Journal of the American Statistical Association, 94:446, 496–509.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Franchino, Fabio, and Bjørn Høyland (2009). ‘Legislative Involvement in Parliamentary Systems: Opportunities, Conflict, and Institutional Constraints’, American Political Science Review, 103:4, 607–21.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Goplerud, Max, and Petra Schleiter (2016). ‘An Index of Assembly Dissolution Powers’, Comparative Political Studies, 49:4, 427–56.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hellström, Johan, and Daniel Walther (2019). ‘How is Government Stability Affected by the State of the Economy? Payoff Structures, Government Type and Economic State’, Government and Opposition, 54:2, 280–308.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Huber, John D (1996). ‘The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies’, American Political Science Review, 90:2, 269–82.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Huber, John D., and Nolan McCarty (2001). ‘Cabinet Decision Rules and Political Uncertainty in Parliamentary Bargaining’, American Political Science Review, 95:2, 345–260.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kayser, Mark A. (2005). ‘Who Surfs, Who Manipulates? The Determinants of Opportunistic Election Timing and Electorally Motivated Economic Intervention’, American Political Science Review, 99:1, 17–27.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kayser, Mark A., Matthias Orlowski, and Jochen Rehmert (2020). ‘Coalition Inclusion Prob-abilities: A Party-Strategic Measure for Predicting Politics and Policy’. Working Paper. Hertie School of Governance, available at http://mark-kayser.com/papers.
   Google Scholar
• King, Gary, James Alt, Nancy Burns, and Michael Laver (1990). ‘A Unified Model of Cabinet Dissolution in Parliamentary Democracies’, American Journal of Political Science, 34:3, 846–71.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Laakso, Markku, and Rein Taagepera 1979. “Effective” Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe', Comparative Political Studies 12:1, 3–27.
   Google Scholar
• Laver, Michael, and Norman Schofield (1998). Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
   Google Scholar
• Laver, Michael, and Kenneth A. Shepsle (1998). ‘Events, Equilibria, and Government Survival’, American Journal of Political Science, 42:1, 28–54.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lupia, Arthur, and Kaare Strøm (1995). ‘Coalition Termination and the Strategic Timing of Parliamentary Elections’, American Political Science Review, 89:3, 648–65.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lupia, Arthur, and Kaare Strøm 2008. ‘Bargaining, Transaction Costs, and Coalition Governance’, in Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang C. Müller, and Torbjörn Bergman (eds.), Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democractic Life Cycle in Western Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 51–83.
   Google Scholar
• Romer, Thomas, and Howard Rosenthal (1978). ‘Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo’, Public Choice, 33:4, 27–43.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Saalfeld, Thomas (2008). ‘Institutions, Chance and Choices: The Dynamics of Cabinet Survival in the Parliamentary Democracies of Western Europe (1945–99)’, in Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang C. Müller, and Torbjörn Bergman (eds.), Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democractic Life Cycle in Western Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 327–68.
   Google Scholar
• Schleiter, Petra, and Edward Morgan-Jones (2009). ‘Constitutional Power and Competing Risks: Monarchs, Presidents, Prime Ministers, and the Termination of East and West European Cabinets’, American Political Science Review, 103:3, 496–512.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Schleiter, Petra, and Margit Tavits (2016). ‘The Electoral Benefits of Opportunistic Election Timing’, The Journal of Politics, 78:3, 836–50.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Schleiter, Petra, and Margit Tavits (2018). ‘Voter Reactions to Incumbent Opportunism’, The Journal of Politics, 80:4, 1183–96.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Shugart, Matthew Soberg, and John M. Carey 1992. Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics. Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Smith, Alistair (2004). Election Timing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Somer-Topcu, Zeynep, and Laron K. Williams (2008). ‘Survival of the Fittest? Cabinet Duration in Postcommunist Europe’, Comparative Politics, 40:3, 313–29.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Strøm, Kaare, and Steven M. Swindle (2002). ‘Strategic Parliamentary Dissolution’, American Political Science Review, 96:3, 575–91.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Tavits, Margit (2009). Presidents with Prime Ministers: Do Direct Elections Matter? Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Tsebelis, George (2002). Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Warwick, Paul W. (1994). Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar