Elected Executives’ Preferences for Performance Assessment: A Survey Experiment with Colombian Mayors

References

• Alonso, J. M., Clifton, J., & Díaz-Fuentes, D. (2015). Did new public management matter? An empirical analysis of the outsourcing and decentralization effects on public sector size. Public Management Review, 17(5), 643–660. https://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2013.822532
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Amirkhanyan Anna, A., Meier, K., Laurence O’Toole, L. J., Jr., Dakhwe, M. A., & Janzen, S. (2018). Management and performance in US nursing homes. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 28(1), 33–49. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mux003
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Andersen, L. B., Boesen, A., & Pedersen, L. H. (2016). Performance in public organizations: Clarifying the conceptual space. Public Administration Review, 76(6), 852–862. https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.12578
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Askim, J. (2007). How do politicians use performance information? An analysis of the Norwegian local government experience. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 73(3), 453–472. https://doi.org/10.1177/0020852307081152
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Avellaneda, C. (2009). Municipal performance: Does mayoral quality matter? Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 19(2), 285–312. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mun001
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Avellaneda, C., & Bello-Gómez, R. (2020). Policy analysis for decision making in Colombian local governments. In P. Sanabria & N. Rubaii (Eds.), Policy analysis in Colombia (pp. 135–151). Unversity of Bristol: Policy Press.
   Google Scholar
• Avellaneda, C. N. (2013). Mayoral decision making: Issue salience, decision context and choice constraint? An experimental study with 120 Latin American mayors. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 23(3), 631–661. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mus041
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Avellaneda, C. N. (2017). The delegation of municipal spending: Does the decision context matter? In K. J. Meier, A. Rutherford, & C. N. Avellaneda (Eds.), Comparative public management: Why national, environmental, and organizational context matter (pp. 154–173). Georgetown University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Bardhan, P., & Mookherjee, D. (2016). Clientelistic politics and economic development. In The handbook of economic development and institutions (pp. 84–102). https://people.bu.edu/dilipm/wkpap/EDIclientsurv.pdf
   Google Scholar
• Behn, R. (2003). Why measure performance? Different purposes require different measures. Public Administration Review, 63(5), 586–606. https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6210.00322
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Belardinelli, P., Bellé, N., Sicilia, M., & Steccolini, I. (2018). Framing effects under different uses of performance information: An experimental study on public managers. Public Administration Review, 78(6), 841–851. https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.12969
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bello-Gomez, R. (2020). Interacting capacities: The indirect national contribution to subnational service provision. Public Administration Review, 80(6), 1011–1023. https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.13192
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bello-Gomez, R., & Avellaneda, C. (2023). Goal achievement in municipal strategic planning: The role of executives’ background and political context. Public Administration Review, 83(5), 1088–1107. https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.13630
   Google Scholar
• Bello-Gomez, R. A., & Avellaneda, C. N. (2022a). Credit claiming and mayoral preferences for project uptake amid a migrant crisis. Journal of Public Policy, 42(4), 757–781. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0143814X22000150
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bello-Gomez, R. A., & Avellaneda, C. N. (2022b). Mayoral preferences for delegation in collaborative arrangements: Issue salience and policy specificity. Public Management Review, 24(7), 1048–1074. https://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2021.1883097
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bert, G., Desmidt, S., Nielsen, P. A., & Baekgaard, M. (2017). Rational planning and politicians’ preferences for spending and reform: Replication and extension of a survey experiment. Public Management Review, 19(9), 1251–1271. https://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2016.1210905
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bogt, H. T. (2001). Politicians and output-oriented performance evaluation in municipalities. The European Accounting Review, 10(3), 621–643. https://doi.org/10.1080/713764629
   Google Scholar
• Bogt, H. T. (2003). Performance evaluation styles in governmental organizations: How do professional managers facilitate politicians’ work? Management Accounting Research, 14(4), 311–332. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mar.2003.09.003
   Google Scholar
• Bogt, H. T. (2004). Politicians in search of performance information? Survey research on Dutch Aldermen’s use of performance information. Financial Accountability & Management, 20(3), 221–252. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0267-4424.2004.00387.x
   Google Scholar
• Borges, M. (2019). The politics of strength: Elections, clientelism, and programmatic politics in the backlands of Brazil [ Doctoral dissertation]. Northwestern University,
   Google Scholar
• Bouckaert, G. (1996). Measurement of public sector performance: Some European perspectives. In A. Halachmi & G. Bouchaert (Eds.), Organizational performance and management in the public sector (pp. 223–237). Quorum Books.
   Google Scholar
• Bourne, M., Neely, A., Mills, J., & Platts, K. (2003). Implementing performance measurement systems: A literature review. International Journal of Business Performance Management, 5(1), 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1504/IJBPM.2003.002097
   Google Scholar
• Boyne, G. (2003). Sources of public service improvement: A critical review amd reserach agenda. Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory, 13(3), 367–394.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bueno, N. S. (2023). The timing of public policies: Political budget cycles and credit claiming. American Journal of Political Science, 67(4), 996–1011. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12688)
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Calvo, E., & Murillo, M. (2013). When parties meet voters: Partisan networks and distributive expectations in Argentina and Chile. Comparative Political Studies, 46(7), 851–882. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414012463882
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Carr, J. B. (2015). What have we learned about the performance of council‐manager government? A review and synthesis of the research. Public Administration Review, 75(5), 673–689. https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.12415
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Carreri, M. (2021). Can good politicians compensate for bad institutions? Evidence from an original survey of Italian mayors. The Journal of Politics, 83(4), 1229–1245. https://doi.org/10.1086/715062
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Christensen, J., Dahlmann, C., Mathiasen, A., Moynihan, D., & Petersen, N. (2019). How do elected officials evaluate performance? Goal preferences, governance preferences, and the process of goal reprioritization. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 9(4), 660–661. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muy030
   Google Scholar
• De Graaf, G., & Paanakker, H. (2015). Good governance: Performance values and procedural values in conflict. The American Review of Public Administration, 45(6), 635–652.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Deslatte, A. (2020). Positivity and negativity dominance in citizen assessments of intergovernmental sustainability performance. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 30(4), 563–578. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muaa004
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Desmidt, S., & Meyfroodt, K. (2020). How does public disclosure of performance information affect politicians’ attitudes towards effort allocation? Evidence from a survey experiment. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 31(4), 756–772. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muaa054
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Deutsch, J., & Silber, J. (2005). Measuring multidimensional poverty: An empirical comparison of various approaches. Review of Income and Wealth, 51(1), 145–174. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4991.2005.00148.x
   Google Scholar
• Dunleavy, P., & Hood, C. (1994). From old public administration to new public management. Public Money and Management, 14(3), 9–16. https://doi.org/10.1080/09540969409387823
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Fernandez-Gutierrez, M., & Van de Walle, S. (2019). Equity or efficiency? Explaining public officials’ values. Public Administration Review, 79(1), 25–34.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• González-Ocantos, E., & Oliveros, V. (2019). Clientelism in latin American politics. In Oxford research encyclopedia of politics (pp. 1–29). https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1677
   Google Scholar
• Grimmer, J., Westwood, S., & Messing, S. (2014). The impression of influence: Legislator communication, representation, and democratic accountability. Princeton University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Grindle, M. (2016). Democracy and clientelism: How uneasy a relationship? Latin American Research Review, 51(3), 241–250.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hatry, H. (2006). Performance measurement: Getting results. The Urban Institute.
   Google Scholar
• Heinrich, C. J. (2002). Outcomes-based performance management in the public sector: Implications for government accountability and effectiveness. Public Administration Review, 62(6), 712–725. https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6210.00253
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hicken, A. (2011). Clientelism. Annual Review of Political Science, 14(1), 289–310. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.031908.220508
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hicken, A., & Nathan, N. (2020). Clientelism’s Red Herrings: Dead ends and new directions in the study of nonprogrammatic politics. Annual Review of Political Science, 23, 277–94. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-050718-032657
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hilgers, T. (2008). Causes and consequences of political clientelism: Mexico’s PRD in comparative perspective. Latin American Politics and Society, 50(4), 123–153. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2008.00032.x
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hinterleitner, M. (2017). Reconciling perspectives on blame avoidance behaviour. Political Studies Review, 15(2), 243–254. https://doi.org/10.1111/1478-9302.12099
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hong, S. (2017). What are the areas of competence for central and local governments? Accountability mechanisms in multi-level governance. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 27(1), 120–134. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muw048
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hong, S., & Kim, Y. (2019). Loyalty or competence: Political use of performance information and negativity bias. Public Administration Review, 79(6), 829–840. https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.13108
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hood, C. (1991). A public management for all seasons. Public Administration, 69(1), 3–19. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9299.1991.tb00779.x
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hood, C. (1995). The new public management in the 1980s: Variations on a theme. Accounting, Organizations & Society, 20(2/3), 93–109. https://doi.org/10.1016/0361-3682(93)E0001-W
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hood, C. (1998). The art of the state: Culture, rhetoric and public management. Clarendon Press.
   Google Scholar
• Hood, C., & Piotrowska, B. M. (2021). Who loves input controls? What happened to ‘outputs not inputs’ in UK public financial management, and why? Public Administration, 1–15. https://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12741
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hopwood, A. G. (1972). An empirical study of the role of accounting data in performance evaluation. In Accounting from the outside (RLE accounting) (pp. 2–28). Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Hunter, D. (2013). Working Hard and working well: A practical guide to performance management for leaders of organizations serving children, adults and families. Hunter Consulting.
   Google Scholar
• James, O., & John, P. (2007). Public management at the ballot box: Performance information and electoral support for incumbent English local governments. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 17(4), 567–580. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mul020
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Julnes, L., de, P., & Holzer, M. (2001). Promoting the utilization of performance measures in public organizations: An empirical study of factors affecting adoption and implementation. Public Administration Review, 61(6), 693–708. https://doi.org/10.1111/0033-3352.00140
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kitschelt, H., & Wilkinson, S. (2007). Citizen-politician linkages: An introduction. In H. Kitschelt & S. I. Wilkinson (Eds.), Patrons, clients and policies: Patterns of democratic accountability and political competition (pp. 1–49). Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Leyva, S., Sanabria-Pulido, P., & Bello-Gomez, R. A. (2023). Unbalanced multilevel governance in Colombia: Fiscal federalism and political bargaining with weak administrative decentralization. In C. N. Avellaneda & R. A. Bello-Gomez (Eds.), Handbook on subnational governments and governance (pp. 89–106). Edward Elgar Publishing.
   Google Scholar
• Liguori, M., Sicilia, M., & Steccolini, I. (2012). Some Like it Non-Financial. Public Management Review, 14(7), 903–922. https://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2011.650054
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lindert, K., Emmanuel, S., & Joseph, S. (2006). Redistributing income to the poor and the rich: Public transfers in latin America and the Caribbean. SP Discussion Paper 0605. Social Protection, World Bank.
   Google Scholar
• Magaloni, B., Diaz-Cayeros, A., & Estevez, F. (2007). Clientelism and portfolio diversification: A model of electoral investment with applications to Mexico. In H. Kitschelt & S. I. Wilkinson (Eds.), Patrons, clients and policies: Patterns of democratic accountability and political competition (pp. 182–205). Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Mauro, P. (1995). Corruption and growth. Quarterly Journal of Economic, 110(3), 681–712. https://doi.org/10.2307/2946696
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Melkers, J., & Willoughby, K. (2004). Staying the course: The use of performance measurement in state governments. IBM Center for the Business of Government.
   Google Scholar
• Ministerio de Educación Nacional. (2005). Decreto 1286 de 2005. https://www.mineducacion.gov.co/1621/articles-85861_archivo_pdf.pdf
   Google Scholar
• Moynihan, D. (2005). Goal-based learning and the future of performance management. Public Administration Review, 65(2), 203–216. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2005.00445.x
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Moynihan, D. P. (2008). The dynamics of peformance management: Constructing information and reform. Georgetown University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Newcomer, K. E., Hatry, H., & Wholey J. (2015). Planning and designing useful evaluations. In E. Kathryn & H. Newcomer, P. Hatry and S. W. Joseph (Eds.), Handbook of Practical program evaluation (Fourth ed., pp. 7–35). Jossey-Bass.
   Google Scholar
• Nichter, S. (2018). Votes for survival: Relational clientelism in Latin America. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316998014
   Google Scholar
• Niedzwiecki, S. (2016). Social policies, attribution of responsibility, and political alignments: A subnational analysis of Argentina and Brazil. Comparative Political Studies, 49(4), 457–498. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414015612392
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Nielsen, P., & Baekgaard, M. (2015). Performance information, blame avoidance, and Politicians’ attitudes to spending and reform: Evidence from an experiment. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 25(2), 545–569. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mut051
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Nielsen, P., & Moynihan, D. (2017a). Romanticizing bureaucratic leadership? The politics of how elected officials attribute responsibility for performance. Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions, 30(4), 541–559. https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12256
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Nielsen, P., & Moynihan, D. (2017b). How do politicians attribute bureaucratic responsibility for performance? Negativity Bias and interest group advocacy. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 27(2), 269–283. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muw060
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Olsen, A. (2015). “Citizen (dis) satisfaction: An experimental equivalence framing study. Public Administration Review, 75(3), 469–478. https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.12337
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Olsen, A. (2017). Compared to what? How social and historical reference points affect citizens’ performance evaluations. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 27(4), 562–580. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mux023
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Piattoni, S. (2001). Clientelism, interests, and democratic representation. Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Poister, T. (2010). The future of strategic planning in the public sector: Linking strategic management and performance. Public Administration Review, 70(s1), s246–s254. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2010.02284.x
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Poister, T. (2015). Performance measurement. Monitoring program outcomes. In E. Kathryn, H. Newcomer, P. Hatry, & S. W. Joseph (Eds.), Handbook of practical program evaluation (Fourth ed., pp. 108–136). Jossey-Bass.
   Google Scholar
• Poister, T., & Streib, G. (1999). Performance measurement in municipal government: Assessing the state of the practice. Public Administration Review, 59(4), 325–335. https://doi.org/10.2307/3110115
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Pollitt, C. (2006a). Performance management in practic? Xe: A comparative study of executive agencies. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 16(1), 25–44. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mui045
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Pollitt, C. (2006b). Performance information for democracy – the missing link? Evaluation: The international journal of theory, Research and Practice, 12(1), 38–55. https://doi.org/10.1177/1356389006064191
   Google Scholar
• Pollitt, C. (2006c). Who are we, what are we doing, where are we going? A Perspective on the performance management community. Leuven 1. June 1, 2006. https://unipub.lib.uni-corvinus.hu/4177/1/kg2007-1_73-82.pdf
   Google Scholar
• Pollitt, C., & Bouckaert, G. (2004). Public Management reform: A comparative analysis (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Rocha, M. M. D. (2023). The third wave of studies on clientelism in Latin America: A critical reading. Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais, 38(111), e3811023. https://doi.org/10.1590/3811023/2023
   Google Scholar
• Ryzin, V., & Gregg, G. The trouble with regression analysis of (factorial) experiments. April 29, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3574111
   Google Scholar
• Sanín G, Francisco, & Acuña, F. (2010). El indefinido nuevo sistema de partidos en Colombia. In N. Golwaser & A. Polack (Eds.), Observatorio latinoamericano 5: Dossier Colombia. Universidad de Buenos Aires.
   Google Scholar
• Schedler, K. (2007). Unleashing change. a study of organizational renewal in government - Edited by Steven Kelman. Public Administration, 85(1), 246–248. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9299.2007.00642_9.x
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Schochet, P., & Burghardt, J. (2008). Do job corps performance measures track program impacts? Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 27(3), 556–576. https://doi.org/10.1002/pam.20356
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Stokes, S. (2009). Political clientelism. In C. Boix & S. Stokes (Eds.), The oxford handbook of comparative politics (pp. 604–627). Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Svara, J. (2008). Strengthening local governemnt leadership and peformance: Reexamining and updating the Winter commission goals. Public Administration Review, 68, S37–S49.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2019). GAO-20-269SP state and local governments’ fiscal outlook: 2019 Update. Report to the Congress, December 2019.
   Google Scholar
• Walker, R., Boyne, G. A., & Brewer, G. (2010). Public management and peformance: Reserach directions. Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Wang, X., & Gianakis, G. A. (1999). Public Officials’s attitudes toward subjective performance measures. Public Productivity & Management Review, 537–553.
   Google Scholar
• Weaver, R. K. (1986). The politics of blame avoidance. Journal of Public Policy, 6(4), 371–398. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0143814X00004219
   Google Scholar
• Weingast, B. R. (2014). Second generation fiscal federalism: Political aspects of decentralization and economic development. World Development, 53, 14–25. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.01.003
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Zale, K. (2019). Part-time government. The Ohio State Law Journal, 80, 987. https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/ohslj80&i=1017
   Google Scholar