NOTES
- I would like to thank Professors Francine McKenzie, Robert Wardhaugh, and Alan MacEachern for their much-appreciated comments on this paper, as well as those of the anonymous readers.
- One recent study has argued that the beliefs and assumptions of the political elite about the Soviet threat and the credibility of the Western nuclear deterrent determined their positions on the nuclear acquisition issue. In her monograph NATO and the Bomb, Erika Simpson explains that the Canadian political elite held “a variety of underlying beliefs and convictions” about the nature of the Soviet threat and the “suitability” of the West's nuclear deterrent strategy, leading them to either support or oppose a nuclear role. See Erika Simpson, NATO and the Bomb: Canadian Defenders Confront Critics (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001), 4–5. Other scholars have examined opinion polls to illustrate the debate's divisive impact upon the electorate. See Donald Munton. “Public Opinion and the Media in Canada from Cold War to Détente to New Cold War,” International Journal (1982/83): 171–213 for an analysis of Canadian public opinion polls on the acquisition issue. More recently, Andrew Richter has examined the nuclear acquisition debate within the context of Canada's strategic community. See Richter, Avoiding Armageddon: Canadian Military Strategy and Nuclear Weapons, 1950–63 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2002).
- In one Gallup poll, 54.5 per cent of respondents favored Canada accepting a nuclear role, while a Canadian Peace Research Institute (CPRI) poll found that 75 percent of the business elite and 60 percent of voters favored a nuclear role, while only 20 percent of the Members of Parliament and union leaders surveyed responded likewise. See the Toronto Scar, January 30,1963 and John Paul and Jerome Laulicht, In Your Opinion: Leaders' and Voters' Attitudes on Defence and Disarmament (Oshawa, ON: Esperanto Press, 1963), 24. The impact of public opinion on the Diefenbaker government's approach to the nuclear weapon acquisition issue is cited in Basil Robinson's Diefenbaker's World: A Populist in Foreign Affairs (Toronto University of Toronto Press, 1989) and Patrick Nicholson's Vision and Indecision (Don Mills, ON: Longmans Canada Ltd., 1968). Patricia McMahon has concluded that Diefenbaker's concerns about electoral success meant that the state of public opinion and opposition positions in Parliament played a major role in his inability to formulate a nuclear weapon policy. See Patricia McMahon, The Politics of Canada's Nuclear Weapons Policy, 1957–1963” (PhD diss., University of Toronto, 1999).
- Munton cites the Globe and Mail's support for a Canadian nuclear role and loosely applies its perspective to the Canadian media as a whole (Munton, 199–297). Jocelyn Ghent-Mallet refers only to national publications (Globe and Mail and Maclean's magazine) and their demands that Canada live up to its nuclear obligations in her analysis of the 1960's nuclear weapon debate. Jocelyn Ghent-Mallet, “Deploying Nuclear Weapons, 1962–63,” in Don Munton and John Kirton, eds., Canadian Foreign Policy: Selected Cases (Scarborough, ON: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1992), 101–102.
- The newspapers examined include the Globe and Mail, Toronto Star, Vancouver Sun, Edmonton Journal, Regina Leader Post, Winnipeg Free Press, Ottawa Citizen, Montreal Gazette, St. John's Evening Telegram, Le Devoir, Le Soleil and Halifax Chronicle-Herald.
- House of Commons, Debates, February 20, 1959, 1223. Diefenbaker went on to state that Canada was negotiating for the acquisition of nuclear warheads: “The government is, therefore, examining with the United States government questions connected with the acquisition of nuclear warheads for Bomarc and other defensive weapons for use by the Canadian forces.” See also Howard H. Letner, “Foreign Policy Decision Making: The Case of Canada and Nuclear Weapons.” World Politics 29, no. 1 (October 1976): 30.
- John Herd Thompson and Stephen Randall, Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002), 217.
- Foreign Relations of the United states 1961–1963, v. 13, August 3, 1961, 1162–1163.
- Foreign Relations of the United States 1961–1963, v. 13, February 26, 1962, 1165–1166.
- Foreign Relations of the United States 1961–1963, v. 13, February 27, 1962, 1167–1168
- Ghent-Mallet, Canadian Foreign Policy, 101–102.
- J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, For Better or for Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1991), 205.
- Ghent-Mallet, Canadian Foreign Policy, 102–105.
- John Saywell, ed., Canadian Annual Review, 1963 (Toronto University of Toronto Press, 1964), 286. Diefenbaker would later complain that because Norstad “had held the most politically sensitive military command in the NATO structure” it was “impossible to accept that he innocently wandered into Canada's nuclear debate.” See John G. Diefenbaker, One Canada: Memoirs of the Right Honourable John G. Diefenbaker (The Tumultuous Years, 1962–1967) (Toronto: Macmillan, 1977), 2. Pierre Trudeau agreed, writing in Cité Libre: “Do you think that American General Norstad…was merely sight seeing when he came to Ottawa…and publicly enjoined the Canadian government to respect its commitments to install nuclear warheads on the Bomarcs?” Translated in Francois Lisee, In the Eye of the Eagle (Toronto: Harper-Collins, 1990), 5.
- Globe and Mail, January 14, 1963.
- Lester B. Pearson, Words and Occasions (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), 200, 202.
- Cité Libre, March 1963. Translated in “Dief's harsh judgment,” Ottawa Citizen 11 October 1977.
- Le Devoir, January 16, 1963; Globe and Mail, January 14, 1963.
- Foreign Relations of the United States 1961–1963, v. 13, January 29, 1963, 1193–1194.
- Foreign Relations of the United States 1961–1963, v. 13, January 30, 1963, 1195–1196.
- John G. Diefenbaker, “I never say anything provocative”: Witticisms, Anecdotes and Reflections by Canada's Most Outspoken Politician, John G. Diefenbaker, Margaret Wente, ed. (Toronto P. Martin Associates, 1975), 120–121.
- House of Commons, Debates, February 5, 1963, 3441. See also John A. Munro, The Wit and Wisdom of John Diefenbaker (Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers, 1982), 117.
- Newsweek, February 11, 1963.
- Ottawa Citizen, February 1, 1963.
- Globe and Mail, February 1, 1963.
- Toronto Star, January 31, 1963, February 1, 1963.
- Edmonton Journal, February 1, 1963.
- Ghent-Mallet, Canadian Foreign Policy, III.
- Historians have concluded that the press release played an important part in the disintegration of the Diefenbaker government. According to Jack Granatstein, “with a mere press release” the State Department and the White House helped bring about Diefenbaker's downfall. See Granatstein, “Cooperation and Conflict: The Course of Canadian-American Relations Since 1945,” in Charles F. Doran and John H. Sigler, eds., Canada and the United States: Enduring Friendship, Persistent Stress (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1985), 58. Edelgard Mahant and Graeme Mount wrote that the press release “effectively torpedoed the minority Diefenbaker government” by ridiculing its “refusal to accept nuclear warheads.” See Edelgard Mahant and Graeme Mount, Invisible and Inaudible in Washington: American Policies Toward Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1999), 49.
- Lester B. Pearson, Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, 1957–1968, v. 3 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), 74–75.
- Ghent-Mallet, Canadian Foreign Policy, 113. According to the agreement, the warheads would remain in the custody of U.S. troops based in Canada and Europe, and they would not be used without the authorization of the Canadian government.
- The newspapers selected for this study were not evaluated with any particular media theory in mind. The “democratic” or “pluralist” model portrays society's elite as responsible to public opinion, with the media acting as the voice of the people, transmitting support or criticism of government policy to policymakers. The “elite” model, on the other hand, portrays the elite actively isolating themselves from public opinion and using the media to interpret and legitimize policy to the masses. See Walter C. Soderlund and Ronald H. Wagenberg, “The Editor and External Affairs: the 1972 and 1974 Election Campaigns,” International Journal [Canada] 31, no. 2 (1976): 244. Bernard C. Cohen's The Press and Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963) provides an early description of the “democratic” model, while Gabriel A. Almond's The American People and Foreign Policy, 2nd ed. (New York: Praeger, 1960) explains the role of the media from an “elite” perspective.
- As Harold Clarke et al. explain, the media can play a central role in the development of peoples' perceptions of political issues because most of the information one encounters on any given issue comes from newspapers, television, and other forms of media. See Harold Clarke, Jane Jenson, Lawrence LeDuc, and Jon H. Pammett, Political Choice in Canada (Toronto: McGraw Hill-Ryerson, 1979), 287. Robert Hackett and Yuezhi Zhao explain that the news media are “institutions central to democratic life” that serve political and educational roles helping to provide a basis for “'civil' discourse” on and mobilization around issues of emerging importance. See Robert Hackett and Yuezhi Zhao, Sustaining Democracy? Journalism and the Politics of Objectivity (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1998), 1–14. Media coverage is attractive for individuals and organizations seeking to mould public opinion because it is less expensive than advertising. and also because it can add legitimacy to and generate support for a cause. See Paul A. Pross, Group Politics and Public Policy, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1992), 168.
- Melody Hessing, “Green Mail: The Social Construction of Environmental lssues through Letters to the Editor,” Canadian Journal of Communication 28 (2003): 26.
- Stairs describes how policymakers use the media to manipulate the domestic political environment, to conduct “intra-bureaucratic warfare” against rival departments, and even to facilitate the development of substantive policy initiatives by testing the waters of public opinion. See Denis Stairs, “The Press and Foreign Policy in Canada,” International Journal [Canada] 31, no. 2 (1976): 223–224, 227. Stairs also found that the bureaucrats in the Department of External Affairs read “most universally” the Globe and Mail, and less so the Montreal Gazette. The Toronto Star “also seems to have a wide circulation among foreign service officers.” Among French-language papers, La Presse and Le Devoir were read “almost totally to the exclusion of the rest.” See Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon's The Domestic Mosaic (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, c1985) for a description of the Biafran crisis in Nigeria, an example of an issue where Canada's media is credited with influencing the government's foreign policy.
- Soderlund and Wagenberg, “The Editor and External Affairs,” 245.
- Editorials provide one of the most accurate means of tracking changing perspectives over a period of time. Focussing on editorials also allows for a larger number of publications to be included, and at the same time reflects the views of a publication's “gate-keepers.” Readers consider their content to be authoritative and reliable, particularly since newspapers generally defend editorial opinion against external criticism. See Sharon Stone, “The Peace Movement and Toronto Newspapers,” Canadian Journal of Communication 14, no. 1 (1989): 59.
- See Rowland Lorimar and Jean McNulty, Mass Communications in Canada (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1996). Polls from the early 1980s found that ninety per cent of Canadians still read one or more daily newspapers every week. The Royal Commission on Newspapers (1981) concluded that despite the growing popularity of television, 89% of adults read at least one newspaper a week, 59% considered newspapers the most reliable source for local news, and 49% felt that newspapers provided the best source for information on issues of personal interest. See Munton, “Public Opinion and the Media in Canada,” 199; Canada, Royal Commission on Newspapers (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1981), 34–36. It has also been argued that media consumers rely more seriously on newspapers for information on important national and international issues. Munton, “Public Opinion and the Media in Canada,” 200. The casual nature of television viewing is cited in Leo Bogart, Press and Public: Who Reads What, When, Where and Why in American Newspapers (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers, 1981), 66ff, 58, 181–185. Bogart refers to a 1979 Gallup Poll in the U.S. which found that audiences had the greatest confidence in newspaper coverage. Clarke et al. found in their analysis of the media and the 1974 Canadian federal election that voters relied on newspapers as much as television for information on the campaigns and issues (288, 416).
- Multiple editorials are often included in a single endnote. In each such case, the first editorial listed is the source of either the direct quotation or major ideas expressed, and all other subsequent editorials contain similar references and/or perspectives. For reference purposes, the following is a list of the 1963 editorials dealing specifically with the nuclear acquisition debate examined in this paper. Edmonton Journal (January 7, January 19, February 1, February 21, February 27, March 1); Globe and Mail (January 5, January 14, January 21, January 28, February 2, February 9, March 28, March 29, August 15); Halifax Chronicle-Herald (January 5, January 15, January 18, February 12, February 16); Le Devoir January 5, January 9, February 12); Le Soleil (January 5, February 26); Montreal Gazette (January 7, January 15, January 16, February 14); Ottawa Citizen (January 12, February 5, February 9); Regina Leader Post (January 15, February 5, February 8); St. John's Evening Telegram (January 22); Toronto Star (January 4, January 10, January 11, January 14, January 15, February 20, February 21, March 29, July 3, August 3, August 10, August 16, December 31); Vancouver Sun (January 11, February 19, February 21, March 29, March 30, June 10); Winnipeg Free Press (January 1, January 3, January 5, January 25).
- See Globe and Mail, February 1, 1963 and Toronto Star, January 4, 1963, January 31, 1963 and February 1, 1963. On the other hand, several editorial boards concluded that the U.S. government was forced to publicly state that Canada had failed to live up to its nuclear commitments. See, for example, Edmonton Journal, January 7, 1963, February 1, 1963; Halifax Chronicle-Herald, January 5, 1963; Globe and Mail, January 5, 1963.
- Le Soleil, January 5, 1963.
- Montreal Gazette, January 7, 1963. See also Regina Leader Post, January 15, 1963.
- Globe and Mail, January 5, 1963. See also Globe and Mail, January 14, 1963.
- Edmonton Journal, January 7, 1963 and January 19, 1963. See also Winnipeg Free Press, January 3, 1963.
- Montreal Gazette, January 7, 1963.
- Globe and Mail, February 2, 1963 and August 15, 1963, and Winnipeg Free Press, January 25, 1963.
- Globe and Mail, January 5, 1963 and January 21, 1963. See also Edmonton Journal, January 7, 1963 and March 1, 1963.
- 1963 . Globe and Mail, February 2, 1963.
- Regina Leader Post, February 8, 1963.
- Regina Leader Post, February 5, 1963.
- Globe and Mail, January 28, 1963. Globe and Mail editors conceded that the Bomarc missile bases and the Voodoo fighter provided no defense against ICBMs. However, according to Western military strategists, the Soviet Union still relied heavily on bombers and therefore the defensive systems were still needed. See Globe and Mail, February 2, 1963; Edmonton journal, February 21, 1963 and February 27, 1963; Halifax Chronic-Herald, February 12, 1963; Montreal Gazette, February 14, 1963.
- Globe and Mail, February 9, 1963.
- Montreal Gazette, January 15, 1963 and Regina Leader Post, January 15, 1963.
- Globe and Mail, February 2, 1963 and March 28, 1963.
- Halifax Chronicle-Herald, January 15, 1963; Winnipeg Free Press, January 1, 1963.
- Globe and Mail, January 14, 1963; Montreal Gazette, February 14, 1963; Globe and Mail, March 29, 1963; Halifax Chronicle-Herald, January 5, 1963, February 12, 1963, and February 16, 1963.
- Halifax Chronicle-Herald, January 15, 1963 and February 16, 1963; Montreal Gazette, January 7, 1963, January 16, 1963 and February 14, 1963; Regina Leader Post, February 8, 1963.
- Globe and Mail, February 9, 1963.
- Ibid.
- Halifax Chronicle-Herald, January 18, 1963.
- Le Soleil, February 26, 1963.
- Globe and Mail, August 15, 1963. Editorials also cited economic reasons that Canada should adopt a nuclear role. Specifically, that Canada had spent millions of dollars on weapons systems that would be wasted without arming them with nuclear warheads. See Edmonton Journal, February 1, 1963; Winnipeg Free Press, January 5, 1963; Halifax Chronicle-Herald, January 5, 1963.
- Toronto Star, January 15, 1963; Vancouver Sun, January 11, 1963.
- Vancouver Sun, February 19, 1963; Toronto Star, January 11, 1963. The Toronto Star viewed Pearson's flip-flop on the nuclear issue in a positive light in at least one respect he also stated that Canada would re-negotiate its military role in its alliances following the acquisition. See Toronto Star, January 14, 1963. The belief that the weapon systems to be fitted with nuclear warheads were fast becoming obsolete with the emergence of ICBMs as delivery vehicles is repeated in several other editorials. See Toronto Star, January 15, 1963 and February 20, 1963; Ottawa Citizen, February 9, 1963.
- Le Devoir, February 12, 1963. The editors of the Star argued that the presence of Bomarc missile bases in North Bay, Ontario and Mount Laurier, Quebec actually decreased Canada's national security. In the midst of the Canadian nuclear debate American Defense Secretary Robert McNamara hinted that the primary purpose of these bases was not to defend the U.S. nuclear deterrent against incoming Soviet bombers, but rather, to draw enemy fire away from other targets. Far from protecting Canada, therefore, these installations increased the likelihood of nuclear assaults on Canadian territory. See Toronto Star, March 29, 1963.
- NATO adopted the “Flexible Response” policy in December 1967. For a more detailed description of the shift from a reliance on the threat of “massive retaliation” to a policy of “flexible response,” see Ivo H. Dallder, The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response: NATO Strategy and Theater Nuclear Forces Since 1967 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991); Michael O. Wheeler, “NATO Nuclear Strategy, 1949–90,” in Gustav Schmidt, ed., A History of NATO-The First Fifty Years (New York: Palgrave Publishers, 2001), 129–132, and; Helga Haftendorn, NATO and the Nuclear Revolution: A Crisis of Credibility, 1966–1967 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 25–37.
- Toronto Star, February 20, 1963.
- Vancouver Sun, March 29, 1963.
- Toronto Star, January 4, 1963, January 10, 1963 and February 20, 1963; Vancouver Sun, January 11, 1963; Ottawa Citizen, January 12, 1963.
- Ottawa Citizen, February 5, 1963; Le Devoir, January 9, 1963.
- Toronto Star, January 4, 1963.
- Toronto Star, February 20, 1963 and January 10, 1963; Vancouver Sun, June 10, 1963. The Vancouver Sun editors cited Pearson's comments that he would negotiate Canada out of its nuclear role once the weapons were acquired as further proof that they were not needed for an effective deterrent. See Vancouver Sun, February 21, 1963.
- Vancouver Sun, January 11, 1963; Le Devoir, January 5, 1963.
- Toronto Star, July 3, 1963.
- Toronto Star, January 15, 1963.
- Toronto Star, February 20, 1963, February 21, 1963, and August 10, 1963.
- Toronto Star, February 21, 1963. The signing of the Test Ban Treaty in mid-1963 led Star editors to once again stress that Canada's acceptance of a nuclear role would be counter-productive from an arms control standpoint. See Toronto Star, August 3, 1963.
- Vancouver Sun, February 21, 1963; Ottawa Citizen, January 12, 1963.
- Le Devoir, January 5, 1963.
- Toronto Star, August 16, 1963. See also Vancouver Sun, March 30, 1963.
- Pearson, Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, 1957–1968, v. 3, 71.
- Toronto Star, January 10, 1963. The editors of the Star pointed to a late 1963 House of Commons Defence Committee Report as evidence that their views on the nuclear debate were correct. The report suggested that Canada should abandon the Starfighter nuclear role in Europe when the weapons became obsolete, and that the country's European land force abandon its new nuclear role. See Toronto Star, December 31, 1963.
- St. John's Evening Telegram, January 22, 1963.
- See “Canada refuses further role in missile defence,” Globe and Mail, 24 February 2005, for information on the government's decision to not participate in the American National Missile Defense program.
- See David Rudd, Jim Hanson, and Jessica Blitt, eds., Canada and National Missile Defence (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2000), for material on the debate surrounding the U.S. missile defense program in Canada.