REFERENCES
- See the Bible, Joshua, Chapter 2 .
- Francis Dvornik, Origins of Intelligence Services: the Ancient Near East, Persia, Greece, Rome, Byzantium, the Arab Muslim Empires, the Mongol Empire, China, Muscovy (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1974), p. 22. In her 1987 doctoral dissertation, “Tinker, Tailor, Caesar, Spy: Espionage in Ancient Rome,” Rose Mary Sheldon includes the following interesting story about Francis Dvornik: “A project to write the history of intelligence in all periods was conceived by General William Donovan, often called the father of American intelligence, after the second World War. In the spring of 1948 General Donovan came to Dumbarton Oaks in Washington, D.C., looking for a scholar who could write the early chapters of such a history. John D. Thatcher, then Director of the Library and Collections at Dumbarton Oaks, sent him to Father Francis Dvornik, the well-known Byzantinist, who was teaching courses on political philosophy in the ancient world. Father Dvornik agreed to write the chapters on antiquity. Unfortunately, the death of General Donovan in 1959 put an abrupt end to the project. It wasn't until 1974 that Father Dvornik published his chapters separately (and not under the auspices of the CIA as is often suggested) as Origins of Intelligence Services. See Rose Mary Sheldon, “Tinker Tailor, Caesar, Spy: Espionage in Ancient Rome,” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1987, p. vii .
- See Frank Santi Russell, Information Gathering in Classical Greece (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), p. 3, though Francis Dvornik suggests that because Greek city-state democracies were small in scale such well-developed intelligence organizations were unnecessary. See Francis Dvornik, Origins of Intelligence Services, p. 33 .
- Ibid., pp. 40–41 .
- Frank Santi Russell , Information Gathering in Classical Greece , p. 16 .
- Ibid., p. 62. Kenneth Fowler, in his monumental Medieval Mercenaries: Volume I: The Great Companies (London: Blackwell, 2000) describes how the mercenaries of the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries designated their groups as “companies” with innocuous, and thus misleading, names, such as “The Great company” or “The White company.” They also affected a loose corporate structure in that they had to negotiate contracts, record payments and disbursements, and maintain good client relations, all the while cultivating a thin legitimate commercial veneer pretext .
- Frank Santi Russell, Information Gathering in Classical Greece, p. 62. See footnote 132. Quoting historian Lysias, Russell notes: “The examples to which Lysias referred were the losses or capture of ships, blockades, and impending ruptures of truces.…‘It appears that they [merchants] always found the means to get such information as necessary, either by means of agents or in another way.’ The agents to whom he referred were fielded by Cleomenes […] who was appointed governor of Egypt by Alexander the Great in 331. Cleomenes developed an organization with field headquarters in Athens that was ‘continually sending quotations of prices to the branches in other places.’”
- Xenophon, Calvary Commanders, quoted in Frank Santi Russell, Information Gathering in Classical Greece, p. 104 .
- Ibid., p. 106 .
- Ibid., p. 187 .
- Ibid., pp. 187–188 .
- Rose Mary Sheldon, “Tinker, Tailor, Caesar, Spy,” p. viii .
- Francis Dvornik, Origins of Intelligence Services, p. 53. “Other examples [of poor intelligence] indicate that the Romans otherwise had limited means of gathering information about day-to-day political events, especially in a systematic and regular way…. The Romans had no real way to obtain political and military information on foreign territories systematically and objectively…[A number of border violations occurred and] these invasions were not predicted, prevented by ‘first strike’, or met at the frontier. Such preventive action was an inappropriate strategy for the Romans. Instead they relied on punitive or retaliatory campaigns that might be waged at any time after the crisis occurred.” Susan P. Mattern, Rome and the Enemy: Imperial Strategy in the Principate (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1995), p. 68 and p. 69 .
- See Nigel Bagnall , The Punic Wars: Rome, Carthage and the Struggle for the Mediterranean ( London : Pimlico , 1999 ); T. A. Dorey and D. R. Dudley, Rome Against Carthage (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1972); and J. F. Lazenby, The First Punic War: A Military History (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996) .
- Francis Dvornik, Origins of Intelligence Services, p. 54 .
- Ibid., pp. 74–75 .
- Ibid., p. 75 .
- Ibid., p. 77; see also N.J.E. Austin and N.B. Rankov, Exploratio: Military and Political Intelligence in the Roman World From the Second Punic War to the Battle of Adrianople (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 91. Some sources seem more confident in placing the death toll nearer 100,000 .
- Susan P. Mattern , Rome and the Enemy: Imperial Strategy in the Principate , p. 69 .
- Francis Dvornik , Origins of Intelligence Services , p. 78 .
- Ibid., p. 91 .
- Ibid .
- See N.J.E. Austin and N.B. Rankov, Exploratio, pp. 136–137. Frumentarii later were turned into an internal secret police, adept at, among other things, assassinations .
- Emphasis added. Francis Dvornik, Origins of Intelligence Services, pp. 101–102, 103; see also Susan P. Mattern, Rome and the Enemy, p. 144, and N.J.E. Austin and N.B. Rankov, Exploratio, p. 136 .
- Francis Dvornik , Origins of Intelligence Services , p. 106 .
- Ibid., p. 109 .
- Ibid., p. 114 .
- N.J.E. Austin and N.B. Rankov , Exploratio , p. 9 .
- Ibid., p. 27 .
- Ibid .
- Ibid .
- Ibid., pp. 28–29 .
- Rose Mary Sheldon, “Tinker, Tailor, Caesar, Spy,” pp. 83, 84–85 .
- N.J.E. Austin and N.B. Rankov , Exploratio , p. 94 .
- Ibid., p. 105 .
- Rose Mary Sheldon, “Tinker, Tailor, Caesar, Spy,” p. 92 .
- Procopius, Anecdota 30, quoted in Francis Dvornik, Origins of Intelligence Services, p. 146 .
- Francis Dvornik , Origins of Intelligence Services , pp. 164 – 165 .
- Ibid., p. 174 .
- Ibid., p. 217 .
- Ibid., p. 256 .
- Ibid., p. 269 .
- Ibid., p. 274 .
- Steven E. Maffeo , Most Secret and Confidential: Intelligence in the Age of Nelson ( Annapolis , MD : Naval Institute Press , 2000 ), p. 3 . The royal interest in foreign shipping confirms that ubiquitous shipping was used to cover various intrigues of state .
- Alan Haynes , Invisible Power: The Elizabethan Secret Services, 1570–1603 ( London : Alan Sutton , 1992 ), p. 3 .
- Ibid., p. 12 .
- Ibid., p. 27 .
- Ibid., p. 13 .
- Ibid., p. 17 .
- Ibid., p. 27 .
- Ibid., p. 30 .
- Ibid., p. 37 .
- Ibid., p. 49 .
- Alison Plowden , The Elizabethan Secret Service ( London : Harvester Wheatsheaf/St. Martin's Press , 1991 ), pp. 14 – 17 , 46 .
- Benjamin Franklin , The Papers of Benjamin Franklin , Vol. 22 , 23 March 1775 through 27 October 1776 , William B. Wilcox , ed. ( New Haven , CT : Yale University Press , 1982 ), p. 454 .
- Ibid., Vol. 27, pp. 382–383 .
- John Adams , Papers of John Adams , Gregg L. Lint , et al., eds. , Vol. 7 ( September 1778 ) ( Cambridge , MA : Belknap Press/Harvard University Press , 1989 ), p. 23 .
- Steven E. Maffeo , Most Secret and Confidential , p. 13 .
- Kenneth Ellis , The Post Office in the Eighteenth Century: A Study in Administrative History ( London : Oxford University Press , 1956 ), p. 61 .
- Steven E. Maffeo, Most Secret and Confidential, p. 28. As Maffeo notes, post office intercepts were something of staple in intelligence gathering. For example, Jeffrey T. Richelson observes that, “Although war would ultimately lead to consolidation of its human intelligence operations, Germany continued to operate the seven COMINT units it had before the [Second World] war began–as many COMINT units as the United States, Italy Japan and Britain had combined. On the civilian side there was…the Forschungstelle [or the] Research Post [Office].” See Jeffrey T. Richelson, A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 174 .
- Emphasis added . Steven E. Maffeo , Most Secret and Confidential , pp. 27 – 28 .
- Ibid., p. 30 .
- Geoffrey J. Marcus , A Naval History of England: Volume 2: The Age of Nelson ( London : George Allen and Unwin , 1971 ), p. 402 .
- Steven E. Maffeo , Most Secret and Confidential , p. 84 .
- Ibid., pp. 54–55 .
- Thomas Cochrane, Earl [some sources Lord] of Dundonald, The Autobiography of a Seaman [microform] (London: R Bently, 1860), 2 vols., Vol. 1, p. 101. See Christopher Lloyd, Lord Cochrane: Seaman, Radical, Liberator: A Life of Thomas, Lord Cochrane, 10th Earl of Dundonald 1775–1860 (New York: Henry Holt, 1998), p. 18: “The Speedy herself was frequently disguised, and she had the flags of all nations in her locker, to be used as occasion demanded…” On the painting of Royal Navy ships, see Robert Gardiner, Frigates of the Napoleonic Wars (London: Chatham Publishing, 2000), pp. 111–112: “The [Admiralty's 1814 Committee on Stores] noted that while official paint consumption appeared enormous, it was well known that every captain had to dip into his own pocket to keep his ship neat, so it recommended reducing the range of [interior] colours [sic] available…. The austere post-war colour [sic] scheme, therefore, was not a matter of aesthetics so much as supply—the report even recommended that ships have black hulls with white streaks…”
- Robert Harvey , Cochrane: The Life and Exploits of a Fighting Captain ( New York : Carroll and Graf , 2000 ), pp. 44 – 45 .
- Steven E. Maffeo , Most Secret and Confidential , pp. 107 – 108 .
- O'Brien, quoted in Steven E. Maffeo, Most Secret and Confidential, p. 109.
- Ibid., p. 107 .
- Marcus, Age of Nelson, quoted in Steven E. Maffeo, Most Secret and Confidential, p. 110 .
- Ibid., p. 112 .
- Ibid., pp. 112–113 .
- Steven E. Maffeo, Most Secret and Confidential, p. 167. See also Jan Morris, Fisher's Face, Or Getting to Know the Admiral (New York: Random House, 1995), p. 137 ff. Morris notes that Fisher's ability to collect intelligence led him to establish his own clearinghouse for such information in Switzerland and was reputed to be able to intercept and decipher foreign diplomatic cables and messages. “When he met foreign officers, dignitaries or commercial people he pumped them for information—‘my dear friend Kiamil Pasha, who may yet be the Grand Vizier,’ or ‘my faithful friend’ the US minister at Constantinople, or ‘Grech, who owns all the small steamers in the Levant,’ or ‘Cottrell, manager of the Eastern Telegraph Company at Syra [sic? Syria?] or ‘Gerald Fitzmaurice who knew everything there was to know about Turkey’ or even ‘Old Gervais at the French Admiralty’…[he] carefully kept his finger upon the pulse of things…” pp. 137–138 .
- Edwin C. Fishel , The Secret War for the Union: The Untold Story of Military Intelligence in the Civil War (Boston : Houghton Mifflin , 1996), p. 9.
- Ibid., pp. 16–17 .
- Ibid., pp. 18, 86. Allan Pinkerton (and his “private detectives”) conducted all of the Union's intelligence gathering but it was consistently of poor quality. Buxton was the only Federal spy of this period who did not report to Pinkerton but to the general directly .
- Ibid., p. 21 .
- Ibid., p. 25 .
- Ibid., pp. 25ff .
- Ibid., p. 34ff .
- Ibid., pp. 55, 85 .
- Ibid., p. 94 .
- Ibid., p. 95 .
- Donald McCormick , Peddler of Death: The Life and Times of Sir Basil Zaharoff ( New York : Holt, Reinhart and Winston , 1965 ), p. 44 .
- Guiles Davenport, Zaharoff: High Priest of War (Boston: Lothrop, Lee and Shepard, 1934), p. 177 .
- Donald McCormick, Peddler of Death, p. 51.
- Ibid., p. 55 .
- Ibid., pp. 77–78 .
- Guiles Davenport , Zaharoff: High Priest of War , p. 168 .
- Donald McCormick , Peddler of Death , p. 87 .
- Ibid., p. 109 .
- Ibid., p. 111 .
- Ibid., p. 115 .
- Ibid., p. 171 .
- Ibid., p. 121 .
- Ibid., pp. 129–130 .
- Ibid., p. 131 .
- Ibid., p. 162 .
- Guiles Davenport , Zaharoff: High Priest of War , p. 265 .
- Ibid., p. 294 .
- Donald McCormick , Peddler of Death , p. 232 .
- Guiles Davenport , Zaharoff: High Priest of War , p. 114 .
- Richard Sasuly , IG Farben ( New York : Boni and Carer , 1984 ), p. 37 .
- Richard B. Spence , “Sidney Reilly in America, 1914–1917,” Intelligence and National Security , Vol. 10 , No. 1 , 1995 , p. 92 .
- Ibid., pp. 94–95 .
- Ibid., p. 97 .
- Ibid., p. 98 .
- Ibid., pp. 96–97 .
- Ibid., p. 98 .
- Ibid., 103 .
- Ibid., p. 106 .
- John Costello and Oleg Tsarev , Deadly Illusions ( New York : Crown Publishers , 1993 ), p. 35 .
- Richard Sasuly , IG Farben , p. 49 .
- Ibid., pp. 51, 67 .
- Ibid., p. 77 .
- Ibid., p. 78 .
- Joseph Borkin , The Crime and Punishment of IG Farben ( New York : Free Press , 1978 ), p. 44 .
- Ibid., p. 46 .
- John Costello and Oleg Tsarev , Deadly Illusions , p. 43 .
- Ibid .
- Eugene Lyons , Assignment in Utopia ( London : George G. Harrap , [ nd–193? ]), p. 561 .
- Jonathan Haslam , The Soviet Union and the Struggle for Collective Security in Europe, 1933–1939 ( London : Macmillan , 1984 ), p. 17 .
- Anthony Cave Brown , Treason in the Blood: H. St. John Philby, Kim Philby and the Spy Case of the Century ( Boston : Houghton Mifflin , 1994 ), p. 359 .
- Ibid., p. 500 .
- Andre Brissard , The Nazi Secret Service ( London : Bodley Head , 1972 ), p. 249 .
- Jonathan Block and Patrick Fitzgerald , British Intelligence and Covert Action ( Kerry , Ireland : Bantam Books , 1983 ), p. 32 .
- Chapman Pincher , Too Secret Too Long ( New York : St Martin's Press , 1984 ), p. 170 .
- Andre Brissard , The Nazi Secret Service , p. 196 .
- Ibid., p. 220 .
- Peter Hayes , Industry and Ideology: IG Farben in the Nazi Era ( Cambridge , UK : Cambridge University Press , 1987 ), p. 18 .
- Ibid., p. 27 .
- Ibid., p. 104 .
- Chapman Pincher , Too Secret Too Long , pp. 46 – 47 .