Scientific Realism and Blocking Strategies*

References

• Alston, William P. 1988. “The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification.” Philosophical Perspectives 2: 257–299.
   Google Scholar
• Berker, Selim. 2013. “Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions.” Philosophical Review 122: 337–393.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Blackburn, Simon. 2002. “Realism: Deconstructing the Debate.” Ratio 15: 111–133.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bogen, Jim. 2011. “‘Saving the Phenomena’ and Saving the Phenomena.” Synthese 182: 7–22.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• BonJour, Laurence. 1985. The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. HUP: Cambridge.
   Google Scholar
• Boyd, Richard N. 1983. “On the Current Status of the Issue of Scientific Realism.” Erkenntnis 19: 45–90.
   Google Scholar
• Bueno, Otávio, and Scott A. Shalkowski. 2020. “Troubles with Theoretical Virtues: Resisting Theoretical Utility Arguments in Metaphysics.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101: 456–469.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Carnap, Rudolf. 1937. “Testability and Meaning Continued.” Philosophy of Science 4: 1–40.
   Google Scholar
• Chakravartty, Anjan. 1998. “Semirealism.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 29: 391–408.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Chakravartty, Anjan. 2004. “Structuralist Conception of Objects.” Philosophy of Science 70: 867–878.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Chakravartty, Anjan. 2007. A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism: Knowing the Unobservable. Cambridge: CUP.
   Google Scholar
• Chakravartty, Anjan. 2008. “What You Don’t Know Can’t Hurt You: Realism and the Unconceived.” Philosophical Studies 137: 149–158.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Chakravartty, Anjan. 2013. “On the Prospects of Naturalized Metaphysics.” In Scientific Metaphysics, edited by D. Ross, J. Ladyman, and H. Kincaid, 27–50. Oxford: OUP.
   Google Scholar
• Chakravartty, Anjan. 2017. Scientific Ontology: Integrating Naturalized Metaphysics and Voluntarist Epistemology. Oxford: OUP.
   Google Scholar
• Chakravartty, Anjan. 2018. “Realism, Antirealism, Epistemic Stances, and Voluntarism.” In The Routledge Handbook of Scientific Realism, edited by J. Saatsi, 225–236. London: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Chakravartty, Anjan, and Bas C. van Fraassen. 2018. “What is Scientific Realism?” Spontaneous Generations 9: 12–25.
   Google Scholar
• Chang, Hasok. 2002. “Preservative Realism and its Discontents: Revisiting Caloric.” Philosophy of Science 70: 902–912.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Chang, Hasok..2012. “Beyond Case Studies: History as Philosophy.” In Integrating History and Philosophy of Science, edited by S. Mauskopf and T. Schmaltz, 109–124. Dordrecht: Springer..
   Google Scholar
• David, Marian. 2001. ““Truth as the Epistemic Goal”, Knowledge, Truth, and Duty.” In Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue, edited by M. Steup, 151–169. Oxford: OUP.
   Google Scholar
• Feldman, Richard. 1988. “Epistemic Obligations.” Philosophical Perspectives, Epistemology 2: 235–256.
   Google Scholar
• Fine, Arthur. 1986. “Unnatural Attitudes: Realist and Instrumentalist Attachments to Science.” Mind, New Series 95: 149–179.
   Google Scholar
• Forbes, Curtis J. 2017. “A Pragmatic, Existentialist Approach to the Scientific Realism Debate.” PhD thesis, University of Toronto.
   Google Scholar
• Goldman, Alvin I. 1979. “What is Justified Belief.” In Justification and Knowledge, edited by G. Pappas, 1–25. Boston: D. Reidel.
   Google Scholar
• Grimm, Stephen R.. 2008. “Epistemic Goals and Epistemic Values.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77: 725–744.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hacking, Ian. 1983. Representing and Intervening. Cambridge: CUP.
   Google Scholar
• James, William. [1896] 2013. “The Will to Believe.” In Reasons and Responsibility. Readings in Some Basic Problems of Philosophy, edited by J. Feinberg and R. Shafer-Landau, 129–137. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
   Google Scholar
• Khalifa, Kareem. 2020. “Understanding, Truth, and Epistemic Goals.” Philosophy of Science 87: 944–956.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kinzel, Katharina. 2015. “Narrative and Evidence. How Can Case Studies from the History of Science Support Claims in the Philosophy of Science?” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 49: 48–57.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kitcher, Philip. 1993. The Advancement of Science. Oxford: OUP.
   Google Scholar
• Kuhn, Thomas. 1957. The Copernican Revolution. HUP: Harvard.
   Google Scholar
• Kuhn, Thomas. 1962. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago/London: Chicago UP.
   Google Scholar
• Ladyman, James. 1998. “What is Structural Realism?” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 29: 409–424.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Laudan, Larry. 1981. “A Confutation of Convergent Realism.” Philosophy of Science 48/1: 19–49.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lehrer, Keith. 1990. Theory of Knowledge. Boulder: Westview.
   Google Scholar
• Lewis, Peter J. 2001. “Why the Pessimistic Induction is a Fallacy.” Synthese 129: 371–380.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lyons, Timothy D. 2013. “A Historically Informed Modus Ponens Against Scientific Realism: Articulation, Critique, and Restoration.” International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27: 369–392.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Magnus, P. D., and Craig Callender. 2004. “Realist Ennui and the Base Rate Fallacy.” Philosophy of Science 71: 320–338.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Massimi, Michela. 2004. “Non-Defensible Middle Ground for Experimental Realism: Why We are Justified to Believe in Colored Quarks.” Philosophy of Science 71: 36–60.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Maxwell, Grover. 1970. “Theories, Perception and Structural Realism.” In The Nature and Function of Scientific Theories, edited by R. Colodny, 3–34. Pittsburgh: PUP.
   Google Scholar
• Mizrahi, Moti. 2015. “Historical Inductions: New Cherries, Same Old Cherry-Picking.” International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 29: 129–148.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Monton, Bradley. 2007. “Introduction.” In Images of Empiricism. Essays on Science and Stances, edited by B. Monton, 1–8. Oxford: OUP.
   Google Scholar
• Monton, Bradley, and Chad Mohler. 2021. “Constructive Empiricism.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta. Stanford: Metaphysics Research Lab. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2021/entries/constructive-empiricism/
   Google Scholar
• Musgrave, Alan. 1988. “The Ultimate Argument for Scientific Realism.” In Relativism and Realism in Science, edited by R. Nola, 229–252. Netherlands: Kluwer.
   Google Scholar
• Musgrave, Alan E. 2007. “The ‘Miracle Argument’ For Scientific Realism”. The Rutherford Journal. Accessed 04.09.2022. http://www.rutherfordjournal.org/article020108.html.
   Google Scholar
• Nagel, Ernest. 1961. The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.
   Google Scholar
• Nickles, Thomas. 1995. “Philosophy of Science and History of Science.” Osiris 10: 138–163.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Nola, Robert. 2008. “The Optimistic Meta-Induction and Ontological Continuity: The Case of the Electron.” In Rethinking Scientific Change and Theory Comparison: Stabilities, Ruptures, Incommensurabilities?, edited by L. Soler, H. Sankey, and P. Hoyningen-Huene, 159–202. Dordrecht: Springer.
   Google Scholar
• Park, Seungbae. 2017. “Critiques of Minimal Realism.” Problemos 92: 102–114.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Poincaré, Henri. 1902. La Science et L’Hypothese. Paris: Flammarion.
   Google Scholar
• Psillos, Stathis. 1994. “A Philosophical Study of the Transition from the Caloric Theory of Heat to Thermodynamics: Resisting the Pessimistic Meta-Induction.” Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 25: 159–190.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Psillos, Stathis. 1999. Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth. London: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Psillos, Stathis. 2001. “Is Structural Realism Possible?” Philosophy of Science 68: 13–24. Supplement: Proceedings of the 2000 Biennial Meeting of the PSA. Part I: Contributed Papers.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Psillos, Stathis. 2021. “Scientific Ontology: Fact or Stance.” Dialogue (Los Angeles, Calif) 60: 15–31.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Putnam, Hilary. 1975. Explanation and Reference, Philosophical Papers 2: Mind, Language and Reality. Cambridge: CUP.
   Google Scholar
• Putnam, Hilary. 1978. Meaning and the Moral Sciences. London: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Resnik, David B. 1994. “Hacking’s Experimental Realism.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24/3: 395–411.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Rosen, Gideon. 1994. “What is Constructive Empiricism?” Philosophical Studies 74: 143–178.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Rowbottom, Darrell P. 2016. “Extending the Argument from Unconceived Alternatives: Observations, Models, Predictions, Explanations, Methods, Instruments, Experiments, and Values.” Synthese 196: 3947–3959.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Rowbottom, Darrell P. 2019. “Scientific Realism: What it is, the Contemporary Debate, and New Directions.” Synthese 196: 451–484.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Russell, Bertrand. 1927. The Analysis of Matter. London: RKP.
   Google Scholar
• Saatsi, Juha T. 2005. “On the Pessimistic Induction and Two Fallacies.” Philosophy of Science 72: 1088–1098.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Stanford, Kyle P. 2000. “An Antirealist Explanation of the Success of Science.” Philosophy of Science 67: 266–284.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Stanford, Kyle P. 2003. “Pyrrhic Victories for Scientific Realism.” Journal of Philosophy 100: 553–572.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Stanford, Kyle P. 2006. Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives. Oxford: OUP.
   Google Scholar
• Swoyer, Chris. 2008. “Abstract Entities.” In Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, edited by T. Sider, J. Hawthorne, and D. Zimmerman, 11–31. Oxford: Blackwell.
   Google Scholar
• Teller, Paul. 2004. “What is a Stance?” Philosophical Studies 121: 159–170.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Van Fraassen, Bas C. 1989. Laws and Symmetry. Oxford: OUP.
   Google Scholar
• Van Fraassen, Bas C. 2002. The Empirical Stance. New Haven: Yale UP.
   Google Scholar
• Van Fraassen, Bas C. 2007. “From a View of Science to a New Empiricism.” In Images of Empiricism. Essays on Science and Stances, with a Reply from Bas C. van Fraassen, edited by B. Monton, 337–383. Oxford: OUP.
   Google Scholar
• Weyl, Hermann. 1963. Philosophy of Mathematics and Natural Science. New York: Atheneum.
   Google Scholar
• Worrall, John. 1989. “Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds?” Dialectica 43: 99–124.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Wylie, Alison. 1986. “Arguments for Scientific Realism: The Ascending Spiral.” American Philosophical Quarterly 23: 287–297.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar