Empowered borrowers? tracking the World Bank’s Program-for-Results

Bibliography

• Andersen, T. B., H. Hansen, and T. Markussen. “US Politics and World Bank–IDA Lending.” Journal of Development Studies 42, no. 5 (2006): 772–794.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Annen, K., and L. Moers. Donor Competition for Aid Impact, and Aid Fragmentation. IMF Working Paper 204. Washington, DC: IMF, 2012.
   Google Scholar
• Barnett, M. N., and M. Finnemore. Rules for the World. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004.
   Google Scholar
• Bayer, P., C. Marcoux, and J. Urpelainen. “Choosing International Organizations: When do States and the World Bank Collaborate on Environmental Projects?” Review of International Organizations 9, no. 4 (2014): 413–440.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bernstein, S. “Ideas, Social Structure, and the Compromise of Liberal Environmentalism.” European Journal of International Relations 6, no. 4 (2000): 464–512.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Best, J. Governing Failure: Provisional Expertise and the Transformation of Global Development Finance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
   Google Scholar
• Brooks, S. G., and W. C. Wohlfoth. World out of Balance. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008.
   Google Scholar
• Bulir, A., and A. J. Hamann. Volatility of Development Aid: From the Frying Pan into the Fire? Working Paper 65. Washington, DC: IMF, 2006.
   Google Scholar
• Canavire-Bacarreza, G. J., E. Neumayer, and P. Nunnenkamp. “Why Aid is Unpredictable: An Empirical Analysis of the Gap between Actual and Planned Aid Flows.” Journal of International Development 27 (2015): 440–463.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Chwieroth, J. M. “Controlling Capital: The International Monetary Fund and Transformative Incremental Change from within International Organizations.” New Political Economy 19, no. 3 (2014): 445–469.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Chwieroth, J. M. “Organizational Change ‘from within’: Exploring the World Bank’s Early Lending Practices.” Review of International Political Economy 15, no. 4 (2008): 481–505.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Cox, R. W. “Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations: An Essay in Method.” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 12, no. 2 (1983): 162–175.
   Google Scholar
• Dreher, A., and M. Gassebner. “Do IMF and World Bank Programs induce Government Crises? An Empirical Analysis.” International Organization 66 (2012): 329–358.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Finnemore, M. “Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology’s Institutionalism.” International Organization 50, no. 2 (1996): 325–347.
   Google Scholar
• Finnemore, M., and K. Sikkink. “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.” International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 887–917.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Fleck, R. K., and C. Kilby. “World Bank Independence: A Model and Statistical Analysis of US Influence.” Review of Development Economics 10, no. 2 (2006): 224–240.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Frot, E., and J. Santiso. “Herding in Aid Allocation.” Kyklos 64, no. 1 (2011): 54–74.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Fuchs, A., P. Nunnenkamp, and H. Ohler. “Why Donors of Foreign Aid do not Cooperate: The Role of Competition for Export Markets and Political Support.” World Economy 38, no. 2 (2015): 255–285.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Gelb, A., and N. Hashmi. The Anatomy of Program-for-Results: An Approach to Results-based Aid. CGD Working Paper 374. Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, 2014.
   Google Scholar
• Gilpin, R. Global Political Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001.
   Google Scholar
• Hawkins, D. A., and W. Jacoby. “How Agents Matter.” In Delegation and Agency in International Organizations, edited by DG Hawkins, DA Lake, DL Nielson and MJ Tierney, 199–228. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
   Google Scholar
• Harrison, G. The World Bank and Africa: The Construction of Governance States. London: Routledge, 2004.
   Google Scholar
• Helleiner, E. Forgotten Foundations of Bretton Woods: International Development and the Making of the Postwar Order. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014.
   Google Scholar
• Helleiner, E., and S. Pagliari. “The End of an Era in International Financial Regulation? A Postcrisis Research Agenda.” International Organization 65 (2011): 169–200.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hoffman, M. J. “What’s Global about Global Governance? A Constructivist Account.” In Contending Perspectives on Global Governance: Coherence, Contestation, and World Order, edited by A Ba and MJ Hoffman, 110–128. London: Routledge, 2005.
   Google Scholar
• Humphrey, C. Developmental Revolution or Bretton Woods Revisited? Working Paper 418. London: ODI, 2015.
   Google Scholar
• Humphrey, C. “The Politics of Loan Pricing in Multilateral Development Banks.” Review of International Political Economy 21, no. 3 (2014): 611–639.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Humphrey, C., and K. Michaelowa. “Shopping for Development: Multilateral Lending, Shareholder Composition and Borrower Preferences.” World Development 44 (2013): 142–155.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hurrell, A. On Global Order. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
   Google Scholar
• Ikenberry, G. J. “Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order.” International Security 23, no. 3 (1998): 43–78.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Ikenberry, G. J. Liberal Leviathan. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011.
   Google Scholar
• Keohane, R. O. After Hegemony. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984.
   Google Scholar
• Kilby, C. “What Determines the Size of Aid Projects?” World Development 39, no. 11 (2011): 1981–1994.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Knack, S., and A. Rahman. Donor Fragmentation and Bureaucratic Quality in Aid Recipients. World Bank Policy Research Paper 3186. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2004.
   Google Scholar
• Knack, S., L. C. Xu, and B. Zou. Interactions Among Donors’ Aid Allocations: Evidence from an Exogenous World Bank Income Threshold. World Bank Policy Research Paper 7039. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2014.
   Google Scholar
• Lardone, M. “The New Public Management Norm on the Ground: A Comparative Analysis of the World Bank’s Experience in Chile and Argentina.” In Owning Development: Creating Policy Norms in the IMF and the World Bank, edited by S Park and A Vetterlein, 204–222. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
   Google Scholar
• Levy, B., and F. Fukuyama. Development Strategies: Integrating Governance and Growth. World Bank Policy Research Paper 5196 Washington, DC: World Bank, 2010.
   Google Scholar
• Lyne, M. M., D. L. Nielson, and M. J. Tierney. “Controlling Coalitions: Social Lending at the Multilateral Development Banks.” Review of International Organizations 4, no. 4 (2009): 407–433.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lyne, M. M., D. L. Nielson, and M. J. Tierney. “Who Delegates? Alternative Models of Principals in Development Aid.” In Delegation and Agency in International Organizations, edited by DG Hawkins, DA Lake, DL Nielson and MJ Tierney, 41–76. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
   Google Scholar
• Manning, R. “Will ‘Emerging Donors’ Change the Face of International Cooperation?” Development Policy Review 24, no. 4 (2006): 371–385.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Martin, L. L. “Interests, Power, and Multilateralism.” International Organization 46, no. 4 (1992): 765–792.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Mearsheimer, J. J. “The False Promise of International Institutions.” International Security 19, no. 3 (1994–95): 5–49.
   Google Scholar
• Montinola, G. “When Does Aid Conditionality Work?” Studies in Comparative International Development 45 (2010): 358–382.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Naim, M. “Rogue Aid.” Foreign Affairs 159 (2007): 95–96.
   Google Scholar
• Nunnenkamp, P., H. Ohler, and R. Thiele. “Donor Coordination and Specialization: Did the Paris Declaration make a Difference?” Review of World Economics 149 (2013): 537–563.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• OECD. Aid Effectiveness: A Progress Report on Implementing the Paris Declaration. Paris: OECD Publishing, 2009.
   Google Scholar
• OECD. “How Fragmented is Aid?” In Development Co-operation Report 2009. Paris, OECD Publishing, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/dcr-2009-7-en.
   Google Scholar
• Park, S., and A. Vetterlein. “Owning Development: Creating Policy Norms in the IMF and the World Bank.” In Owning Development: Creating Policy Norms in the IMF and the World Bank, edited by S Park and A Vetterlein, 3–26. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
   Google Scholar
• Pauly, L. W. “Managing Financial Emergencies in an Integrating World.” Globalizations 6, no. 3 (2009): 353–364.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Rahman, A., and Y. Sawada. Can Donor Coordination Solve the Aid Fragmentation Problem? World Bank Policy Research Paper 5251. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2010.
   Google Scholar
• Risse, T. “‘Let’s Argue!’ Communicative Action in World Politics.” International Organization 54, no. 1 (2000): 1–39.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Ruggie, J. G. “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order.” International Organization 36, no. 2 (1982): 379–415.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Ruggie, J. G. “What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge.” International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 855–885.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Runde, D. 2015. “Ensuring the World Bank’s Relevance.” Forbes, 16 March. http://onforb.es/1BLMmUS.
   Google Scholar
• Sandbrook, R. Reinventing the Left in the Global South: The Politics of the Possible. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
   Google Scholar
• Shafik, N. The Future of Development Finance. CGD Working Paper 250. Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, 2011.
   Google Scholar
• Sharma, P. “Bureaucratic Imperatives and Policy Outcomes: The Origins of World Bank Structural Adjustment Lending.” Review of International Political Economy 20, no. 4 (2013): 667–686.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Stone, R. W. Controlling Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
   Google Scholar
• US Treasury. “US Position on the World Bank’s Program-for-Results (P4R).” January 24, 2012. http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/development-banks/Documents/1_30_2012_P4R_US_Position%20Statement_Final.pdf.
   Google Scholar
• Vestergaard, J., and R. H. Wade. “Protecting Power: How Western States retain the Dominant Voice in the World Bank’s Governance.” World Development 46 (2013): 153–164.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Wade, R. H. “US Hegemony and the World Bank: The Fight over People and Ideas.” Review of International Political Economy 9, no. 2 (2002): 201–229.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Walz, J., and V. Ramachandran. Brave New World: A Literature Review of Emerging Donors and the Changing Nature of Foreign Assistance. CGD Working Paper 273. Washington DC, Center for Global Development, 2011.
   Google Scholar
• Weaver, C. “The World’s Bank and the Bank’s World.” Global Governance 13, no. 4 (2007): 493–512.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Woods, N. The Globalizers: The IMF, the World Bank, and their Borrowers. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006.
   Google Scholar
• Woods, N. “Whose Aid? Whose Influence? China, Emerging Donors and the Silent Revolution in Development Assistance.” International Affairs 84 (2008): 1205–1221.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• World Bank. Egypt: Inclusive Housing Finance Program-for-Results Project. Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2015. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/05/24376013/egypt-inclusive-housing-finance-program-for-results-project.
   Google Scholar
• World Bank. Ethiopia: Enhancing Shared Prosperity through Equitable Services Project. Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2015. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/07/24746658/ethiopia-enhancing-shared-prosperity-through-equitable-services-project.
   Google Scholar
• World Bank. Ethiopia: Health Millennium Development Goals Program-for-Results Project. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2013. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/02/17278398/ethiopia-health-millennium-development-goals-program-for-results-project.
   Google Scholar
• World Bank. Global Development Finance: External Debt of Developing Countries. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2010.
   Google Scholar
• World Bank. “A New Instrument to Advance Development Effectiveness: Program-for-Results Financing.” Washington, DC: World Bank, 2011. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2011/12/15590386/new-instrument-advance-development-effectiveness-program-for-results-financing.
   Google Scholar
• World Bank. “Program-for-Results Financing: Interim Guidance Notes to Staff on Assessments.” Washington, DC: World Bank, 2012. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PROJECTS/Resources/Internal_Guidance_Notes.pdf.
   Google Scholar
• World Bank. “Program for Results (PforR): IEG Process Evaluation – Approach Paper.” Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2015. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/06/24623968/program-results-pforr-ieg-process-evaluation-approach-paper.
   Google Scholar
• World Bank. “Program-for-Results Summary of Consultations.” Washington, DC: World Bank, 2011. www.worldbank.org/ProgramforResults/.
   Google Scholar
• World Bank. “Program-for-Results: Two-year Review.” Washington, DC: World Bank, 2015. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/03/24174962/program-results-two-year-review.
   Google Scholar
• World Bank. Tanzania: Strengthening Primary Health Care for Results Program Project. Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2015. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/05/24481589/tanzania-strengthening-primary-health-care-results-program-project.
   Google Scholar
• World Bank. West Bank and Gaza: Local Governance and Services Improvement Program Project. Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2015. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/05/24503772/west-bank-gaza-local-governance-services-improvement-program-project.
   Google Scholar