Value creation through corporate destruction? Corporate governance in shipping takeovers

References and notes

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• Asymmetric [T1  T 2] events windows were also examined, where T 1 = D – J1), T 2 = D + J2), J1 = 30, 20, 1 and 0 days and J2 = −5, 5, 0, 1 and 30 days. Results (not reported) were found to remain qualitatively similar to those produced in the symmetric event windows
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• The present empirical finding cover the short run impact of the takeover bids and are rather tentative. Solid conclusions on the post-merger performance can be drawn when the long run implications are evaluated capturing the full merger effect; this is typically revealed after a three-year period following merger completion. Bidders in mergers have been shown to underperform in a three-year period following the acquisition
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