Civil emergency preparedness if deterrence fails

References

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• Chuikov . April 1971 . Civil Defense Edited by: Oakridge National Laboratory . April , (Grazhdanskaya Oborona) (Moscow: 1969)
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• Jones , T.K. 1976 . testimony to House Armed Services Committee . February 26 1976 . Subcommittee on Investigations, Civil Defense Panel .
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• Gray , Colin and Durbin , Eugene . 1978 . “The Value of CEP for Deterrence” . also presented at the Federal Preparedness Agency Symposium on Civil Emergency Preparedness, National Security and Strategic Deterrence . January 18–20 1978 , Arlington, Virginia. Foreign Service Institute . These papers can be obtained by contacting: Federal Preparedness Agency, GSA Attn. Gaston Choiniere, EE, Washington, D.C. 20405. Tel: (202)566–0550.
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• Kahn , Herman . 1965 . On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios , 37 – 51 . New York : Frederick A. Praeger .
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• Hoeber , Francis P. , Kassing , David B. and Schneider , William Jr. , eds. 1978 . Arms, Men and Military Budgets: Issues for Fiscal Year 1979 , New York : Crane, Russak and Co. . The near‐inevitability of Soviet strategic nuclear superiority in the early 1980s is documented by the author in
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• Douglass , Joseph D. Jr. 1976 . The Soviet Theater Nuclear Offensive , Vol. 1 , U.S. Government Printing Office . Studies in Communist Affairs
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• Dec. 1974 . The Alliance in Europe, Part III: Military Doctrine and Technology , Dec. , London : IISS . Adelphi Paper No. 109
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• Douglass , Joseph D. Jr. 1977 . “Soviet Nuclear Strategy in Europe: A Selective Targeting Doctrine?” . Strategic Review , V ( 4 ) Fall
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• The prime example is the “neutron bomb” or more properly the “enhanced‐radiation, reduced‐blast” (ERRB) bomb. See also the “Research, Development and Acquisition Requirements to Support Long‐Term Theater Nuclear Force Modernization'’ Study of the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary for Atomic Energy, Department of Defense.
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• Several additional points might be made here. As noted by Colin Gray (op. cit.) the increases in casualties from attempts to retarget against an evacuated Soviet population are very small. But the calculations themselves are preposterous. Retargeting to kill more population and destroy less industry and other urban assets seems to have no military, let alone moral, justification, and no demonstrated deterrent advantage. The experience of World War II and Vietnam suggests that, as long as the wherewithal for further fighting survives, the killing of citizens simply enrages the survivors and stiffens resistance. Moreover, as a deterrence doctrine it may simply play to Soviet propaganda. The evidence suggests that the Soviets do not target U.S. cities or population per se. This is not to say that, in the absence of a U.S. civil defense, their attacks might not create massive casualties, since they do target economic and other urban or suburban assets.
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• Gouré , Leon . “A Comparative Analysis of U.S./U.S.S.R. Theories of CEP” . FPA Symposium . (see Note 1)
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• Berman , Robert P. 1978 . Soviet Air Power in Transition , Washington, D.C. : Brookings Institution .
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• The concept of economic bottlenecks was pursued in World War II. The classic case is generally considered to be the U.S. bombing of the German ball‐bearing factory at Schweinfurt. It did not, as hoped, ground all the German aircraft and red‐line all their vehicles, but the postwar conclusion was that the reason was not a false concept but poor execution plus failure to evaluate properly an alternate (Swedish) source.
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• Jones , T. K. “Industrial Survival” . FPA Symposium . (See Note 1)
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• 1974 . “Briefing on Counterforce Attacks” . Hearing, Subcommmittee on Arms Control International Law and Organization, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations . September 11 1974 . sanitized and made public on 10 January 1975
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• Op. cit, fn. 13, above.
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• 1972 . “Strategic Defense Options after Moscow and Peking” . Proceedings of a Conference at Claremont Men's College . June 10 1972 . The writer has taken this view of the uses of strategic superiority, in print, since 1972. See
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• Schneider , William Jr. 1976 . Arms, Men and Military Budgets: Issues for Fiscal Year 1977,1978, and 1979 , New York : Crane, Russak & Co. . 1977, 1978
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