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Spanish Journal of Finance and Accounting / Revista Española de Financiación y Contabilidad Volume 37, 2008 - Issue 137
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Original Articles

Gobierno corporativo, conflictos de agencia y elección de auditor

Corporate Governance, agency conflicts and auditor choice

Juan Monterrey MayoralUniversidad de ExtremaduraCorrespondence[email protected]
,
Amparo Sánchez SeguraUniversidad de Extremadura
,
Emiliano Ruiz BarbadilloUniversidad de CádizCorrespondence[email protected]
&
Nieves Gómez AguilarUniversidad de Cádiz
Pages 113-156 | Received 20 Jan 2006, Accepted 14 Oct 2007, Published online: 15 Jan 2014

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