References
- Alesina, A., & Drazen, A. (1991). Why are stabilizations delayed? American Economic Review, 81(5), 1170–1188. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2006912
- Alesina, A., & Tabellini, G. (1990). A positive theory of fiscal deficits and government debt. The Review of Economic Studies, 57(3), 403–414. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.2307/2298021
- Alt, J., Bueno de Mesquita, E., & Rose, S. (2011). Disentangling accountability and competence in elections: Evidence from U.S. term limits. The Journal of Politics, 73(1), 171–186. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381610000940
- Arapis, T., & Reitano, V. (2018). A glimmer of optimism in government savings accumulation? An empirical examination of municipal unassigned fund balance in Florida. Public Finance Review, 46(3), 389–420. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1177/1091142116643386
- Baqir, R. (2002). Districting and Government Overspending. Journal of Political Economy, 110(6), 1318–1354. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/342804
- Baumol, W. J., & Blinder, A. S. (2008). Macroeconomics: Principles and policy (10th ed.). (2007 Update). Thomson/South-Western.
- Berry, C. R., & Gersen, J. E. (2010). The timing of elections. The University of Chicago Law Review, 77(1), 37–64. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40663025
- Besley, T., & Case, A. (1995). Does electoral accountability affect economic policy choices? Evidence from gubernatorial term limits. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110(3), 769–798. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.2307/2946699
- Boin, A., Hart, P., McConnell, A., & Preston, T. (2010). Leadership style, crisis management and blame management: The case of Hurricane Katrina. Public Administration, 88(3), 706–723. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9299.2010.01836.x
- Brooks, S. M., & Kurtz, M. J. (2007). Capital, trade, and the political economies of reform. American Journal of Political Science, 51(4), 703–720. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00276.x
- Buchanan, J. M., & Tullock, G. (1962/1999). The calculus of consent: Logical foundations of constitutional democracy (Vol. 3). The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan. Liberty Fund, Inc.
- California State Controller. (2005). Cities Financial Transactions Report Instructions. Retrieved May 14, 2011, from https://www.sco.ca.gov/ard_locinstr_cities_forms.html.
- Clingermayer, J. C., & Dan Wood, B. (1995). Disentangling patterns of state debt financing. American Political Science Review, 89(1), 108–120. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.2307/2083078
- Daniel, K., & Lott, J. J. R. (1997). Term limits and electoral competitiveness: Evidence from California’s state legislative races. Public Choice, 90(1/4), 165–184. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004973421853
- Di Bartolomeo, G., Di Pietro, M., Saltari, E., & Semmler, W. (2018). Public debt stabilization: The relevance of policymakers’ time horizons. Public Choice, 177(3–4), 287–299. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-018-0584-7
- Drazen, A., & Easterly, W. (2001). Do crises induce reform? Simple empirical tests of conventional wisdom. Economics & Politics, 13(2), 129–157. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0343.00087
- Drazen, A., & Grilli, V. (1993). The benefit of crises for economic reforms. The American Economic Review, 83(3), 598–607. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2117535
- Gore, A. K. (2009). Why do cities hoard cash? Determinants and implications of municipal cash holdings. The Accounting Review, 84(1), 183–207. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.2308/accr.2009.84.1.183
- Greer, R. A. (2015). Overlapping local government debt and the Fiscal common. Public Finance Review, 43(6), 762–785. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1177/1091142114545678
- Greer, R. A., Moldogaziev, T. T., & Scott, T. A. (2018). Polycentric governance and the impact of special districts on fiscal common pools. International Journal of the Commons, 12(2), 108–136. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.18352/ijc.839
- Hendrick, R. (2006). The role of slack in local government finances. Public Budgeting & Finance, 26(1), 14–46. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5850.2006.00837.x
- Hildreth, W. B., Yeager Samuel, J., Miller Gerald, J., & Rabin, J. (2012). Finance managers’ propensity to save. Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting & Financial Management, 24(2), 1–35. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1108/JPBAFM-24-02-2012-B001
- Hood, C. (2002). The risk game and the blame game. Government and Opposition, 37(1), 15–37. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/1477-7053.00085
- Hou, Y. (2006). Budgeting for fiscal stability over the business cycle: A countercyclical fiscal policy and the multiyear perspective on budgeting. Public Administration Review, 66(5), 730–741. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2006.00638.x
- Hou, Y., & Moynihan, D. P. (2008). The case for countercyclical Fiscal capacity. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 18(1), 139–159. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mum006
- Jin, H., Qian, Y., & Weingast, B. R. (2005). Regional decentralization and fiscal incentives: Federalism, Chinese style. Journal of Public Economics, 89(9–10), 1719–1742. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.11.008
- Kim, C. (2015). The effects of recessions on contracting moderated by institutional arrangements of government: evidence from california cities, 1993–2009. Public Budgeting & Finance, 35(2), 40–65. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/pbaf.12064
- Kim, C. (2021). Local government growth from a tri-sector perspective. The Social Science Journal. Online published. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1080/03623319.2020.1851012
- Krause, G. A., Lewis, D. E., & Douglas, J. W. (2013). Politics can limit policy opportunism in fiscal institutions: Evidence from official general fund revenue forecasts in the American States. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 32(2), 271–295. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1002/pam.21674
- Levin, J., & Tadelis, S. (2010). Contracting for government services: Theory and evidence from U.S. cities. Journal of Industrial Economics, 58(3), 507–541. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6451.2010.00430.x
- Mahmalat, M., & Curran, D. (2018). Do crises induce reform? A critical review of conception, methodology, and empirical evidence of the ‘crisis hypothesis’. Journal of Economic Surveys, 32(3), 613–648. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/joes.12209
- Marlowe, J. (2005). Fiscal slack and counter-cyclical expenditure stabilization: A first look at the local level. Public Budgeting & Finance, 25(3), 48–72. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5850.2005.00367.x
- Marlowe, J. (2011). Beyond 5 percent: Optimal municipal slack resources and credit ratings. Public Budgeting & Finance, 31(4), 93–108. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5850.2011.00994.x
- Nielsen, P. A., & Baekgaard, M. (2015). Performance information, blame avoidance, and politicians’ attitudes to spending and reform: Evidence from an experiment. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 25(2), 545–569. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mut051
- Nielsen, P. A., & Moynihan, D. P. (2017). How do politicians attribute bureaucratic responsibility for performance? Negativity bias and interest group advocacy. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 27(2), 269–283. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muw060
- Park, S. (2017). Local revenue structure under economic hardship: Reliance on alternative revenue sources in california counties. Local Government Studies, 43(4), 645–667. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1080/03003930.2017.1305956
- Park, S. (2018). Understanding public sector debt: Financial vicious circle under the soft budget constraint. Public Organization Review, 18(1), 71–92. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/s11115-016-0358-y
- Park, S. (2019). Cutbacks Revisited: The relationship between resources and performance. Public Management Review, 21(4), 515–536. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2018.1500631
- Pearce, J. L., & Perry, J. L. (1983). Federal Merit Pay: A longitudinal analysis. Public Administration Review, 43(4), 315–325. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.2307/975834
- Rodden, J. A. (2005). Hamilton’s Paradox: The promise and peril of fiscal federalism. Cambridge University Press.
- Rodden, J. A., & Wibbels, E. (2010). Fiscal decentralization and the business cycle: An empirical study of federations. Economics and Politics, 22(1), 37–67. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2009.00350.x
- Rose, S., & Smith, D. L. (2012). Budget slack, institutions, and transparency. Public Administration Review, 72(2), 187–195. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2011.02491.x
- Ross, J. M., & Mughan, S. (2018). The effect of fiscal illusion on public sector financial management: Evidence from local government property assessment. Public Finance Review, 46(4), 635–664. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1177/1091142116676360
- Schelker, M. (2012). The influence of auditor term length and term limits on US state general obligation bond ratings. Public Choice, 150(1–2), 27–49. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9688-4
- Su, M. (2019). Understanding the accumulation of local government savings: A dynamic analysis. International Journal of Public Administration, 42(11), 893–903. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1080/01900692.2018.1522506
- Tang, S. Y., Callahan, R. F., & Pisano, M. (2014). Using common-pool resource principles to design local government fiscal sustainability. Public Administration Review, 74(6), 791–803. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.12273
- Ter-Minassian, T., & Fedelino, A. (2010). Impact of the Global Crisis on Sub-National Governments’ Finances. Bank of Italy Occasional Paper. SSRN. https://ssrn.com/abstract=1985235. https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1985235
- Trounstine, J. (2012). Turnout and Incumbency in Local Elections. Urban Affairs Review, 49(2), 167–189. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1177/1078087412463536
- Tyer, C. B. (1993). Local government reserve funds: Policy alternatives and political strategies. Public Budgeting & Finance, 13(2), 75–84. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-5850.00976
- Von Hagen, J. (2006). Political economy of fiscal institutions Ch. 26. In B. R. Weingast & D. A. Wittman (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of political economy (pp. 464–478). Oxford University Press.
- Wang, W., & Hou, Y. (2012). Do local governments save and spend across budget cycles? Evidence from North Carolina. The American Review of Public Administration, 42(2), 152–169. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1177/0275074011398387
- Weaver, R. K. (1986). The politics of blame avoidance. Journal of Public Policy, 6(4), 371–398. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1017/S0143814X00004219
- Weingast, B. R. (2009). Second generation fiscal federalism: The implications of fiscal incentives. Journal of Urban Economics, 65(3), 279–293. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2008.12.005
- Weingast, B. R., Shepsle, K. A., & Johnsen, C. (1981). The political economy of benefits and costs: A neoclassical approach to distributive politics. Journal of Political Economy, 89(4), 642–664. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1086/260997