TRANSLATING THE MFP: NATIONAL INNOVATION MANAGEMENT POLICY, HIGH TECHNOLOGY INCUBATORS AND AUSTRALIA-JAPAN RELATIONS

Notes and References

• This paper has been taken from my doctoral thesis which drew upon a year spent in Japan in 1990-91. Material was gathered from relevant interviews in both Japanese and English, archival research and special site inspections. The visit was in part made possible through DEET's National Asian Languages Scholarship and Asian Studies Postgraduate Scholarship Scheme.
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• MITI, A Multifunctionpolis Scheme for the 21st Century: basic concept, MITI, Tokyo, 1987, pp. 4, 5.
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• Ibid., p. 1. Senator John Button was Minister of DITAC throughout the 1980s and in 1987 became the leader of the Australian side in MFP negotiations. The quote was taken from a speech by John Button at the Multifunction Polis Forum, Melbourne, 22 July 1988 reproduced in MFP Perspectives, a compendium of material on the MFP produced by DITAC in 1988, p.2.
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• This has been noted by many commentators including D. Edgington in ‘Japanese manufacturing investment in Australia: corporations, governments and bargaining, Pacific Affairs, Spring 1991, 64(1), pp.65–84.
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• W. Hamilton, Serendipity City: Australia, Japan and the Multifunction Polis, ABC, Sydney, 1991, p.11.
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• S. Minagawa, ‘Institutionalisation of economic relations with Japan: a case study of Japanese direct investment in Australia and the Multifunction Polis idea’, Occasional Papers, Nanzan University Centre for Australian Studies, Nagoya, Japan, January 1990, p.24.
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• The MFP meant many things to many people including an opportunity for building Australian government subsidised golf courses; however, there is no doubt that the MFP was both presented and accepted as a new type of high technology incubator.
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• Porter warned in 1985 that ‘[t]echnological change is one of the principal drivers of competition’. M. Porter, Competitive Advantage: creating and sustaining superior performance, The Free Press, New York, 1985, p.164.
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• In the incubator design discourse such developments have been referred to by a variety of appellations including: development block; industry cluster; information city; technopolis; milieu; and science park. In spite of debate over appropriate form all terms fundamentally denote special environments in which the stages of the innovation process are said to be both accelerated and controlled. This variety in terms is the result of a heated debate over the appropriate form of such ‘special environments’ and hence they have been named and defined in a wide variety of ways. In an attempt to move beyond this debate the less commonly used term ‘incubator’ has been chosen.
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• One series of studies estimated that by 1991 there were 562 incubator developments spread throughout Europe, North America, and the Asia Pacific region. D. Fusi, ‘Major new sites for science continue to spring up around the World’, Site Selection and Industrial Development, 1991, 36, p.614. D. Fusi, ‘Science parks pave the way for corporate high-tech locations’, Site Selection and Industrial Development, 1990, 35, pp. 656–8.
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• Size is an important basic dimension in classification as the participant population can range from a research centre team to a science city of many thousands of workers and their families. Consideration of on-site functions is important as inclusion of features such as residential facilities may be a major factor in imparting form and nature to the incubator.
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• It must be noted however that unlike most Western style science parks the Japanese ‘park’ usually does not closely involve a university R&D centre but focuses mainly on collaboration between businesses. Hence Japanese ‘parks’ tend to be more like an industrial rather than a science park.
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• Whether incubators actually perform this function or serve other more complex purposes is another question. Here I am concerned with the reason for their increased popularity - the ‘promise’ of innovation.
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• There were two editions. Modification was required because the first edition contained a number of proposals such as toxic waste processing and rocket launching facilities that were deemed too controversial by the Australian government.
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• For example it was proposed that all ‘MFP residents would undergo medical examinations at the medical center and computerised records would be kept of their medical history and state of health.’ MITI, 1987 op cit, p.42. These records would then be open to analyse for commercial purposes.
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• In the course of the 1988-1990 official feasibility study a host of consultancies were commissioned by a variety of sectors of the Australian Government to contribute to the mid 1990 decision on the future of the MFP and its potential form and location. Of these the major reports produced were: D. Yencken et al., Social Issues Study Multifunction Polis: Final Report, DITAC, Canberra, May, 1989, on the potential social effect on Australia; Arthur Andersen/Kinhill Consortium, Multifunction Polis Joint Feasibility Study: Consultancy Final Report, Arthur Andersen/Kinhill Consortium, [Sydney], December, 1989, on appropriate form; The National Institute of Economic and Industry Research (NTEIR) study, contained within the Andersen/Kinhill Report, which examined economic implications; The Bureau of Industry Economics (BIE), Economic Evaluation of The Multifunction Polis, DITAC, Canberra, 1990, also examined economic implications; and National Capital Planning Authority (NCPA), MFP: An Urban Development Concept, AGPS, Canberra, July, 1990, which discussed town planning strategies. The findings of these consultancies contributed in varying capacities to: shaping the States’ May 1990 presentations; effecting public perceptions and community responses; influencing the political situation; setting the Joint Steering Committee's decision making agenda; and effecting Japan Domestic Committee and MITI relations with DITAC.
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• At the end of the first feasibility study all of these special bodies were disbanded except for the JDC who changed the name of their organisation but continued to be officially involved in investment negotiations.
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• The working groups were attended by members of the JDC with a preponderance interested in particular areas. In 1989 the urban infrastructure working group had thirty six members, international exchange and resort thirty two, industry and technology twenty two, finance thirteen, regulation seven, and education and training five.
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• They eventually identified four main areas: education; health; media; and information technology.
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• Originally the consortium partners divided up the MFP consultancy work as follows: Arthur Andersen was to deal with commercial aspects, concept development and international marketing, and Kinhill, to deal with spatial attributes and site selection. However as the feasibility study progressed dissatisfaction with the consortium's output became apparent. Attempts were made to force the consortium to meet the expectations of their employers. In April, 1989 the Joint Steering Committee met to ‘provide greater focus for the feasibility study by clarifying both governments’ principle expectations for MFP.’ However little change occurred. Multifunction Polis-Joint Steering Committee, Project Background: Multifunction Polis feasibility study, 1990, [Multifunction Polis-Joint Steering Committee, Sydney], 1990, pp.17, 90.
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• DITAC commissioned studies by David Yencken, the National Planning Authority, and the Bureau of Industry Economics. The Joint Secretariat employed the following consultants for various work: Conran Roche Planning UK, Bechtel Corporation US, NIEIR as well as various other individuals.
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• I. Inkster, The Clever City: Japan, Australia and the Multifunction Polis, Sydney University Press, Sydney, 1991, p.50.
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• A hub was defined as the central site proposed for the location of the MFP. A spoke was a site proposed to be linked in some way to the main hub.
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• Inkster, 1991, op. cit., p.51.
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• Six of the seven Japanese committee members found reasons for not coming to the Melbourne meeting.
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• They were held in March 1990. In early March Liberal Party Opposition Leader Andrew Peacock made a speech denouncing the MFP and bringing it into the political limelight. He was not supported however by his party and Liberal power brokers such as John Howard, Nick Greiner and John Elliott rejected his stand. Labor Party Prime Minister Bob Hawke countered the criticism of DITAC's handling of the affair by accusing Peacock of racism.
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• Arthur Andersen/Kinhill Consortium, Multifunction Polis Joint Feasibility Study: Consultancy Final Report, Arthur Andersen/Kinhill Consortium, [Sydney], December, 1989a; Arthur Andersen/Kinhill Consortium, Multifunction Polis Joint Feasibility Study: Project Development Report, Arthur Andersen/Kinhill Consortium, [Sydney], November, 1989b.
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• A number of MFP media ‘discussions’ ensued. Prime examples were a special edition of the 7.30 Report, ABC, 28 February, 1990, and ‘Japocalypse’, Couchman Report, ABC 28 February 1990.
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• The Bureau of Industry Economics (BIE) report was commissioned in February 1990, by DITAC. It was intended to function as a counter to the findings of NIEIR which had indicated that the MFP had to have 60-80% foreign population to be economically viable. It was published in July 1990 just as the final MFP report was being considered by the Australian and Japanese governments. BIE sought a way of using the MFP for Australia's benefit but without extensive foreign control, The report assumed the MFP was a physical place not just interconnected activities, a real city not unlike other Australian cities. The base scenario was a population of 100,000 in a city constructed over fifteen years from the early 1990's. Total investment was estimated to be $13.5 billion or $900 million/year Australian. Unlike NIEIR, BIE stated the MFP was viable with a foreign population of no more than 25%. The report warned that the MFP must make efficient use of resources in Australia rather than add to them and that there was a need to be careful in linking MFP produced innovations to the rest of the economy. The Bureau of Industry Economics (BIE), Economic Evaluation of The Multifunction Polis, DITAC, Canberra, 1990.
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• DITAC, The Multifunction Polis Proposal: One Australian Perspective, DITAC, Canberra, 1988.
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• Premier's Department, Queensland, “The Multifunction Polis of the 21st Century - a Queensland View’, February 1988, as noted in DITAC, ibid., p.7.
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• DITAC chose the international examples of Silicon Valley and Route 128 as their ideal development models, both a far cry from MITI's Utopian resort city.
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• DITAC's desire for a network of site has been corroborated in numerous interviews with negotiation participants, in their clashes with MFP-Adelaide over development strategies after June 1990 and in their direction of MFP-Australia Development Corporation from 1991 onwards. DITAC pursued its own network model virtually abandoning MFP-Adelaide after August 1991.
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• South Australian State Government, Adelaide: a submission to the MFP Joint Secretariat by the South Australian Government, South Australian State Government, Adelaide, May, 1990; Committee for Melbourne, Melbourne Docklands, Victorian State Government, Melbourne, May, 1990; The Future North Queensland Syndicate, The North Queensland Multifunction Polis (NQMFP), The Future North Queensland Syndicate, [Brisbane], 15 May 1990; New South Wales State Government, Sydney, Hub of the Australian Multifunction Polis: NSW Government final proposal for the Joint Feasibility Study, New South Wales State Government, Sydney, May, 1990; Queensland State Government, Queensland Multifunction Polis: The Natural Choice, Queensland State Government, Brisbane, May 1990a; Queensland State Government, Queensland Multifunction Polis: The Natural Choice, Queensland Submission Part B, Commercial Opportunities, Queensland State Government, Brisbane, May, 1990b.
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• SA State Government, Adelaide: the nominated site for the Multi Function Polis (MFP), [SA State Government, Adelaide], 1990, p.3.2.
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• P. Ward, ‘Industry boost as $839M future city gets go-ahead’, The Australian, 1 August 1991, pp.l,4.
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• A major feature of the SA model of the incubation process was its attention to issues mentioned in incubator design literature. Adelaide Technology Park (ATP) situated near Gillman had long been seen as Australia's most successful and was presented with a flourish as an example of SA's ability to manage incubators.
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• R. Sproull, ‘Name change needed to boost MFP image’, The Australian, 5 September 1991, p.4.
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• R. Sullivan, ‘Japanese tour MFP to decide on funding’, The Australian, 2 December 1991, p.5.
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• Japanese interest in Queensland real estate had not entirely diminished despite the recession. R. Eccleston, ‘$1bn Japanese spree on Gold Coast property’, The Australian, 25 January 1992, p.7.
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• R. Skelton, ‘Koreans keen to go for MFP’, Weekend Australian, 7 December 1991, p.3. S. Wilson, ‘City plan’chance to lead world”, The Australian, 25 January 1992, p.7.
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• R. Skelton, 1991, op. cit. Quoted in B. Donaghy, ‘Drawing the lines for SA's MFP Multiversity’, Australian Campus Review Weekly, 9-15 July 1992, pp.12,15.
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• P. Hartcher, ‘Keating to resuscitate ailing MFP’, Sydney Morning Herald, 24 February 1992, p.1.
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• J. Della-Giacomo and K. Glascott, ‘MFP Bannon's bid to win poll’, The Australian, 2 March 1992, p.2.
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• Hanya Tetsuo, in MFP Research Committee, Investment Environment Survey Mission, translated and printed by DITAC, 1992, p. 11. Deputy Tamaoki, ibid, p. 119.
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• MITI has sought since 1992 to back out however they have encountered strong opposition from the Australian government. MITI officially continues its interest but in name only for the present. This is not to say that it may not suit them at some future moment to pick up the ball again.
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• The new appointment of Dr Laurie Hammond as the new chief executive of the MFP, was announced in July 1996. J. Rowbotham, ‘The fixer: can this man make the MFP work?’ The Australian, 31st July, p.9.
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• MITI, in their role as industrial ambassador, developed a series of special international projects such as the International Flexible Manufacturing Research Program and has created a new international role for JETRO.
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• The most relevant predecessors to the MFP, were the Silver Columbia Scheme and ELSA, each of which proposed to send large numbers of Japanese abroad for permanent or extended periods of residence.
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• As Watanabe Chihiro explained ‘MITI's financial budget is relatively small…and its legal authority is less than powerful. In this connection, MITI makes free use of what we can call the “soft” technologies of public administration, which are presented by a future-oriented way of thinking and consensus-based process of policy making. ‘C. Watanabe and Y. Honda, Japanese Industrial Science and Technology in 1990s: MITI's role at a turning point, New Energy Development Organisation, MITI, Tokyo, [1991], p.17.
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• The stimulation of creativity became the subject of many CST, STA, Monbusho and MITI reports and the STA itself was reformed in the 1980s as part of the national government's response. J. Sigurdson and A. Andersen, Science and Technology in Japan, Longman, London, 1991, p.56.
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• S. Tatsuno, Created in Japan: from imitators to world-class innovators, Harper and Row, New York, 1989.
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• In 1986 MITI's influential Industrial Structure Council proposed that the ‘creative blending of technologies’ or technology fusion held the answers for problems in Japan's industrial structure. Otsuka Kazuhiko, Director of MITI's Industrial Structure Division until the end of 1986 proclaimed technology fusion as Japan's main tool for industrial restructuring.’ K. Otsuka, ‘Industrial restructuring through technological blending’, in I. Miyake et al., Opinions on Japan's Economic Restructuring, Foreign Press Centre Japan, Tokyo, 1987, p.43.
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• The debate is still continuing into the 1990s with regular comments made from Nishizawa and Nakatani in particular. See: J. Nishizawa, ‘We need creativity’, in S. Ichikawa et. al., Science and Technology Research in Japan's Future, Foreign Press Center Japan, Tokyo, 1990, pp.16-21; I. Nakatani, ‘Nation's future lies in original thinking’, The Nikkei Weekly, 27 September 1993, p.6.
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• While the term ‘social engineering’ tends to raise the hackles of many Westerners it is considered a reasonably honourable activity in Japan. Such an activity, in line with Confucian principles, shows foresight and emphasises the importance of ‘appropriate’ human behaviour. Both considerations have long held importance in Japanese culture as marks of civilised behaviour and in Confucian terms distinguish the enlightened human being from the uneducated barbarian. Kumata Yoshinobu, one of the theorists discussed later is a Professor in the Department of Social Engineering at the Tokyo Institute of Technology.
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• See Y. Masuda, The Information Society as Post-Industrial Society, Institute for the Information Society, Tokyo, 1981; K. Kurokawa, ‘Towards the Evocation of Meaning’, Japan Architect, August 1989, 64, p. 12.
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• See C. A. Doxiadis and J. Papaioannou, Ecumenopolis: The Inevitable City of the Future, W. W. Norton, New York, 1974.
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• An example of which was MITI's unpopular New Industrial Cities program run in the 1960s which attempted to relocate heavy industry to greenfield sites. See P. Rimmer, ‘Putting Multi-function Polis into context: MITI's search for a place in the sun?’, Australian Planner, June 1989, 27(2), pp.15-21. Again in the 1970's, after the announcement of National Land Agency priorities, MITI began combining innovation management goals with regional development aims resulting in the formulation of the Technopolis Program.
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• Not surprisingly the JDC's most active companies were in engineering and construction industries. In the 1980s Japan's main construction companies were big, wealthy, politically powerful, and seeking opportunities for overseas investment and diversification. MITI's special MFP city provided enormous opportunity for extensive use of Japanese advanced urban software infrastructure as well as acting as a test-bed for the production of incubator city prototypes for export elsewhere. Such prototypes would potentially have a market in those countries hoping to update their infrastructure and buy an ‘intelligent’ city. The MFP was an opportunity to produce a prototype and to do so using cheap land, energy, and a skilled labour supply and an attractive showcase location. SA knew that the MFP was a prototype for other such developments and stated this in their May, 1990 proposal. SA State Government, Adelaide: a submission to the MFP Joint Secretariat by the South Australian Government, SA State Government, Adelaide, May, 1990, pp.6,1.
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• DITAC had commissioned a major report into the potential social effects of the MFP known as the Social Issues Study and led by Professor D. Yencken. However as the feasibility study proceeded the publication of this report became a delicate matter. Though it was completed in 1989, its release to the public was delayed. The report was composed of two separate studies. The first study looked at the context of the MFP proposal and the issues associated with new towns and urban development. The second examined the social, cultural and environmental issues that might be involved in the successful integration of any MFP development into Australian society. The final composite report called for more public discussion and community consultation but was in essence positive on preceding with the MFP feasibility study.
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• This Precinct Program had been designed for the most part by Edward Blakely who later became a major figure in the Arthur Andersen/Kinhill consultancy.
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• This emphasis on the central importance of the university sector in incubator design was very different to Japanese incubators where the main R& D performer was the private sector.
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• This attitude to incubator design in Japanese government was not restricted to MITI. Satoshi Ohoka, Director of International planning for the Japan Development Bank warned that inattention to lifestyle qualities would raise major problems in the functioning of incubators: ‘… their success depends on whether they will actually help high-density human relations in a technological society or not. Hardware facilities are nothing more than basic requirements; what matters for research cores in the final analysis is the software.’ S. Ohoka, “The importance of Regional Core Centers: research and development-type town planning’, Business Japan, September 1991, p.4.
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• This strategy had also been used by local governments in Japan who had been very active in obtaining funds from the large central government ministries under the aegis of particular schemes.
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• R. Joseph, ‘The Silicon Valley Factor: Australia's Technology Parks’, in P. Scott (ed.) A Herd of White Elephants?: some big technology projects in Australia, Hale and Iremonger, Sydney, 1992, p.78.
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• A. Patience, “The Bannon decade: preparation for what?’, in A. Parkin, A. and A. Patience (eds.), The Bannon Decade: the politics of restraint in South Australia, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1992, p.349.
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• In the Investment Mission Report MITI recommended that Australia follow the financial establishment program of Kansai Science City which was funded by local government and business, not the national Japanese government. This was a telling piece of advice as development of Kansai Science City has stalled since 1992 due to lack of both interest from Japanese companies in relocating from Tokyo and available investment funds due to the recession.
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• See for example R. R. Nelson (ed.), National innovation systems: a comparative analysis, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993. In a forthcoming paper I will discuss innovation management theorists and national innovation systems models in particular. One criticism which will be noted is the lack of mechanisms which could provide public participation in decisions made regarding the management of technological change.
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• Tessa Morris-Suzuki convincingly argues that social networks of information played a far more important role in transforming Japan than ‘far-sighted’ government policy or the actions of large companies. See The Technological transformation of Japan From the Seventeenth to the Twenty-first Century, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994.
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