For Belgian Eyes Only: Intelligence Cooperation in Belgium

REFERENCES

• Within the Belgian Defence flow chart, the service is known as ACOS-IS, Assistant Chief of Staff Intelligence and Security.
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• Herman Matthijs, “Intelligence Services in Belgium,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 23, 2008, pp. 552–576.
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• Belgian Chamber of Representatives, 48th Session, 1991, H. Doc. 1305/8, pp. 4–8; Stefaan De Clerck and Johan Huygh, “Een kleine geschiedenis van de wetgeving op de inlichtingendiensten,” in De Staatsveiligheid. Essays over 175 jaar Veiligheid van de Staat, M. Cools, K. Dassen, R. Libert, and P. Ponsaers, eds. (Brussels: Politeia, 2005), p. 188.
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• Michel I, Coalition Agreement, 9 October 2014, pp. 131, 143–144, 208.
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• To be expounded in a forthcoming study “Intelligence and Security in Belgium: a Historical Perspective.” The pathology described by Christopher Andrew, “Governments and Secret Services: A Historical Perspective,” International Journal, Vol. 34, 1979, pp. 168–170, applies here.
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• Senate, Het verslag van de parlementaire commissie, belast met het onderzoek naar de wijze waarop de bestrijding van het banditisme en het terrorisme georganiseerd wordt, Session 1989–90, 1990, S. Doc. 59/8–1988, pp. 208–218, 281–285, 290.
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• Senate, parlementaire commissie banditisme en terrorisme, pp. 371, 373–374.
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• Kingdom of Belgium, Law of 18 July 1991 Regulating Oversight on the Police and Intelligence Services, art. 1 §1.
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• Standing Committee I, Activity Report 1994 (Brussels, 1994), pp. 47–48. Stéphan Schewebach, “La fin de la Surêté Publique (1990–1994),” in M. Cools, K. Dassen, R. Libert, and P. Ponsaers, eds., De Staatsveiligheid: Essays over 175 jaar Veiligheid van de Staat, pp. 155–162.
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• Standing Committee I, Activity Report 1995 (Brussels, 1995), pp. 155–156; Lars Bové, De geheimen van de Staatsveiligheid. Onderzoek naar een schimmige overheidsdienst (Tielt: Lannoo, 2015), pp. 106, 256. The “Khaled affair” of 1991 sheds light upon the relations with the Foreign Affairs Ministry at the time: diplomats had chosen to deal directly with a Palestinian go-between for the release of hostages, whereas this was supposed to happen via the VSSE. Lack of confidence in the service led the diplomats not to engage the VSSE, but the non-communication eventually caused great embarrassment to the ministry: see R. Coolsaet, V. Dujardin, and C. Roosens, Buitenlandse Zaken in België. Geschiedenis van een ministerie, zijn diplomaten en consuls van 1830 tot heden, (Tielt: Lannoo, 2014), p. 378.
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• Standing Committee I, Activity Report 1995, pp. 151–152, citing the Prime Minister’s response. Belgian Chamber of Representatives, 49th Session, 1996, H. Doc. 437/1, p. 31.
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• Standing Commitee I, Activity Report 2004 (Brussels, 2005), p. 6. Jean-Claude Delepière, “Le Comité permanent de controle des services de renseignement,” in M. Cools, K. Dassen, R. Libert, and P. Ponsaers, eds., De Staatsveiligheid: Essays over 175 jaar Veiligheid van de Staat, p. 236.
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• Kenneth Strong, Men of Intelligence. A Study of the Roles and Decisions of Chiefs of Intelligence from World War I to the Present Day (London: Cassel, 1970), p. 159.
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• Standing Committee I, Activity Report 1994, pp. 38–40, 52.
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• Standing Committee I, Activity Report 2006 (Antwerp: Intersentia 2007), p. 8. Jean-Claude Delepière, “Le coordinateur de la qualité du travail de renseignements: le Comité permanent de contrôle des services de renseignements” in S. Petermann, and W. Claes, eds., De inlichtingendiensten in België en de nieuwe bedreigingen (Brussels: Politeia, 2005), p. 48.
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• Standing Committee I, Activity Report 1995, pp. 72–75; Activity Report 1997 (Brussels, 1997), p. 192. Herman Matthijs, “Intelligence Services in Belgium,” pp. 569–570; Koenraad Dassen, “Nationaal zowel als internationaal: veiligheid, dé bouwsteen voor vrijheid,” in Herman Matthijs, ed., Geheime diensten in België, de Verenigde Staten en over de wereld (Bruges: die Keure, 2006), p. 85.
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• E.g., Standing Committee I, Activity Report 2000 (Brussels, 2000), pp. 67, 158; Activity Report 2001 (Brussels, 2001), pp. 83, 214; Activity Report 2004, p. 16; with its final conclusion in 2007: Activity Report 2007 (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2008), p. 3, with more details in Activity Report 2008, pp. 61–62.
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• Standing Committee I, Activity Report 2001 (Brussels, 2002), pp. 9, 55, 83; reiterated in Activity Report 2002 (Brussels, 2002), p. 19; Activity Report 2003 (Brussels, 2003), p. 135.
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• Standing Committee I, Activity Report 2006, p. 135.
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• Herman Matthijs, “Een nieuwe geheime dienst? Het O.C.A.D.,” in Herman Matthijs, ed., Geheime diensten: A Licence to Kill (Bruges: die Keure, 2007), p. 107.
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• Kingdom of Belgium, Law of 30 November 1998 Regulating the Intelligence and Security Services, art. 20 (translated by the author).
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• Standing Committee I, Activity Report 1997, pp. 187–193. The contents of the protocols themselves is classified.
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• Standing Committee I, Activity Report 1999 (Brussels, 2000), pp. 63–65.
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• Standing Committee I, Activity Report 2001, p. 54 (translated by the author).
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• Standing Committee I, Activity Report 2002, pp. 15–16.
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• Herman Matthijs, “Het jaar van de Veiligheid van de Staat,” in Herman Matthijs, Geheime diensten in België. de Verenigde Staten en over de wereld, p. 27.
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• Standing Committee I, Activity Report 2004, pp. 17–20; Activity Report 2006, p. 10.
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• Standing Committee I, Activity Report 1997, p. 190; Activity Report 2008, p. 49; Lars Bové, De geheimen van de Staatsveiligheid, p. 211–218; Olivier Detez, “Le travail du renseignement et la non-prolifération,” in M. Cools, K. Dassen, R. Libert, and P. Ponsaers, eds., De Staatsveiligheid: Essays over 175 jaar Veiligheid van de Staat, pp. 206–307.
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• Standing Committee I, Activity Report 2005 (Brussels, 2006), p. 27; Standing Committee I, Activity Report 2006, p. 7; Activity Report 2008, pp. 46–49, 53–55.
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• Standing Committee I, Activity Report 2006, pp. 55–57; Activity Report 2009, pp. 30–32, 102; Activity Report 2011, p. 38. An example of an effective information flux: Activity Report 2014, p. 59.
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• Standing Committee I, Activity Report 2014, p. 120.
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• Standing Committee I, Activity Report 1995 (Brussels, 1995), pp. 112–118.
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• Standing Committee I, Activity Report 2010 (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2011), pp. 6–13, 104; Lars Bové, De geheimen van de Staatsveiligheid, pp. 142–146.
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• Standing Committee I, Activity Report 2000, pp. 61–66; Activity Report 2001, p. 82.
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• Standing Committee I, Activity Report 2001, pp. 56, 81–82.
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• Standing Commitee I, Activity Report 2003, p. 139.
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• Standing Committee I, Activity Report 2000, p. 158; Activity Report 2003, pp. 123–124. In 2011 the VSSE drafted its own set of instructions for cooperating with foreign correspondents, as its sister services are called. While praising the initiative, the Standing Committee noted that this was supposed to be done by the Ministerial Committee, and regretted that the service had to fill the void this way. Unfortunately, the VSSE seems to neglect sending the instruction on for the higher authority’s approval: Standing Committee I, Activity Report 2014 (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2015), p. 23, n. 54. ADIV has embarked on a similar document: loc. cit. pp. 112–113. Lars Bové, De geheimen van de Staatsveiligheid, p. 168.
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• Standing Commitee I, Activity Report 2003, pp. 221–224, 226–229d.
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• Standing Committee I, Activity Report 2008 (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2009), pp. 65–66.
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• Standing Committee I, Activity Report 2011 (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2012), p. 39, with VSSE citing, as so often, lack of resources, 112.
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• Ibid., p. 15–16.
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• Ibid., p. 20.
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• Standing Committee I, Activity Report 2012, pp. 22.
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• Standing Committee I, Activity Report 2014, pp. 34, 116; Lars Bové, De geheimen van de Staatsveiligheid, p. 186.
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• Xavier Rousseaux and David Somer, “Pour une histoire de la Surêté de l’Etat en Belgique. Essai autour de 175 années de pénombre,” in M. Cools, K. Dassen, R. Libert, and P. Ponsaers, De Staatsveiligheid: Essays over 175 jaar Veiligheid van de Staat, p. 66. Of their activities little is yet known, since most material remains classified.
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• When a Belgian Army contingent participated with the UN peacekeeping force in Rwanda (UNAMIR) during the 1994 genocide, 10 Belgian soldiers were executed while protecting the residence of Prime Minister Agathe. Handicapped by the lack of an intelligence capacity at the UN command level, the entire situation was handled in an uncoordinated manner. Consequently, the intelligence effort was conducted most inefficiently: Senate, Parlementaire commissie van onderzoek betreffende de gebeurtenissen in Rwanda, 49th Session, 1997, S. Doc. 1–611/7; Standing Committee I, Activity Report 1996 (Brussels, 1996), pp. 128–140, 236.
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• Standing Committee I, Activity Report 2010, pp. 69–72. For example, before and after the assassination of President Kabila in 2001 extensive deliberations were conducted on events in Congo: Standing Committee I, Activity Report 2001, p. 36–37.
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• Herman Matthijs, “Een nieuwe geheime dienst? Het O.C.A.D.,” in Herman Matthijs, ed., Geheime diensten: A Licence to Kill, p. 93, n. 3; De Baets, “Terrorisme en inlichtingendiensten,” p. 254; Danny Stevens, “Van Antiterroristische Gemengde Groep naar Coördinatie-orgaan voor dreigingsanalyse,” in Herman Matthijs, ed., Geheime diensten in België, de Verenigde Staten en over de wereld, pp. 31–38.
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• Stephen Sloan, “The New Terrorist Threat Environment. Continuity and Change in Counter-Terrorism Intelligence,” in Peter Katona, Michael D. Intriligator, and John P. Sullivan, eds., Countering Terrorism and WMD: Creating a Global Counter-Terrorism Network (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 203.
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• Lionel Delval, “Société du risque et gestion des crises: les pouvoirs publics belges sont-ils organises pour faire face à un risque majeur? Type de risque: menace terroriste” in M. Cools, P. Leroy, R. Libert, V. Pashley, D. Stans, E. Testelmans, and K. Van Acker, eds., 1915–2015: Het verhaal van de Belgische militaire inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdienst (Antwerp: Maklu, 2015) pp. 422–423; Stéphane Lefebvre, “The Difficulties and Dilemmas of International Intelligence Cooperation,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 16, No. 4, Winter 2003–2004, at p. 531.
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• Standing Committee I, Activity Report 2002, p. 9 (translated from Dutch by the author).
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• Standing Commitee I, Activity Report 2001, pp. 98, 204; Activity Report 2002, pp. 11–12; Activity Report 2003 (Brussels 2004), pp 17–19.
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• Standing Committee I, Activity Report 2001, p. 204; Activity Report 2004, p. 42.
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• Standing Committee I, Activity Report 2007, p. 28.
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• Jean-Claude Delepière, “Le coordinateur de la qualité du travail de renseignements,” p. 49.
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• Standing Committee I, Activity Report 2012 (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2013), pp. 28–33; Lars Bové, De geheimen van de Staatsveiligheid, pp. 51–54.
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• Standing Committee I, Activity Report 2004, p. 98.
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• Ibid., pp. 92–106.
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• Standing Committee I, Activity Report 2001, pp. 31, 157–158.
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• Ibid., p. 41–45, 128–135; Lars Bové, De geheimen van de Staatsveiligheid, p. 294.
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• The case of the asylum granted to the Tanzim member Khalil Al-Nawawreh in 2002–2003: Standing Commitee I, Activity Report 2003, pp. 239–245.
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• Standing Committee I, Activity Report 2004, p. 10.
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• Standing Committee I, Activity Report 2007, p. 11. Lionel Delval, “Société du risque et gestion des crises,” p. 438.
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• Standing Committee I, Activity Report 2012, pp. 31–33, 97.
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• Kristof Clerix, “Sharia4Belgium helpt strijd tegen radicalisering,” available at http://www.mo.be/artikel/sharia4belgium-helpt-strijd-tegen-radicalisering, accessed 12 October 2015.
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• Standing Committee I, Activity Report 2008, pp. 33–41; Activity Report 2009 (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2010), pp. 31, 37–39. The enactment of the Special Intelligence Methods Law in 2010 greatly extended the intelligence services’ capacities to conduct its investigations: Activity Report 2010 (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2011), pp. 51–73; Lars Bové, De geheimen van de Staatsveiligheid, pp. 236–239, 257; Wauter Van Laethem, “The Belgian Civil Intelligence Service: Roles, Powers, Organisation and Supervision,” European Journal of Intelligence Studies, Vol. 2, 2008, p. 27.
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• Standing Committee I, Activity Report 2011, pp. 22–25, 112; Lars Bové, De geheimen van de Staatsveiligheid, pp. 227–234.
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• Standing Committee I, Activity Report 2006, pp. 37–39; Herman Matthijs, “Het jaar van de Veiligheid van de Staat,” pp. 13–15.
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• This was the case in 1999, with British intelligence information from the Mitrokhin Archive. But under the 1997 protocol ADIV and VSSE did eventually compare and collate their data, with SIS permission: Standing Committee I, Activity Report 2000, p. 92; See also Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The KGB in Europe and the West: The Mitrokhin Archive (London: Penguin, 2000).
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• Herman Matthijs, “Intelligence Services in Belgium,” pp. 572–573; Wauter Van Laethem, “Het Coördinatieorgaan voor de dreigingsanalyse: een punctuele analyse,” Vigiles, Vol. 13, 2007, pp. 109–127; Danny Stevens, “Van Antiterroristische Gemengde Groep naar Coördinatie-orgaan voor dreigingsanalyse,” pp. 39–48.
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• Peter Gill and Mark Phythian, Intelligence in an Unsecure World (Cambridge: Polity, 2012), p. 74; David Omand, Securing the State (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), pp. 41–45; Standing Committee I, Fusion Centres throughout Europe (Antwerp: Intersentia 2010).
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• Standing Committee I, Activity Report 2011, p. 29. On trump card, see Wauter Van Laethem, “Coördinatieorgaan,” p. 127; on envy, see Lars Bové, De geheimen van de Staatsveiligheid, p. 274.
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• Standing Committee I, Activiteitenverslag 2007, pp. 6–9; Lars Bové, De geheimen van de Staatsveiligheid, p. 224.
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• Lars Bové, De geheimen van de Staatsveiligheid, p. 223; Herman Matthijs, “Het jaar van de Veiligheid van de Staat,” pp. 19–20.
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• Standing Committee I, Activity Report 2007, p. 46; Wauter Van Laethem, “Het Coördinatieorgaan voor de dreigingsanalyse: een punctuele analyse,” pp. 121–123; Herman Matthijs, “Intelligence Services in Belgium,” pp. 573–574.
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• Peter Gill and Mark Phythian, Intelligence in an Unsecure World, p. 115.
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• Kenneth Lasoen, “Indications and Warning in Belgium. Brussels is not Delphi,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 40, 2017, DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2017.1288111.
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• Standing Committee I, Activity Report 2007, pp. 11–30, 49.
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• “Ocad-topman André Vandoren stapt op,” De Standaard, 29 September 2015; Lars Bové, De geheimen van de Staatsveiligheid, p. 225.
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• See Jennifer Sims, “Intelligence to Counter Terror. The Importance of All-Source Fusion,” in Loch K. Johnson, Strategic Intelligence IV: Counterintelligence and Counterterrorism. Defending the Nation against Hostile Forces, (London: Praeger, 2007), pp. 144–146; Annette Sobel, “Actionable Intelligence in Support of Homeland Security Operations,” in Peter Katona, Michael D. Intriligator, and John P. Sullivan, eds., Countering Terrorism and WMD, pp. 212–217.
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• Kristof Clerix, “Hoe de overheid teruggekeerde Syriëstrijders opvolgt,” available at http://www.mo.be/analyse/hoe-de-overheid-teruggekeerde-syri-strijders-opvolgt, accessed 12 October 2014.
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• Standing Commitee I, Activity Report 2003, p. 171.
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• Standing Committee I, Activity Report 2006, p. 17. An example of contradictory information hailing from the same office: Activity Report 2008, p. 39. Two advisory notices to Immigration concerning the naturalization of one individual who, according to the first notice, was known to the service for extremist activities (formulated in the present tense), and, according to the second, had been known but had no longer been monitored since the 1980s.
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• Standing Committee I, Activity Report 2009, p. 15.
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• Lars Bové, De geheimen van de Staatsveiligheid, p. 265. On management and human relations, see Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 334–338.
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• Standing Committee I, Activity Report 2010, p. 41. See also Activity Report 2014, p. 117.
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• Standing Committee I, Activity Report 2011, pp. 12, 105.
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• Standing Committee I, Activity Report 2012, pp. 28.
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• Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, pp. 318–319.
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• Standing Committee I, Activity Report 2011, pp. 44–45 with n. 82, 83, 113.
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• Standing Committee I, Activity Report 2014, p. 113.
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• Standing Committee I, Activity Report 2011, p. 40.
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• Recently reviewed as running excellently by the service’s main partners within Belgian Defence and the FPS Foreign Affairs: Standing Committee I, Activity Report 2013 (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2014), pp. 20–21, 114.
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• Standing Committee I, Activity Report 2001, p. 204; Activity Report 2005, p. 81. Lars Bové, De geheimen van de Staatsveiligheid, p. 227.
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• Standing Committee I, Activity Report 2006, pp. 134–135. A protocol was eventually concluded on 27 June 2011: Activity Report 2012, p. 2.
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• Standing Committee I, Activity Report 2001, p. 104.
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• Ibid., pp. 164–166; Activity Report 2003, pp. 187–189, 193.
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• Standing Committee I, Activity Report 2010, pp. 20–23; Wauter Van Laethem, “The Belgian Civil Intelligence Service: Roles, Powers, Organisation and Supervision,” p. 4.
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• Lars Bové, De geheimen van de Staatsveiligheid, pp. 147–149.
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• Standing Committee I, Activity Report 2006, p. 133; Activity Report 2010, p. 26. Herman Matthijs, “Het jaar van de Veiligheid van de Staat,” pp. 6–13.
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• Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, p. 128.
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• Standing Commitee I, Activity Report 2003, p. 19.
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• Belgian Chamber of Representatives, Commission for Justice, 54th Session, 2014, H. Doc. CRIV54/COM040, pp. 23–24.
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• “Staatsveiligheid herschikt haar troepen,” De Tijd, 25 August 2015.
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• “Staatsveiligheid wacht nog steeds op versterking,” De Standaard, 20 November 2015, p. 7.
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• Chamber, Joint Commissions for Justice and the Interior, 2015, pp. 23–24: 85 of those names were Molenbeek; Andrew Higgins, “Terrorism Response Puts Belgium in a Harsh Light,” The New York Times, 24 November 2015.
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• John Gentry, “Assessing Intelligence Performance,” in Loch K. Johnson, ed., Handbook of National Security Intelligence (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 90–91; Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, p. 45; Kenneth Strong, Men of Intelligence, p. 156.
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• Chamber, Joint Commissions for Justice and the Interior, 2015, p. 23. “Onduidelijk waar geld vandaan moet komen,” De Standaard, 20 November 2015, p. 6. And yet three months elapsed before additional budgets were divided: see Dries Bervoet, “Duizend nieuwe agenten voor strijd tegen terreur,” De Tijd, 5 February 2016. As described by Mark Lowenthal, intelligence budgets are on a political roller coaster, and the point that “a sudden increase in funds cannot immediately make up for prolonged shortfalls” is all the more true in Belgium because of the long time-period between the allocation and the actual disponibility of the promised funds: Mark Lowenthal, “The Intelligence-Policymaker Relationship,” in Loch K. Johnson, ed., Handbook of National Security Intelligence, p. 448.
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• Chamber, Joint Commissions for Justice and the Interior, 2016, pp. 7–14, 17–20, 25, 36, 44–45. Joris Van der Aa, “Waarom de Mechelse korpschef belangrijke informatie over terrorist Salah Abdeslam tegenhield,” De Standaard, 15 May 2016.
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• Gregory B. O’Hayon and Daniel R. Morris, “Warning in the Age of WMD Terrorism,” in Peter Katano, Michael D. Intrilligator, and John P. Sullivan, eds., Countering Terrorism and WMD, p. 59.
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• Literature is vast on this subject, be it 9/11, the Falklands War, the fall of the Shah of Iran. See, for example, Robert Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War (Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010); Julian Richards, The Art and Science of Intelligence Analysis (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2010); Richard Betts, Enemies of Intelligence. Knowledge and Power in American National Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); Michael Goodman, “The Dog that Didn’t Bark: The Joint Intelligence Committee and Warning of Aggression,” Cold War History, Vol. 7, 2007, pp. 529–551; and Lawrence Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 184–215; Daniel Byman, “Strategic Surprise and the September 11 Attacks,” Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 7, 2005, pp. 145–170; Amy Zegart, “September 11 and the Adaptation Failure of U.S. Intelligence Agencies, “International Security, Vol. 19, 2005, pp. 78–111.
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• Stephen Sloan, “The New Terrorist Threat Environment,” p. 208.
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• David Stans, “Le Comité permanent R dans sa relation avec le Parlement et certains acteurs du pouvoir exécutif: cohérence ou incohérence?” Ph.D. dissertation, Université de Liège, 2014, pp. 352–355.
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• Els Witte, Jan Craeybeckx, and Alain Meynen, Politieke geschiedenis van België van 1830 tot heden (Antwerp: Standaard Uitgeverij, 2005).
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• Lars Bové, De geheimen van de Staatsveiligheid, pp. 274–275.
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• Kingdom of Belgium, Royal Decree of 8 September 2015 Modifying various Royal Decrees Concerning the Denomination “National Security Council”; Royal Decree of 2 June 2015 creating the Strategic Committee and the Coordination Committee for Intelligence and Security, Belgian Official Journal, Vol. 185, No. 143, pp. 32611–32612.
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• The political party dominating the government, Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie, took its cues on various policy issues from then-Prime Minister David Cameron and the Conservative Party in Britain, which established a National Security Council and Adviser upon assuming power: Philip H. J. Davies, “Twilight of Joint Intelligence Committee?” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 24, No. 3, Fall 2011, pp. 426–446, at pp. 437–439; Peter Hennessy, The Secret State: Whitehall and the Cold War (London: Allen Lane, 2004), pp. 383–384, 398.
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• Koen Geens and Jan Jambon, Kadernota Integrale Veiligheid 2016–2019 (Brussels, 2016); Willy Bruggeman and Wim Hardyns, “De aanpak van radicalisme,” p. 21. In a similar vein, the four-year National Security Plan traditionally focuses solely on police activity. In December commitments were made about a national intelligence plan to improve cooperation, promised for July 2016, but were not heard of since: Belgian Chamber of Representatives, Commission for National Defence, 54th Session, 2015, H. Doc. CRIV54/COM288, p. 2.
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