Disagreement and Progress in Philosophy and in Empirical Sciences

References

• Ables, Brent. 2015. “Disagreement and Philosophical Progress.” Logos & Episteme 6 (1): 115–127. https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme2015616.
   Google Scholar
• Balcerak Jackson, Magdalena. 2013. “Conceptual Analysis and Epistemic Progress.” Synthese 190 (15): 3053–3074. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0120-0.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bird, Alexander. 2007. “What Is Scientific Progress?” Noûs 41 (1): 64–89. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00638.x.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Borge, Bruno, and Nicolás Francisco Lo Guercio. 2021. “Learning from Scientific Disagreement.” Theoria 36 (3): 275–398.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Brake, Elisabeth. 2017. “Making Philosophical Progress: The Big Questions, Applied Philosophy, and the Profession.” Social Philosophy and Policy 34 (2): 23–45. https://doi.org/10.1017/S026505251700019X.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Chalmers, David J. 2015. “Why Isn’t There More Progress in Philosophy?” Philosophy 90 (1): 3–31. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819114000436.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• David, Bourget, and David J. Chalmers. 2014. “What Do Philosophers Believe?” Philosophical Studies 170 (3): 465–500. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0259-7.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• David, Bourget, and David J. Chalmers. 2023. “Philosophers on Philosophy: The 2020 PhilPapers Survey.” Philosophers’ Imprint 23:11. https://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.2109.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Dawid, Richard. 2013. String Theory and the Scientific Method. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Dellsén, Finnur. 2021. “Understanding Scientific Progress: The Noetic Account.” Synthese 199 (3–4): 11249–11278. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03289-z.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Dietrich, Eric S. 2011. “There Is No Progress in Philosophy.” Essays in Philosophy 12 (2): 330–345. https://doi.org/10.5840/eip20111229.
   Google Scholar
• Frances, Bryan. 2017. “Extensive Philosophical Agreement and Progress.” Metaphilosophy 48 (1–2): 47–57. https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12227.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Goldstein, Rebecca. 2014. “How Philosophy Makes Progress.” The Chronicle of Higher Education, April 14, 2014. http://chronicle.com/article/Is-Philosophy-Obsolete-/145837.
   Google Scholar
• Hossenfelder, Sabine. 2021. “Who’s Killing Physics?” Cosmos, October 22, 2021. https://cosmosmagazine.com/science/physics/future-of-physics-killing-quantum-mechanics/.
   Google Scholar
• Kornblith, Hilary. 2013. “Is Philosophical Knowledge Possible?” In Disagreement and Skepticism, edited by Diego E. Machuca, 260–276. New York: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Kuhn, Thomas S. 1970. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
   Google Scholar
• Leal, Fernando. 2019. “On Philosophical Argumentation.” Journal of Argumentation in Context 8 (2): 173–194. https://doi.org/10.1075/jaic.19007.lea.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Massimi, Michela. 2019. “Realism, Perspectivism, and Disagreement in Science.” Synthese 198 (S25): 6115–6141. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02500-6.
   Google Scholar
• McGinn, Collin. 1993. Problems in Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Mulligan, Kevin, Peter Simons, and Barry Smith. 2006. “What’s Wrong with Contemporary Philosophy?“ Topoi 25 (1): 63–67.
   Google Scholar
• Niiniluoto, Illka. 1980. “Scientific Progress.” Synthese 45 (3): 427–462. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02221787.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Okun, Lev B. 1989. “The Concept of Mass.” Physics Today 42 (6): 31–36. https://doi.org/10.1063/1.881171.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Olson, Dustin. 2019. “Epistemic Progress Despite Systematic Disagreement.” Epistemology & Philosophy of Science 56 (2): 77–94. https://doi.org/10.5840/eps201956231.
   Google Scholar
• Sarıhan, Işık. 2017. “Philosophical Puzzles Evade Empirical Evidence: Some Thoughts and Clarifications Regarding the Relation Between Brain Sciences and Philosophy of Mind.” In The Human Sciences After the Decade of the Brain, edited by Jon Leefmann and Elisabeth Hildt, 14–23. London: Elsevier.
   Google Scholar
• Sarıhan, Işık. 2023. “Problems with Publishing Philosophical Claims We Don’t Believe.” Episteme 20 (2): 449–458. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2021.56.
   Google Scholar
• Shan, Yafeng. 2019. “A New Functional Approach to Scientific Progress.” Philosophy of Science 86 (4): 739–758. https://doi.org/10.1086/704980.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Shan, Yafeng. 2022. “Philosophy Doesn’t Need a Concept of Progress.” Metaphilosophy 53 (2–3): 176–184. https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12526.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Stoljar, Daniel. 2017. Philosophical Progress: In Defence of a Reasonable Optimism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Weinberger, Naftali, and Seamus Bradley. 2020. “Making Sense of Non-Factual Disagreement in Science.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 83: 36–43. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2020.01.004.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Williamson, Timothy. 2006. “Must Do Better.” In Truth and Realism, edited by Patrick Greenough and Michael P. Lynch, 177–187. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Wilson, Jessica. 2017. “Three Barriers to Philosophical Progress.” In Philosophy’s Future: The Problem of Philosophical Progress, edited by Russell Blackford and Damien Broderick, 91–114. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
   Google Scholar