Stereotyping as Discrimination: Why Thoughts Can Be Discriminatory

References

• Ahmed, Sarah. 2006. Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, and Others. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Alcoff, Linda Martín. 2006. Visible Identities: Race, Gender, and the Self. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Anderson, Elizabeth. 1999. “What’s the Point of Equality?” Ethics 109 (2): 287–337. doi:https://doi.org/10.1086/233897.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Antony, Louise. 2016. “Bias: Friend or Foe? Reflections on Saulish Skepticism.” In Implicit Bias and Philosophy: Volume 1, edited by M. Brownstein and J. Saul, 157–190. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Aristotle. 2002. Nicomachean Ethics, Trans. Christopher Rowe. Oxford: OUP.
   Google Scholar
• Arneson, Richard. 2006. “What Is Wrongful Discrimination?” San Diego Law Review 43 (4): 775–808.
   Google Scholar
• Arneson, Richard. 2017. “Discrimination and Harm.” In The Routledge Handbook of the Ethics of Discrimination, edited by Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, 151–163. New York, NY: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Ásta. 2018. Categories We Live By: The Construction of Sex, Gender, Race, & Other Social Categories. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Bahler, Brock, ed. 2020. The Logic of Racial Practice: Explorations in the Habituation of Racism. London: Lexington Books.
   Google Scholar
• Basu, Rima. 2018. “The Wrongs of Racist Beliefs.” Philosophical Studies 176 (9): 2497–2515.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Basu, Rima. 2019. “What We Epistemically Owe Each Other.” Philosophical Studies 176 (4): 915–931.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Beeghly, Erin. “What’s Wrong with Stereotyping?” Unpublished Manuscript.
   Google Scholar
• Beeghly, Erin. 2015. “What Is a Stereotype? What Is Stereotyping?” Hypatia 3 (30): 675–691. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/hypa.12170.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Beeghly, Erin. 2020. “Bias and Knowledge: Two Metaphors.” In An Introduction to Implicit Bias: Knowledge, Justice, and the Social Mind, edited by Erin Beeghly and Alex Madva, 77–98. New York, NY: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Beeghly, Erin. 2021. “What’s Wrong with Stereotypes? the Falsity Hypothesis.” Social Theory and Practice 47 (1): 33–61. doi:https://doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract2021112111.
   Google Scholar
• Begby, Endre. 2013. “The Epistemology of Prejudice.” Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2: 90–99.
   Google Scholar
• Begby, Endre. 2018. “Doxastic Morality: A Moderately Skeptical Perspective.” Philosophical Topics 46 (1): 155–172. doi:https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics20184619.
   Google Scholar
• Begby, Endre. 2021. The Epistemology of Prejudice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Bernstein, Sara. “Biased Evaluative Descriptions.” Unpublished Manuscript.
   Google Scholar
• Briggs Initiative. https://repository.uchastings.edu/ca_ballot_inits/324/
   Google Scholar
• Brownstein, Michael. 2018. The Implicit Mind: Cognitive Architecture, the Self, and Ethics. Oxford: OUP.
   Google Scholar
• Code, Lorraine. 1991. What Can She Know? Feminist Theory and the Construction of Knowledge. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Crenshaw, Kimberlé. 1989. “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics.” University of Chicago Legal Forum 1989 (1): 139–167.
   Google Scholar
• Dalmiya, Vrinda, and Linda Alcoff. 1993. “Are ‘Old Wives Tales’ Justified.” In Feminist Epistemologies, edited by Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter, 217–244. New York: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Davidson, L J., and Dan Kelly. 2020. “Minding the Gap: Bias, Soft Structures, and the Double Life of Social Norms.” Journal of Applied Philosophy 37 (2): 190–210. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12351.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Davis, Emmalon. 2016. “Typecasts, Tokens, and Spokespersons: A Case for Credibility Excess as Testimonial Injustice.” Hypatia 31 (3): 485–501. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/hypa.12251.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• De Beauvoir, Simone. 1953. The Second Sex, trans. H.M. Parshley. New York: Knopf.
   Google Scholar
• Del Pinal, Guillermo, and Kevin Reuter. 2017. “Dual Character Concepts in Social Cognition: Commitments and the Normative Dimension of Conceptual Representation.” Cognitive Science 41 (3): 477–501. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12456.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Dembroff, Robin. 2020. “Beyond the Binary: Genderqueer as a Critical Gender Kind.” Philosophers Imprint 20 (9): 1–23.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Dominguez, Noel. 2020. “Moral Responsibility for Implicit Biases: Examining Our Options.” In An Introduction to Implicit Bias: Knowledge, Justice, and the Social Mind, edited by Erin Beeghly and Alex Madva, 153–173. New York: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Eidelson, Benjamin. 2015. Discrimination and Disrespect. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Ellison, Ralph. 1995. Invisible Man. New York: Vintage International.
   Google Scholar
• Exodus. 2017. King James Bible.
   Google Scholar
• Fanon, Frantz. 2008. Black Skin, White Masks, Trans. Richard Philcox. New York: Grove Press.
   Google Scholar
• Fiske, Susan, and Shelley Taylor. 1991. Social Cognition. 2nd ed. New York: McGraw Hill.
   Google Scholar
• Fricker, Miranda. 2009. Epistemic Injustice: The Power and Ethics of Knowing. Oxford: OUP.
   Google Scholar
• Fricker, Miranda. 2017. “Evolving Concepts of Epistemic Injustice.” In The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice, edited by Ian James Kidd, José Medina, and Gaile Pohlhaus Jr., 53–60. New York: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Gallagher, Shaun. 2005. How the Body Shapes the Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Garry, Ann. 2011. “Intersectionality, Metaphors, and the Multiplicity of Gender.” Hypatia 26 (4): 826–850. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2011.01194.x.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hardy-Vallée, Benoit, and Nicolas Payette, eds. 2018. Beyond the Brain: Embodied, Situated, and Distributed Cognition. New Castle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
   Google Scholar
• Haslanger, Sally. 2019. “Cognition as a Social Skill.” Australasian Philosophical Review 3 (1): 5–25. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/24740500.2019.1705229.
   Google Scholar
• Hauser, Christine. 2018 “‘Are You Actually an M.D.?’: A Black Doctor Is Questioned as She Intervenes on A Delta Flight.” New York Times, November. 2. Accessed June 1, 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/02/us/delta-black-doctor-racial-profiling.html
   Google Scholar
• Hellman, Deborah. 2008. When Is Discrimination Wrong? Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Hellman, Deborah. 2018. “Indirect Discrimination and the Duty to Avoid Compounding Injustice.” In Foundations of Indirect Discrimination Law, edited by Hugh Collins and Tarunabh Khaitain, 105–122. London: Bloomsbury.
   Google Scholar
• Hieronymi, Pamela. 2008. “Responsibility for Believing.” Synthese 161 (3): 357–373. doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9089-x.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Holroyd, Jules. 2012. “Responsibility for Implicit Bias.” Journal of Social Philosophy 43 (3): 274–306. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9833.2012.01565.x.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Holroyd, Jules, and Joseph Sweetman. 2016. “The Heterogeneity of Implicit Bias.” In Implicit Bias and Philosophy, Volume 1, edited by Michael Brownstein and Jennifer Saul, 80–103. Oxford: OUP.
   Google Scholar
• Hosein, Adam. 2015. “Freedom, Sex Roles, and Antidiscrimination.” Law and Philosophy 34 (5): 485–517. doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-015-9232-2.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Johnson, Gabbrielle. 2020. “The Structure of Bias.” Mind 129 (516): 1193–1236. doi:https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzaa011.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kahneman, Daniel. 2011. Thinking Fast and Slow. New York, NY: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux.
   Google Scholar
• Khaitan, Tarunabh. 2015. A Theory of Discrimination Law. Oxford: OUP.
   Google Scholar
• Knobe, Joshua, Sandeep Prasada, and George Newman. 2017. “Dual Character Concepts and the Normative Dimension of Conceptual Representation.” Cognition 127 (2): 242–257. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2013.01.005.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Korsgaard, Christine. 1996. The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Krieger, Linda Hamilton. 1995. “The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equality Opportunity/.” Stanford Law Review 47 (6): 1161–1248. doi:https://doi.org/10.2307/1229191.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Leboeuf, Céline. 2020. “The Embodied Biased Mind.” In An Introduction to Implicit Bias: Knowledge, Justice, and the Social Mind, edited by Erin Beeghly and Alex Madva, 41–56. New York: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Lebron, Christopher J. 2013. The Color of Our Shame: Race and Justice in Our Time. Oxford: OUP.
   Google Scholar
• Leslie, Sarah Jane. 2015. “Hilary Clinton Is the Only Man in the Obama Administration.” Analytic Philosophy 56 (2): 111–141. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12063.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lindemann, Hilde. 2014. Holding and Letting Go: Damaged Identities, Narrative Repair. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Lippert-Rasmussen, Kasper. 2014. Born Free and Equal: A Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature of Discrimination. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Livingstone Smith, David. 2020. On Inhumanity: Dehumanization and How to Resist It. Oxford: OUP.
   Google Scholar
• Lorde, Audre. 1984. Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches by Audre Lorde. Berkeley, CA: Crossing Press.
   Google Scholar
• Lugones, María. 2003. Pilgramages/Peregrinajes: Theorizing Coalition Against Multiple Oppressions. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littefield.
   Google Scholar
• Madva, Alex. 2018. “Implicit Bias, Moods, and Moral Responsibility.” Pacific Philosophy Quarterly 99 (1): 53–78. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12212.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• McGeer, Victoria. 2015. “Mind-Making Practices: The Social Infrastructure of Self-knowing Agency and Responsibility.” Philosophical Explorations 18: 259–281. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2015.1032331.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• McGowan, Mary Kate. 2019. Just Words: On Speech and Hidden Harm. Oxford: OUP.
   Google Scholar
• McHugh, Nancy Arden, and Lacey J. Davidson. 2020. “Epistemic Responsibility and Implicit Bias.” In An Introduction to Implicit Bias: Knowledge, Justice, and the Social Mind, edited by Erin Beeghly and Alex Madva, 174–190. New York, NY: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Medina, José. 2013. The Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial Oppression, Epistemic Injustice, and Resistant Imagination. Oxford: OUP.
   Google Scholar
• Mills, Charles. 1997. The Racial Contract. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Moraga, Cherríe, and Gloria Andalzúa, eds. 2015. The Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color. 4th ed. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
   Google Scholar
• Moreau, Sophia. 2020. Faces of Inequality: A Theory of Wrongful Discrimination. Oxford: OUP.
   Google Scholar
• Murdoch, Iris. 1970. “The Idea of Perfection.” In The Sovereignty of the Good, 1–44. New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
   Google Scholar
• Nanay, Bence. Forthcoming. “Implicit Bias as Mental Imagery.” Journal of the American Philosophical Association.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Ngo, Helen. 2018. The Habits of Racism: A Phenomenology of Racism and Racialized Embodiment. New York: Lexington Books.
   Google Scholar
• Noë, Alva. 2004. Action in Perception. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• O’Connor, Sandra Day. “Interviewed by Terry Gross.” Fresh Air, National Public Radio. March 5, 2013 at 31.08. https://www.npr.org/2013/03/05/172982275/out-of-order-at-the-court-oconnor-on-being-the-first-female-justice
   Google Scholar
• Oxford English Dictionary. “Discrimination.” Accessed May 24, 2021. https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/54060?redirectedFrom=discrimination#eid
   Google Scholar
• Oxford English Dictionary. “Judgment.” Definition 1 (C) and 3.” Accessed May 24, 2021. https://www-oed-com.ezproxy.lib.utah.edu/view/Entry/101888?rskey=YSbW6P&result=2#eid
   Google Scholar
• Piper, Adrian. 1993. “Two Forms of Discrimination.” In Race and Racism, edited by Bernard Boxill, 193–237. Oxford: OUP.
   Google Scholar
• Puddifoot, Katherine. 2017. “Epistemic Discrimination.” In The Routledge Handbook of the Ethics of Discrimination, edited by Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, 54–67. New York: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Rankine, Claudia. 2014. Citizen: An American Lyric. New York, NY: Graywolf Press.
   Google Scholar
• Rhodes, Marjorie, Sarah-Jane Leslie, and Christina M. Tworek. 2012. “Cultural Transmission of Social Essentialism.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 101 (34): 13526–13531. doi:https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1208951109.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Rini, Regina. 2020. The Ethics of Microaggression. New York, NY: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Selni, Michael. 2013. “Indirect Discrimination and the Anti-discrimination Mandate.” In Philosophical Foundations of Discrimination Law, edited by Deborah Hellman and Sophia Moreau, 250–268. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Shelby, Tommie. 2002. “Is Racism in The ‘Heart?” Journal of Social Philosophy 33 (3): 411–420. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/0047-2786.00150.
   Google Scholar
• Stark, Cynthia. 1997. “The Rationality of Valuing Oneself: Kant on Self-Respect.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 35 (1): 65–82. doi:https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.1997.0006.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Stokes, Dustin. 2013. “The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception.” Philosophy Compass 8 (7): 646–663. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12043.
   Google Scholar
• Taylor, Paul C. 2018. “Moral Perfectionism.” In To Shape A New World: Essays on the Political Philosophy of Martin Luther King Jr., edited by Tommie Shelby and Brandon M. Terry, 35–57. Cambridge, MA: Belnap Press.
   Google Scholar
• The Combahee River Collective. 2017. “The Combahee River Collective Statement.” In How We Get Free: Black Feminism and the Combahee River Collective, edited by Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, 15–28. Chicago, IL: Haymarket Books.
   Google Scholar
• Thompson, Frej Clem. 2017. “Direct Discrimination.” In The Routledge Handbook to the Ethics of Discrimination, edited by Kasper Lippert Rasmussen, 19–29. New York: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Tullman, Katherine. 2017. “Experiencing Gendered Seeing.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 55 (4): 475–499. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12257.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Varela, Francisco J. Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch. 2017. The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. Revised ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Wells, Ida B. 2014. The Light of Truth: Writings of an Anti-Lynching Crusader, edited by Mia Bay. New York: Penguin Classics.
   Google Scholar
• Wilson, Robert, and Lucia Foglia. 2017. “Embodied Cognition.” In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward Zalta. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/embodied-cognition/
   Google Scholar
• Yancy, George. 2017. Black Bodies, White Gazes: The Continuing Significance of Race in America, 2nd Edn. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
   Google Scholar
• Young, Iris Marion. 2005. On Female Body Experience: “Throwing like a Girl” and Other Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Zawidzki, Tadeusz Wiesław. 2013. Mindshaping: A New Framework for Understanding Human Social Cognition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
   Google Scholar