76
Views
5
CrossRef citations to date
0
Altmetric
Original Articles

Disbelief as the Dual of Belief

Pages 231-252 | Published online: 06 Nov 2007

References

  • Goodstein , R. L. 1963 . Boolean algebra , Oxford : Pergamon .
  • Hajek , Alan . 2003 . What conditional probability could not be . Synthese , 137 : 273 – 323 .
  • Kyburg , Henry E. and Pittarelli , Michael . 1996 . Set‐based Bayesianism . IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics—Part A: Systems and Humans , 26 (3) : 324 – 339 .
  • Marciszewski , Witold , ed. 1981 . Dictionary of logic as applied in the study of language , The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff .
  • Massey , Gerald J. 1992 . The indeterminacy of translation: A study in philosophical exegesis . Philosophical Topics , 20 : 317 – 345 .
  • Norton , John D. 2003 . A material theory of induction . Philosophy of Science , 70 : 647 – 670 .
  • Norton , John D. 2005 . “ A little survey of induction ” . In Scientific evidence: Philosophical theories and applications , Edited by: Achinstein , Peter. 9 – 34 . Baltimore, MD : Johns Hopkins University Press .
  • Norton , John D. 2007a . Probability disassembled . British Journal for the Philosophy of Science , 58 : 141 – 171 .
  • Norton , John D. in press . Ignorance and indifference . Philosophy of Science ,
  • Shafer , Glenn . 1976 . A mathematical theory of evidence , Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press .

Reprints and Corporate Permissions

Please note: Selecting permissions does not provide access to the full text of the article, please see our help page How do I view content?

To request a reprint or corporate permissions for this article, please click on the relevant link below:

Academic Permissions

Please note: Selecting permissions does not provide access to the full text of the article, please see our help page How do I view content?

Obtain permissions instantly via Rightslink by clicking on the button below:

If you are unable to obtain permissions via Rightslink, please complete and submit this Permissions form. For more information, please visit our Permissions help page.