Foreign Intelligence Liaison: Devils, Deals, and Details

REFERENCES

• For more details on the impact of 9/11 on the growth of liaison relationships among intelligence services, see Stéphane Lefebvre, “The Difficulties and Dilemma of International Intelligence Cooperation,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence , Vol. 16 , No. 4 , Winter 2003–2004 , pp. 527 – 542 . [CSA]
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• National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States , The 9–11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States—Authorized Edition (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004, paperback edition) , p. 122 .
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• Seymour Hersh , “The Stovepipe: How Conflicts Between the Bush Administration and the Intelligence Community Marred the Reporting on Iraq's Weapons.” The New Yorker , 27 October 2003 .
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• On the U.S.–U.K. intelligence relationship, see articles by Richard J. Aldrich: “British Intelligence and the Anglo-American ‘Special Relationship’ during the Cold War,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 24, No. 1, March 1998, pp. 331–351; “The Value of Residual Empire: Anglo-American Intelligence Cooperation in Asia after 1945,” in Intelligence, Defence and Diplomacy: British Policy in the Post-War World. Richard J. Aldrich and Michael F. Hopkins eds. (London/Portland, OR: Cass, 1994). Also, Bradley F. Smith, “The Road to the Anglo-American Intelligence Partnership,” American Intelligence Journal, Vol. 16, No. 2/3, Autumn/Winter 1995, pp. 59–62; and “The ULTRA-MAGIC Deals and the Most Secret Special Relationship, 1940–1946” (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1993; 1994). Christopher Andrew, “The Making of the Anglo-American SIGINT Alliance.” Also see, In The Name of Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Walter Pforzheimer, eds. Hayden B. Peake and Samuel Halpern (Washington, DC: NIBC Press, 1994) pp. 95–109. Paul Maddrell, “British-American Scientific Intelligence Collaboration During the Occupation of Germany,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 15, No. 2, (Summer 2000), pp. 74–94. Jay Jakub, Spies and Saboteurs: Anglo-American Collaboration and Rivalry in Human Intelligence Collection and Special Operations, 1940–45 (London: Macmillan, 1998 and New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999). See Christopher Andrew, “The Growth of the Australian Intelligence Community and the Anglo-American Connection.” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 4, No. 1, April 1989, pp. 213–256; Jeffrey T. Richelson and Desmond Ball, The Ties That Bind: Intelligence Cooperation Between the UKUSA Countries (Boston and London: Allen & Unwin, 1985). The Ties That Bind: Intelligence Cooperation Between the UKUSA Countries—the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Canada, Australian and New Zealand, 2nd ed. (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990); Desmond J. Ball, Pine Gap: Australia and the U.S. Geostationary Signals Intelligence Satellite Program, Canberra, Australia: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1988); David Stafford and Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, eds., “Special Issue on American-British-Canadian Intelligence Relations 1939–2000,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 15, No. 2, Summer 2000: entire issue. On U.S. relations with other close allies see Stéphane Lefebvre, “The Difficulties and Dilemma of International Intelligence Cooperation,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 16, No. 4, (Winter 2003–2004), pp. 527–542. Also, Glen M. Segell, “Intelligence Agency Relations Between the European Union and the U.S.” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 17, No. 1, Spring 2004, pp. 81–96; Dorine Dubois, “The Attacks of 11 September: EU–US Cooperation against Terrorism in the Field of Justice and Home Affairs,” European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 7, No. 3, (2002), pp. 317–335. For intra-European intelligence cooperation, see Sigurd Hess, “Intelligence Cooperation in Europe 1990 to the Present,” Journal of Intelligence History, Vol. 3, No. 1, Summer 2003. Frits Hoekstra, “The Dutch BVD and Transatlantic Co-operation During the Cold War Era: Some Experiences,” Journal of Intelligence History, Vol. 3, No. 1, Summer 2003. Bob De Graaff and Cees Wiebes, “Intelligence and the Cold War Behind the Dikes: The Relationship Between the American and Dutch Intelligence Communities, 1946–1994,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 12, No. 1, January 1997, pp. 41–58. Rolf Tamnes, The United States and the Cold War in the High North (Albershot & Oslo: Dartmouth & Ad Notam, 1991). Loch K. Johnson and Annette Freyberg, “Ambivalent Bedfellows: German-American Intelligence Relations, 1969–1991,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 10, No. 2, Summer 1997, pp. 165–179. Ephraim Kahana, “Mossad-CIA Cooperation,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 14, No. 3, Fall 2001, pp. 409–420. Michael M. Gunter, “United States-Turkish Intelligence Liaison Since World War II,” Journal of Intelligence History, Vol. 3, No. 1, Summer 2003. Arthur S. Hulnick, “Intelligence Cooperation in the Post–Cold War Era: A New Game Plan?” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 5, No. 4, Winter 1991–1992, pp. 455–465. For more, specifically, on the Global War on Terror, see Desmond J. Ball, “Desperately Seeking Bin Laden: The International Dimension of the War against Terrorism,” in Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order, eds. Ken Booth and Tim Dunne (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave, 2002); Martin Rudner, “Hunters and Gatherers: The Intelligence Coalition Against Islamic Terrorism.” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 17, No. 2, Summer 2004, pp. 193–230. H. Bradford Westerfield offers some important theoretical insights in “America and the World of Intelligence Liaison,” in Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 11, No. 3, July 1996, pp. 523–560. On the impact of science and technology on intelligence relationships, see Paul Maddrell, “British-American Scientific Intelligence Collaboration during the Occupation of Germany.” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 15, No. 2, Summer 2000, pp. 74–94. [CSA]
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• H. Bradford Westerfield , “America and the World of Intelligence Liaison,” in Intelligence and National Security , Vol. 11 , No. 3 , July 1996 , pp. 523 – 560 . [CSA]
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• Chris Clough , “Quid Pro Quo: The Challenges of International Strategic Intelligence Cooperation,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence , Vol. 17 , No. 4 , Winter 2004–2005 , pp. 601 – 613 . [CSA] [CROSSREF]
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• Uday Ram and Matt Walker, my research assistants, helped conduct the literature review and engaged in long and intellectually stimulating discussions of the subject matter. I also wish to thank the Center for Peace and Security Studies at Georgetown University and its Director, Michael Brown, for organizing a colloquium on an earlier draft of this article. These discussions have strengthened this article significantly. [CSA]
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• Other authors, most notably H. Bradford Westerfield, have argued that liaison can include collaboration in any intelligence activity—including, for example, analysis and training. While such activities may be part of a liaison relationship, true liaison, as defined here, must incorporate the intent to augment collection as part of the arrangement. Otherwise, form may be confused with substance. Westerfield's definition is therefore unsatisfying, as it mixes motives and obscures the measures of value that must accompany any long-standing liaison relationship. Joint training may be part of an institutionalized liaison relationship and may briefly dominate that relationship, but such training must over time improve collection or risk classification as covert action or foreign aid. That it might be called intelligence liaison is irrelevant to the conceptual definition of the phenomenon. Similarly, sharing of analysis is worthless from an intelligence standpoint unless the recipients have a way of establishing the credibility of the underlying sources, in which case the analytical sharing is a gateway to shared collection. If no sourcing is offered, institutionalized analytical exchange becomes an exercise in influence and exhortation—the kind of effort the U.S. government pursued in seeking UN sanction for going to war in Iraq. One does not expend resources improving the analytic capabilities of a partner service unless one expects to get returns for the trouble; those returns are almost always measured either in terms of political gain (covert action or enhanced influence) or intelligence gain (enhanced collection—defined as including everything from platforms to sensors, processing, and data exfiltration). Only the latter can be considered as analytically distinct from policy execution and is therefore the only activity considered foreign intelligence liaison for the purposes of this article. For a counter view, see H. Bradford Westerfield, “America and the World of Intelligence Liaison,” in Intelligence and National Security , Vol. 11 , No. 3 , July 1996 , pp. 523 – 560 . [CSA]
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• The theory of intelligence offered in this article is based on a neorealist's perspective on international politics and is therefore informed by a realist's precepts concerning the structure of the international system and its effects on the security of states. Unlike most theorists of the realist school, however, the author believes information to be a measurable component of power. The absence of credible theory and associated metrics for strong intelligence capabilities has led most structural realists to undervalue this component of power. See Andrew K. Hanami , ed., Perspectives on Structural Realism ( New York : Palgrave MacMillan , 2003 ).
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• James Bamford , Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra Secret National Security Agency From the Cold War Through the Dawn of a new Century : ( New York : Doubleday , 2001 ), p. 40 .
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• Ibid ., pp. 154 – 155 . [CSA]
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• See Ste´phane Lefebvre, “The Difficulties and Dilemma of Internatinal Intelligence Cooperation,” p. 529 . [CSA]
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• See Ephraim Kahana's, “Mossad- CIA Cooperation.” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence , Vol. 14 , No. 3 , Fall 2001 , pp. 409 – 420 . [CSA] [CROSSREF]
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• Ibid ., pp. 409 – 420 . [CSA]
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• Seymour M. Hersh , “The Syrian Bet: Did the Bush Administration Burn a Useful Source on Al Qaeda?,” The New Yorker, 28 July 2003. Robin Wright and Glenn Kessler, “Sanctions Against Syria Nearly Ready; Officials Say U.S. Aims to Preserve Cooperation on Intelligence, Business Deals.” The Washington Post , 12 March 2004 . [CSA]
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• James J. Wirtz , “Constraints on Intelligence Collaboration: The Domestic Dimension,” in Defense Analysis , Vol. 8 , No. 3 , pp. 247 – 259 . Wirtz has pointed out that adversarial liaison is particularly dangerous for the intelligence services of democratic states as it risks exposure and eventual political blowback . [CSA]
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• Arthur S. Hulnick , “Intelligence Cooperation in the Post Cold War Era: A New Game Plan?” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence , Vol. 15 , No. 4 , Winter 1991–1992 , p. 456 . [CSA]
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• For cases of Bulgarian assassination attempts, see Richard H. Cummings , “The Murder of Georgi Markov,” Intelligencer , Vol. 10 , No. 1 , February 1999 , pp. 9 – 11 ; and Paul B. Henze, The Plot to Kill the Pope (New York: Scribners, 1984). Ernest Volkman examines the case of Hu Simeng Gasde, an East German double agent, in Espionage: The Greatest Spy Operations of the Twentieth Century (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1995), pp. 160–166. [CSA] [CROSSREF]
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• Michael Herman discusses the expansion of liaison networks: “Every new foreign exchange is a new risk, through intelligence penetration of the foreign agency or its users, its careless handling or public leaking of the material, or its deliberate use of it in trading with its other intelligence contacts. Multi-lateral “clubs” and international networks of exchanges increase these risks geometrically.” Intelligence Power in Peace and War ( Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 1996 ), pp. 207 – 208 .
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• In such circumstances, intelligence “sharing” seems, from the intelligence professional's standpoint, more like officially sanctioned “leaking”—that is, the unilateral forfeiture of sources and methods. This hypothesis would help explain the changing effectiveness and bureaucratic evolution of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) for disarming Iraq after the first Gulf War. The U.S. government's initial reluctance to provide intelligence to the UN was overcome once careful intelligence handling procedures were arranged. [CSA]
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• H. Bradford Westerfield , “ America and the World of Intelligence Liaison ,” Intelligence and National Security , Vol. 11 , No. 3 , July 1996 , p. 524 . [CSA]
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• Ibid ., p. 523 . [CSA]
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• James Bamford , Body of Secrets , p. 149 . [CSA]
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• For example, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) developed a partnership of convenience with General Tai Li, referred to by some as the Chinese Himmler, to augment collection against the Japanese in Southeast Asia. Tai Li's priorities were to counter internal Chinese threats to nationalist rule, not to satisfy OSS's interests. Much of the “take” out of the liaison relationship was therefore tainted. [CSA]
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• Richard J. Aldrich , “ Dangerous Liasons: Post-September 11 Intelligence Alliances ,” Harvard International Review , Fall 2002 , pp. 50 – 54 . [CSA]
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• Ste´phane Lefebvre, “The Difficulties and Dilemma of International Intelligence Cooperation,” p. 533 . [CSA]
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• Indeed, failure of one partner to target the other would be an indicator of slackness in the negligent state—a slackness that an adversary might exploit by using the weaker partner as a back door to gain access to, and possibly establish a mole in, the stronger one. At the same time, if a state's partner is competent, the legitimate access that partner is afforded can open opportunities for deliberate collaboration with an adversary against the receiving state if the cost/benefit equation shifts. [CSA]
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• Richard J. Aldrich , “ Dangerous Liasons: Post-September 11 Intelligence Alliances ,” p. 50 . [CSA]
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• James Simon , former Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Administration, lecture at Georgetown University, March, 2003. Also, Eric Schmitt, “Mideast Accord: The CIA's New Role as Umpire May Bring More Risk,” The New York Times , 23 October 1998 . [CSA]
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• For a fascinating account of this liaison relationship, see Mary Ellen Reese, General Reinhard Gehlen: The CIA Connection (Fairfax, VA: George Mason University Press, 1990). This may be properly considered a liaison relationship and not a unilateral collection because General Gehlen both sought his (rump) government's approval for the exchange and eventually assumed the position of Konrad Adenauer's intelligence chief. [CSA]
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• See Loch K. Johnson's interview with former DCI Richard Helms ( “Spymaster Richard Helms: An Interview with the Former US Director of Central Intelligence,” Intelligence and National Security , Vol. 18 , Issue 3 , Autumn 2003a , p. 32 ). Similarly, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has been reluctant to approve a new NRO satellite program because, according to one government official, it would be “irrelevant to current threats.” Douglas Jehl, “New Spy Plan Said to Involve Satellite System,” The New York Times, 12 December 2004. [CSA]
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• The commercialization of imagery has contributed to this trend. So has the shift in communications from microwave and landline to cell-phone traffic. Speech by then-NSA Director Michael Hayden at Georgetown University , 24 February 2004 .
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• Quoted from Tim Golden , Desmond Butler , and Don Van Natta Jr. , “As Europe Hunts for Terrorists, The Hunted Press Advantages.” The New York Times , 22 March 2004 , p. A12 . [CSA]
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• Richard Aldrich points out the Pakistan's foreign ministry is far less powerful than the Pakistani intelligence service, ISI, which runs aspects of Pakistan's foreign policy towards Afghanistan and Kashmir. See his article “Dangerous Liasons: Post-September 11 Intelligence Alliance,” p. 51 . [CSA]
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