Nuclear Intelligence and North–South Politics

REFERENCES

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• The term “white elephant” originates from seventeenth century Southeast Asia, where albino elephants were treasured as sacred possessions, and were lavished with expensive food and lodgings. Although they were coveted, once acquired they served no useful purpose, and often led to the financial ruin of their owners .
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• There are legitimate reasons for the non-disclosure by the IAEA of certain safeguards-related information, but these are used to justify a more general—some would argue, unnecessary—lack of transparency in the Agency .
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• For example, see discussions on IAEA handling of the South Korea file following revelations of non-compliance in 2004. Jungmin Kang , Tatsujiro Suzuki , and Peter Hayes , “South Korea's Nuclear Misadventures,” Nautilus Institute Special Report, 10 September 2004.
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• International criticism of U.S. failure to exert pressure on nuclear Israel is long-running and extends to the Obama administration's foreign policy. For background and analysis, see Avner Cohen and George Perkovich , “The Obama–Netanyahu Meeting: Nuclear Issues,” Proliferation Analysis , 14 May 2009 .
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• For example, the independent Group of Scientific Experts (iGSE) is a mostly European and U.S. network of academics and analysts engaged in research on new technologies to detect clandestine nuclear activities. For details, see the iGSE Website at http://www.igse.net/
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