Governing the future: the European Central Bank’s expectation management during the Great Moderation

References

• Abolafia, M. Y. (2010). Narrative construction as sensemaking: How a central bank thinks. Organization Studies, 31(3), 349–367.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Andersson, J. & Keizer, A.-G. (2014). Governing the future: Science, policy and public participation in the construction of the long term in the Netherlands and Sweden. History and Technology, 30(1–2), 104–122.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Andrade, P. & Le Bihan, H. (2013). Inattentive professional forecasters. Journal of Monetary Economics, 60(8), 967–982.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Beckert, J. (2013a). Imagined futures: Fictional expectations in the economy. Theory and Society, 42(3), 219–240.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Beckert, J. (2013b). Capitalism as a system of expectations: Toward a sociological microfoundation of political economy. Politics & Society, 41(3), 323–350.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Best, J. (2005). The limits of transparency: Ambiguity and the history of international finance. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Blinder, A. S. (2004). The quiet revolution: Central banking goes modern. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Borio, C. & Zhu, H. (2012). Capital regulation, risk-taking and monetary policy: A missing link in the transmission mechanism? Journal of Financial Stability, 8(4), 236–251.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bowman, A., Ertürk, I., Froud, J., Johal, S., Leaver, A., Moran, M. & Williams, K. (2013). Central bank-led capitalism? Seattle University Law Review, 36(2), 455–487.
   Google Scholar
• Braun, B. (2014). Why models matter: The making and unmaking of governability in macroeconomic discourse. Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, 7, 48–79.
   Google Scholar
• Braun, B. (2015). Preparedness, crisis management and policy change: The euro area at the critical juncture of 2008–2013. The British Journal of Politics & International Relations, 17(3), 419–441.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Buiter, W. (2013, September 25). Forward guidance: More than old wine in new bottles and cheap talk? (Citigroup Global Economics View). New York: Citi Research.
   Google Scholar
• Caballero, R. J. (2010). Macroeconomics after the crisis: Time to deal with the pretense-of-knowledge syndrome. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 24(4), 85–102.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Callon, M. (1998a). An essay on framing and overflowing: Economic externalities revisited by sociology. In M. Callon (Ed.), The laws of the market (pp. 245–269). London: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Callon, M. (1998b). Introduction: The embeddedness of economic markets in economics. In M.Callon (Ed.), The laws of the market (pp. 1–57). London: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Callon, M. (2007). What does it mean to say that economics is performative? In D. MacKenzie, F. Muniesa & L. Siu (Eds.), Do economists make markets? On the performativity of economics (pp. 311–357). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Chong, K. & Tuckett, D. (2015). Constructing conviction through action and narrative: How money managers manage uncertainty and the consequence for financial market functioning. Socio-Economic Review, 13(2), 309–330.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Coddington, A. (1976). Keynesian economics: The search for first principles. Journal of Economic Literature, 14(4), 1258–1273.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Commons, J. R. (1931). Institutional economics. The American Economic Review, 21(4), 648–657.
   Google Scholar
• Davies, W. & McGoey, L. (2012). Rationalities of ignorance: On financial crisis and the ambivalence of neo-liberal epistemology. Economy and Society, 41(1), 64–83.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Dow, S. (2013). The real (social) experience of monetary policy. In J. Pixley & G. C. Harcourt (Eds.), Financial crises and the nature of capitalist money (pp. 178–195). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
   Google Scholar
• Duisenberg, W. (1998). ECB press conference, 13 October 1998: Introductory statement. Retrieved from http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/1998/html/is981013.en.html
   Google Scholar
• ECB. (1998a). Press release 1 December 1998: The quantitative reference value for monetary growth. Retrieved from http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/1998/html/pr981201_3.en.htm l
   Google Scholar
• ECB. (1998b). Press Release 13 October 1998: A stability-oriented monetary policy strategy for the ESCB. Retrieved from http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/1998/html/pr981013_1.en.html
   Google Scholar
• ECB. (2000a). Staff economic projections for the euro area. Monthly Bulletin 12/2000.
   Google Scholar
• ECB. (2000b). The two pillars of the ECB’s monetary policy strategy. Monthly Bulletin 11/2000.
   Google Scholar
• ECB. (2002). Transparency in the monetary policy of the ECB. Monthly Bulletin 11/2002.
   Google Scholar
• ECB. (2003). The outcome of the ECB’s evaluation of its monetary policy strategy. Monthly Bulletin 06/2003.
   Google Scholar
• ECB. (2004a). Box 8: ECB staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area. Monthly Bulletin 09/2004.
   Google Scholar
• ECB. (2004b). The monetary policy of the ECB. Frankfurt: European Central Bank.
   Google Scholar
• ECB. (2007). The ECB survey of professional forecasters (SPF): A review after eight years’ experience (ECB Occasional Paper no. 59). Retrieved from http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops/ecbocp59.pdf
   Google Scholar
• ECB. (2008). New procedures for constructing ECB staff projections ranges. Retrieved from http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecbstaffprojectionrangesen.pdf
   Google Scholar
• ECB. (2012). Assessing the anchoring of longer-term inflation expectations. Monthly Bulletin 07/2012.
   Google Scholar
• Engelen, E., Ertürk, I., Froud, J., Johal, S., Leaver, A., Moran, M., … Williams, K. (2011). After the great complacence: Financial crisis and the politics of reform. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Esposito, E. (2013). The structures of uncertainty: Performativity and unpredictability in economic operations. Economy and Society, 42(1), 102–129.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• European Monetary Institute. (1997). The single monetary policy in stage three: Specification of the operational framework. Frankfurt: European Monetary Institute.
   Google Scholar
• Fligstein, N., Brundage, J. S. & Schultz, M. (2014). Why the Federal Reserve failed to see the financial crisis of 2008: The role of “macroeconomics” as sense-making and cultural frame (IRLE Working Paper no. 111–14). Retrieved from http://www.irle.berkeley.edu/workingpapers/111-14.pdf
   Google Scholar
• Foucault, M. (2007). Security, territory, population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977–1978. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
   Google Scholar
• Freedman, C. & Laxton, D. (2009). Why inflation targeting? (IMF Working Paper 09/86). Retrieved from http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/wp0986.pdf
   Google Scholar
• Friedman, B. M. (2002). The use and meaning of words in central banking: Inflation targeting, credibility, and transparency (NBER Working Paper no. 8972). Retrieved from http://www.nber.org/papers/w8972
   Google Scholar
• Friedman, M. (1968). The role of monetary policy. The American Economic Review, 58(1), 1–17.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Gabor, D. & Jessop, B. (2015). Mark my words: Discursive central banking in crisis. In B. Jessop, B. Young & C. Scherrer (Eds.), Financial cultures and crisis dynamics (pp. 294–315). London: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Galí, J. (2002). Monetary policy in the early years of EMU. In M. Buti & A. Sapir (Eds.), Economic and Monetary Union and economic policy in Europe (pp. 41–72). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
   Google Scholar
• Galí, J. (2011). Are central banks’ projections meaningful? Journal of Monetary Economics, 58(6–8), 537–550.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Garcia, J. A. (2003). An introduction to the ECB survey of professional forecasters (ECB Occasional Paper no. 8). Retrieved from http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops/ecbocp8.pdf
   Google Scholar
• Geraats, P. M. (2002). Central bank transparency. The Economic Journal, 112(483), F532–F565.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Goffman, E. (1959). The presentation of self in everyday life. Garden City, NY: Double Day.
   Google Scholar
• Goodhart, C. (2009). The interest rate conditioning assumption. International Journal of Central Banking, 5(2), 85–108.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Goodhart, C. (2012, February 1). Longer-term forecasts are a step backwards. The Financial Times. Retrieved from http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2034b62a-4c00-11e1-b1b5-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3dn5Evkg2
   Google Scholar
• Greenspan, A. (2004). Risk and uncertainty in monetary policy. The American Economic Review, 94(2), 33–40.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Gürkaynak, R. S., Sack, B. & Swanson, E. T. (2005). Do actions speak louder than words? The response of asset prices to monetary policy actions and statements. International Journal of Central Banking, 1(1), 55–93.
   Google Scholar
• Hall, R. B. (2008). Central banking as global governance: Constructing financial credibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Hall, P. A. & Franzese, R. J. (1998). Mixed signals: Central bank independence, coordinated wage bargaining, and European Monetary Union. International Organization, 52(3), 505–535.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hardie, I. & MacKenzie, D. (2007). Assembling an economic actor: The agencement of a hedge fund. The Sociological Review, 55(1), 57–80.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hayek, F. A. (1989). The pretence of knowledge (Nobel Lecture 1974). The American Economic Review, 79(6), 3–7.
   Google Scholar
• Holmes, C. (2014). ‘Whatever it takes’: Polanyian perspectives on the Eurozone crisis and the gold standard. Economy and Society, 43(4), 582–602.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Holmes, D. R. (2014). Economy of words: Communicative imperatives in central banks. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Ingham, G. (2004). The nature of money. Cambridge: Polity.
   Google Scholar
• Issing, O. (1998, October 6). Monetary policy in EMU. Speech at The 53rd Joint Annual Meetings of the Boards of Governors of the IMF and the World Bank, Washington, DC.
   Google Scholar
• Issing, O. (2004). The role of macroeconomic projections within the monetary policy strategy of the ECB. Economic Modelling, 21(5), 723–734.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Issing, O. (2014). Forward guidance: A new challenge for central banks (SAFE White Paper Series no. 16). Retrieved from http://safe-frankfurt.de/uploads/media/Issing_Forward_Guidance.pdf
   Google Scholar
• Issing, O., Gaspar, V., Angeloni, I. & Tristani, O. (Eds.). (2001). Monetary policy in the Euro area: Strategy and decision-making at the European Central Bank. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Keynes, J. M. (1937). The general theory of employment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 51(2), 209–223.
   Google Scholar
• King, M. (1997). Changes in UK monetary policy: Rules and discretion in practice. Journal of Monetary Economics, 39(1), 81–97.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Knafo, S. (2013). The making of modern finance: Liberal governance and the gold standard. Abingdon: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Knight, F. H. (1921). Risk, uncertainty and profit. New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin.
   Google Scholar
• Koenig, E. F., Leeson, R. & Kahn, G. A. (2012). The Taylor rule and the transformation of monetary policy. Stanford, CA: Hoover Press.
   Google Scholar
• Krampf, A. (2014). From the Maastricht Treaty to post-crisis EMU: The ECB and Germany as drivers of change. Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 22(3), 303–317.
   Google Scholar
• Krippner, G. R. (2007). The making of US monetary policy: Central bank transparency and the neoliberal dilemma. Theory and Society, 36(6), 477–513.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Langenohl, A. (2010). Analyzing expectations sociologically: Elements of a formal sociology of the financial markets. Economic Sociology: The European Electronic Newsletter, 12(1), 18–27.
   Google Scholar
• Langley, P. (2014). Liquidity lost: The governance of the global financial crisis. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Leitemo, K. (2003). Targeting inflation by constant-interest-rate forecasts. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 35(4), 609–626.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lockwood, E. (2014). Predicting the unpredictable: Value-at-risk, performativity, and the politics of financial uncertainty. Review of International Political Economy. Advance Online Publication.
   Google Scholar
• Lucas, R. E. (1972). Expectations and the neutrality of money. Journal of Economic Theory, 4(2), 103–124.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lucas, R. E. (1976). Econometric policy evaluation: A critique. In K. Brunner & A. H. Meltzer (Eds.), The Phillips curve and labor markets. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, (Vol. 1, pp. 19–46). Amsterdam: North Holland.
   Google Scholar
• Lucas, R. E. (2003). Macroeconomic priorities. American Economic Review, 93(1), 1–14.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Luhmann, N. (1976). The future cannot begin: Temporal structures in modern society. Social Research, 43(1), 130–152.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• MacKenzie, D. (2012). Knowledge production in financial markets: Credit default swaps, the ABX and the subprime crisis. Economy and Society, 41(3), 335–359.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Masuch, K., Nicoletti-Altimari, S., Pill, H. & Rostagno, M. (2002). The role of money in monetary policy making. In O. Issing (Ed.), Background studies for the ECB’s evaluation of its monetary policy strategy (pp. 187–224). Frankfurt: European Central Bank.
   Google Scholar
• McNamara, K. (2002). Rational fictions: Central bank independence and the social logic of delegation. West European Politics, 25(1), 47–76.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Morgan, J. (2013). Forward-looking contrast explanation, illustrated using the great moderation. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 37(4), 737–758.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Morris, S. & Shin, H. S. (2002). Social value of public information. The American Economic Review, 92(5), 1521–1534.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Morris, S. & Shin, H. S. (2008). Coordinating expectations in monetary policy. In J.-P. Touffut (Ed.), Central banks as economic institutions (pp. 88–104). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
   Google Scholar
• Muth, J. F. (1961). Rational expectations and the theory of price movements. Econometrica, 29(3), 315–335.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Nelson, S. C. & Katzenstein, P. J. (2014). Uncertainty, risk, and the financial crisis of 2008. International Organization, 68(2), 361–392.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Nesvetailova, A. (2015). A crisis of the overcrowded future: Shadow banking and the political economy of financial innovation. New Political Economy, 20(3), 431–453.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Orphanides, A. (2001). Monetary policy rules based on real-time data. American Economic Review, 91(4), 964–985.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Palan, R. (2015). Futurity, pro-cyclicality and financial crises. New Political Economy, 20(3), 367–385.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Pixley, J. (2004). Emotions in finance: Distrust and uncertainty in global markets. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Power, M. (2007). Organized uncertainty: Designing a world of risk management. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Reichmann, W. (2013). Epistemic participation: How to produce knowledge about the economic future. Social Studies of Science, 43(6), 852–877.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Rogoff, K. (1985). The optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate monetary target. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100(4), 1169–1189.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Rudebusch, G. D. & Williams, J. C. (2008). Revealing the secrets of the temple: The value of publishing central bank interest rate projections. In J. L. Campbell (Ed.), Asset prices and monetary policy (pp. 247–289). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
   Google Scholar
• Samman, A. (2014). Making financial history: The crisis of 2008 and the return of the past. Millennium – Journal of International Studies, 42(2), 309–330.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Soroka, S. N., Stecula, D. A. & Wlezien, C. (2014). It’s (change in) the (future) economy, stupid: Economic indicators, the media, and public opinion. American Journal of Political Science, 59(2), 457–474.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Svensson, L. E. O. (1997). Inflation forecast targeting: Implementing and monitoring inflation targets. European Economic Review, 41 (6), 1111–1146.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Svensson, L. E. O. (1999). Monetary policy issues for the Eurosystem. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 51, 79–136.
   Google Scholar
• Swedberg, R. (2013). The financial crisis in the US 2008–2009: Losing and restoring confidence. Socio-Economic Review, 11(3), 501–523.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Taylor, J. B. (1993). Discretion versus policy rules in practice. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 39, 195–214.
   Google Scholar
• Trichet, J.-C. (2005, August). Monetary policy and ‘credible alertness’. Paper presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Symposium, Jackson Hole, WY.
   Google Scholar
• Turner, P. (2014). Is the long-term interest rate a policy victim, a policy variable or a policy lodestar? In J. S. Chadha, A. Durré, M. A. S. Joyce & L. Sarno (Eds.), Developments in macro-finance yield curve modelling (pp. 19–55). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Velthuis, O. (2015). Making monetary markets transparent: The European Central Bank’s communication policy and its interactions with the media. Economy and Society, 44(2), 316–340.
   Google Scholar
• von Hagen, J. (1999). Money growth targeting by the Bundesbank. Journal of Monetary Economics, 43(3), 681–701.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Wansleben, L. (2013). Cultures of expertise in global currency markets. Abingdon: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Woodford, M. (2003). Interest and prices: Foundations of a theory of monetary policy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Woodford, M. (2005). Central bank communication and policy effectiveness (NBER Working Paper no. 11898).
   Google Scholar
• Woodward, B. (2000). Maestro: Greenspan’s Fed and the American boom. New York, NY: Touchstone.
   Google Scholar