References
- For a small sample of this burgeoning literature see Audrey Kurth Cronin and Patrick M. Cronin, "The Realistic Engagement of China,"The Washington Quarterly, vol. 19, no. 1 (Winter 1996): pp. 141-69; Roy C. Howle, Jr., "An Enviable War: Engaged Containment and the US-China Balance, Parameters, vol. 31, no. 3 (Autumn 2001): pp. 92-104; Robert S. Ross, "Why Our Hardliners are Wrong," The National Interest, no. 49 (Fall 1997): pp. 42-5; and James Shinn, ed., Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement with China (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1996).
- For two intriguing but very different views on China's self-image as a great power see Steven W. Mosher, Hegemon: China 's Plan to Dominate Asia and the World (San Francisco, CA: Encounter, 2000) and Gilbert Rozman, "China's Quest for Great Power Identity," Orbis, vol. 43, no. 3 (Summer 1999): pp. 383-404.
- There are, however, exceptions to this general tendency. See for example Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Living with China," The National Interest, no. 59 (Spring 2000): pp. 5-21 and Gilbert Rozman, "A New Sino-Russian-American Triangle?" Orbis, vol. 44, no. 4 (Fall 2000): pp. 541-555.
- Based on figures in The CIA World Factbook 2001 online ed., accessed January 2002 at {http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html}.
- For a strong rejection of arguments for the inevitability of World War I see Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War (New York: Basic, 1999).
- See Stephen P. Aubin, "China: Yes, Worry About the Future," Strategic Review, vol. 26, no. 1 (Winter 1998): pp. 17-20 and Toshi Yoshirhara, Chinese Information Warfare: A Phantom
- Menace or Emerging Threat (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College/Strategic Studies Institute, November 2001).
- See Michael Pillsbury, ed., Chinese Views of Future Warfare (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1998) and idem, China Debates the Future Security Environment (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2000).
- For a review of China's impressive economic growth see Greg Mastel, The Rise of the Chinese Economy: The Middle Kingdom Emerges (Armonk, NY: M.E. Shape, 1997): pp. 9-42.
- During the Cold War the major states of Western and Central Europe, with the arguable exception of France, generally acted as Washington's junior partners. They did so mainly because the United States was the only power capable of organizing and maintaining a coalition capable of competing militarily with the Soviet colossus. Given the nature of Moscow's regime, European leaders had even reason to believe that their survival as essentially autonomous international actors required the acceptance of American leadership. See Edward N. Luttwak, On the Meaning of Victory: Essays on Strategy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986): pp. 161-62. The decline of the USSR resulted in a much-altered strategic environment and the European Union certainly does not rely on the United States for its continued existence. It would be surprising indeed if Brussels blithely accepts permanent US supremacy, despite the fact that many key European policymakers have loudly proclaiming the necessity of EU independence in international affairs and the desirability of a "European defense identity" separate from NATO. For two contrasting views on the likely development of the EU as a security actor see Hugh Thomas, The Future of Europe, Predictions series #4 (London: Phoenix, 1997) and C. Dale Walton, "Europa United: The Rise of a Second Superpower and its Effect on World Order," European Security, vol. 6, no. 4 (Winter 1997): pp. 44-54.
- For a variety of perspectives on the possibility of PRC-ROC military conflict see William M. Carpenter, "The Taiwan Strait Triangle," Comparative Strategy, vol. 19, no. 4 (OctoberDecember 2000): pp. 329-40; Richard L. Russell, "What If ... 'China Attacks Taiwan!' " Parameters, vol. 31, no. 3 (Autumn 2001): pp. 76-91; and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, "War or Peace in the Taiwan Strait?' The Washington Quarterly, vol. 19, no. 1 (Winter 1996): pp. 171-87.
- Interestingly, China has at times in the past been possessed substantial naval power. For a popular description of Chinese naval power at its height in the early fifteenth century see Louise Levathes, When China Ruled the Seas: The Treasure Fleet of the Dragon Throne, 1405-33 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994).
- This is in stark contrast some would-be superpowers, such as the Third Reich. It is difficult to ascertain definitively what the limits were of Hitler's territorial and military ambitions. Indeed, Norman J. W. Goda persuasively argues that in 1940-42 Hitler was attempting to obtain military bases that were intended for eventual use in an invasion of the Western Hemisphere. Tomorrow the World: Hitler, Northwest Africa, and the Path Toward America (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1998).
- However, Chinese leaders are not necessary confident that they will achieve hegemony in eastern Eurasia. Indeed, many Chinese authors believe that both Japan and India will be significant future influences, and that Japan in particular may develop into one of the "poles" in a multipolar world. See Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment: pp. 107-53.
- As Zbigniew Brzezinski notes, "China's continued economic success remains heavily dependent on the inflow of Western capital and technology and on access to foreign markets, and that severely limits China's options." The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives (New York: BasicBooks, 1997): p. 186.
- For an illustration of the continuing Vietnamese suspicion of China see Henry Kamm, Dragon Ascending: Vietnam and the Vietnamese (New York: Arcade Publishing, 1996) : pp. 125-33.
- Nicholas J. Spykman, The Geography of the Peace (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1944), 43. Interestingly, although both Mackinder and Spykman agree on the centrality of Eurasia in political affairs they diverge on many related issues. For instance, Spykman regards Africa as an "off-shore" continent (idem, 38), while Mackinder considers it part of the "World-Island." Mackinder argues that, "The joint continent of Europe, Asia, and Africa, is now effectively, and not merely theoretically, an island. [T]he three so-called new continents are in point of area merely satellites of the old continent. There is one ocean covering nine-twelfths of the globe; there is one continent-the World Island-covering two-twelfths of globe; and there are many smaller islands, whereof North America and South America are, for effective purposes, two, which together cover the remaining one-twelfth." Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, n.d.; originally published 1919): pp. 45, 46-7.
- Some observers would differ with this assessment For example, William Odom argues that, "Russia is no longer a great power and is unlikely again to become one over the next several decades." "Realism About Russia," The National Interest, no. 65 (Fall 1991): pp. 56-66.
- For an interesting analysis of China's future energy and food requirements and the possible political significance of these needs see Thomas M. Kane and Lawrence W. Serewicz,"China's Hunger: The Consequences of a Rising Demand for Food and Energy," Parameters, vol. 31, no. 3 (Autumn 2001): pp. 63-75.
- See Colin S. Gray, The Geopolitics of Super Power (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1988): pp. 93-112.
- On India's status as an emerging power, see Victor M. Gobarev, India as World Power: Changing Washington 's Myopic Policy, Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 381, 11 September 2000; Amos Perlmutter, "China and India," Washington Times online ed., 5 January 2001; and idem, "Shifting Balance of World Power," Washington Times online ed., l February 2001.
- See Paul Kennedy, Preparing for the Twenty-First Century (New York: Random House, 1993): p. 177.
- Indeed, serious border clashes between the two countries occurred in 1962. For a comparison of Chinese and Indian goals and behavior in the crisis see Alien S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1975).
- For an illustration of the complex diplomatic situation the United States faces in South Asia see David E. Sanger, "Bush's South Asian Strategy: Keep Terrorism as the Villain," New York Times online ed., 7 January 2002.
- Philip C. Saunders has a differing view, believing that United States may be able to weld together a "virtual alliance" in the Asia-Pacific that would not be institutionally unlike NATO but would offer significant benefits in the containment of China. "A Virtual Alliance for Asian Security," Orbis, vol. 43, no. 2 (Spring 1999): pp. 237-56.