2,913
Views
1
CrossRef citations to date
0
Altmetric
Articles

North Korea, missile defense, and U.S.-China security dilemma

&

References

  • Acton, J. (February 23, 2017). Testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing on “China’s Advanced Weapons.”
  • Acton, J. (2018). Escalation through entanglement: How the vulnerability of command-and-control systems raises the risks of an inadvertent nuclear war. International Security, 43(1), 56–99. doi:https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00320
  • Bi, J. (2002). Uncertain courses: Theatre missile defense and cross-strait competition. Journal of Strategic Studies, 25(3), 109–160. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390412331302795
  • Brooks, L., & Rapp-Hooper, M. (2013). Extended deterrence, assurance, and reassurance in the Pacific during the second nuclear age. In A. J. Tellis, A. M. Denmark, & T. Tanner (Eds.) Strategic Asia 2013-14: Asia in the Second Nuclear Age (pp. 266–300). The National Bureau of Asian Research.
  • Chan, M. (2018, January 1). China fires up new hypersonic missile challenge to US defences. South China Morning Post.
  • Chase, M., Erickson, A., & Yeaw, C. (2009). Chinese theater and strategic missile force modernization and its implications for the United States. Journal of Strategic Studies, 32(1), 67–114. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390802407434
  • Chase, M. S., Garafola, C. L., & Beauchamp-Mustafaga, N. (2018). Chinese perceptions of and responses to US conventional military power. Asian Security, 14 (2), 136–154. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2017.1301931
  • Christensen, T. (1999). China, the US-Japan alliance, and the security dilemma in East Asia. International Security, 23(4), 49–80. doi:https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.23.4.49
  • Christensen, T. (2002). The contemporary security dilemma: Deterring a Taiwan conflict. The Washington Quarterly, 25(4), 5–21. doi:https://doi.org/10.1162/016366002760252509
  • Cossa, R., Glosserman, B., & Pottinger, M. (2011). Progress despite disagreements: The sixth China-US strategic dialogue on strategic nuclear dynamics. Issues and Insights, 12(5), 1–20.
  • Cossa, R., Glosserman, B., & Santoro, D. (2015). US-China strategic nuclear relations: Time to move to track-1 dialogue. Issues and Insights, 15(7), 1–12.
  • Cossa, R., Glosserman, B., & Santoro, D. (2016). Reaching an inflection point? The tenth China-US dialogue on strategic nuclear dynamics. Issues and Insights, 16(20), 1–18.
  • Cui, L. (2006). Chaoxianbandao anquan wenti: Zhongguo de zuoyong [The question of security of the Korean peninsula: The role of China]. Xiandai guoji guanxi [Contemporary International Affairs], 9, 42–47.
  • Cunningham, F. S., & Fravel, M. T. (2015). Assuring assured retaliation: China’s nuclear posture and U.S.-China strategic stability. International Security, 40(2), 7–50. doi:https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00215
  • Cunningham, F. S., & Fravel, M. T. (2019). Dangerous confidence? Chinese views on nuclear escalation. International Security, 44(2), 61–109. doi:https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00359
  • Erickson, A. (2016). Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) development: Drivers, trajectories, and strategic implications. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press.
  • Fravel, M. T., & Medeiros, E. S. (2010). China’s search for assured retaliation: The evolution of Chinese nuclear strategy and force structure. International Security, 35(2), 48–87. doi:https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00016
  • Gartzke, E., & Lindsay, J. R. (2017). Thermonuclear cyberwar. Journal of Cybersecurity, 3(1), 37–48.
  • Garver, J. W., & Wang, F. L. (2010). China’s Anti-encirclement Struggle. Asian Security, 6(3), 238–261. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2010.507412
  • Gertz, B. (2014, August 19). China secretly conducts second flight test of new ultra high speed missile. Washington Free Beacon.
  • Glaser, C. L. (1985). Do we want the missile defenses we can build? International Security, 10(1), 25–57. doi:https://doi.org/10.2307/2538789
  • Glaser, C. L. (2010). Rational theory of international politics: The logic of competition and cooperation. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
  • Glaser, C. L., & Fetter, S. (2001). National missile defense and the future of US nuclear weapons policy. International Security, 26(1), 40–92. doi:https://doi.org/10.1162/016228801753212859
  • Glosny, M. A. (2004). Strangulation from the Sea? A PRC submarine blockade of Taiwan. International Security, 28(4), 125–160. doi:https://doi.org/10.1162/0162288041588269
  • Glosny, M. A., Twomey, C., & Jacobs, R. (2013). US-China strategic dialogue: Phase VII report. Monterey, Naval Postgraduate School.
  • Glosny, M. A., Twomey, C., & Jacobs, R. (2014). US–China strategic dialogue: Phase VIII report. Monterey, Naval Postgraduate School and the Pacific Forum CSIS.
  • Goldstein, L., & Murray, W. (2004). Undersea dragons: China’s maturing submarine force. International Security, 28(4), 161–196. doi:https://doi.org/10.1162/0162288041588304
  • Gong, K. (2012). The Korea-US alliance from a Chinese perspective. Asian Perspective, 36(2), 309–330. doi:https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2012.0012
  • Grego, L., Lewis, G., & Wright, D. (2016). Shielded from oversight: The disastrous US approach to strategic missile defense. Union of Concerned Scientists.
  • Han, M. (1999). Imjinwaeran gwa hanchung kwan’gye [The Hideyoshi invasions of Korea and Sino-Korean relations]. Seoul: Yŏksapip‘yŏngsa.
  • Haney, C. (2016, July 14). Testimony before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces.
  • Heginbotham, E., Chase, M. S., Heim, J. L., Lin, B., Cozad, M. R., Morris, L. J., … Berkowitz, S. K. (2017). China’s evolving nuclear deterrent: Major drivers and issues for the United States. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation.
  • Hyten, J. (2018, March 20). Statement of John E. Hyten Commander United States strategic command before the senate committee on armed services.
  • Jervis, R. (1976). Perception and misperception in international politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
  • Jervis, R. (1978). Cooperation under the security dilemma. World Politics, 30(2), 167–214. doi:https://doi.org/10.2307/2009958
  • Jervis, R. (1998). System effects. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
  • Jervis, R. (2001). Was the Cold War a security dilemma? Journal of Cold War Studies, 3(1), 36–60. doi:https://doi.org/10.1162/15203970151032146
  • Jervis, R. (2002). Signaling and perception: drawing inferences and projecting images. In K. Monroe (Ed.), Political psychology (pp. 293–312). Erlbaum: Mahwah,
  • Johnson, J. (2017). Washington’s perceptions and misperceptions of Beijing’s Anti-Access Area-Denial (A2-AD) ‘strategy’: Implications for military escalation control and strategic stability. The Pacific Review, 30 (3), 271–288. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2016.1239129
  • Johnson, J. (2019). Chinese evolving approaches to nuclear “war-fighting”: An emerging intense US–China security dilemma and threats to crisis stability in the Asia Pacific. Asian Security, 15(3), 215–232. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2018.1443915
  • Johnson, J. (2020). Delegating strategic decision-making to machines: Dr. Strangelove Redux? Journal of Strategic Studies, 43(5), 1–39.
  • Kang, Z. (2016). Gaochaoshengsu dianzizhan xuqiu qianxi [Analysis of EW Requirements on Hypersonic Weapons]. Dianzixinxi duikang jishu [Electronic Information Warfare Technology], 31(2), 7–10.
  • Korda, M., & Kristensen, H. (2019, January 17). Mixed messages on Trump’s Missile defense review. Federation of American Scientists. https://fas.org/blogs/security/2019/01/mixed-messages-on-trumps-missile-defense-review/
  • Kristensen, H. M., & Norris, R. S. (2015). Chinese nuclear forces. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 71(4), 77–84.
  • Kristensen, H. M. (2015, May 11). Pentagon report: China deploys MIRV missile. Federation of American Scientists. https://fas.org/blogs/security/2015/05/china-mirv/
  • Lewis, J. G. (2007). The minimum means of reprisal: China’s search for security in the nuclear age. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
  • Lewis, J. G. (2016). China’s belated embrace of MIRVs. In M. Krepon, S. Mason, & T. Wheeler (Eds.), The lures and pitfalls of MIRVs: From the first to the second nuclear age (pp. 95–119). Washington DC: Stimson Center.
  • Li, B. (2016). The security dilemma and THAAD deployment in the ROK. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/2013/02/04/what-china-s-missile-intercept-test-means-pub-50833
  • Liao, S. (2017). Sade ru Han yu Zhongguo dongbeiya deyuan "anquan kunjing" de jiaju ji yingdui [THAAD in South Korea and China’s response to the intensification of security dilemma in Northeast Asia]. Dongjiang xuekan [Dongjiang Journal], 34(3), 101–106.
  • Lieber, K. A., & Press, D. G. (2017). The new era of counterforce: Technological change and the future of nuclear deterrence. International Security, 41(4), 9–49. doi:https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00273
  • Liff, A. P., & Ikenberry, G. J. (2014). Racing toward tragedy? China’s rise, military competition in the Asia Pacific, and the security dilemma. International Security, 39(2), 52–91. doi:https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00176
  • Liff, A. P. (2018). China and the US alliance system. The China Quarterly, 233, 137–165. doi:https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741017000601
  • Lindsey, E., Glosney, M., & Twomey, C. (2011). US-China strategic dialogue: Phase VI report. Naval Postgraduate School.
  • Liu, C. (2015). An analysis of US motives behind THAAD deployment in South Korea. Contemporary International Relations, 4, 129–153.
  • Liu, S., Liu, C., & Shen, X. (2011). Meiguo daodan fangyu xitong fazhan dongxiang ji duice sikao [The missile defense development of USA and corresponding countermeasures]. Xiandai fangyu jishu [Modern Defense Technology], 39(3), 1–4.
  • Liu, S., & Wu, C. (2015). Cong baquan wendinglun kan Meiguo de yatai zai pingheng zhanlue: Jianlun Zhongguo de yingdui zhice [The US’ “Rebalance to Asia” strategy from the perspective of hegemony stability theory: Discussion on China’s reponses]. Dongbeiya luntan [Northeast Asia Forum], 24(5), 71–83.
  • Liu, X., & Huo, X. (2007). Zhongguo zai chaoxianbandao de diyuan anquan zhanlue fenxi [An analysis of China’s geopolitical security strategy in the Korean Peninsula]. Dongbeiya Luntan [Northeast Asia Forum], 16(5), 50–56.
  • Logan, D. C. (2020). Are they reading schelling in Beijing? The dimensions, drivers, and risks of nuclear-conventional entanglement in China. Journal of Strategic Studies, 1–51. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2020.1844671
  • Luo, K. (2005). Mei daodan fangyu jihua yu wo zhuangbei fazhan duice yanjiu [A study on equipment development countermeasure for US BMD]. Zhuangbei zhihui jishu xueyuan xuebao [Journal of the Academy of Equipment Command and Technology], 16(2), 61–64.
  • Masterson, J. (2019, November). China shows off new missiles. Washington DC: Arms Control Association.
  • Mercer, J. (2010). Emotional beliefs. International Organization, 64(1), 1–31. doi:https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818309990221
  • Montgomery, E. (2013). Competitive strategies against continental powers: The geopolitics of Sino-Indian-American relations. Journal of Strategic Studies, 36(1), 76–100. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2012.736383
  • Morgan, F. E. (2013). Crisis stability and long-range strike: A comparative analysis of fighters, bombers, and missiles. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation.
  • Nathan, A. J., & Scobell, A. (2012). China’s search for security. New York: Columbia University Press.
  • Oelrich, I. (2019, December 17). Hypersonic missiles: Three questions every reader should ask. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
  • O’Rourke, R. (2020). Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) program: Background and issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service. RL33745.
  • Pu, X., & Schweller, R. (2014). Status signaling, multiple audiences, and China’s blue-water naval ambition. In R. L. in T. V. Paul, D. W. Larson, & W. C. Wohlforth (Eds.), Status in world politics (pp. 141–165). New York: Cambridge University Press.
  • Qi, H. (2016). Sade ru Han yu Meiguo yatai fandao buju de zhanshu yu zhanlue kaoliang [Analysis of the tactical and strategic consideration behind THAAD in South Korea and US missile defense arrangement in the Asia-Pacific]. Xiandai guoji guanxi [Contemporary International Relations], 7, 13–21.
  • Rinehart, I. E., Hildreth, S. A., & Lawrence, S. V. (1995). Ballistic Missile Defense in the Asia Pacific Region: Cooperation and Opposition. Congressional Research Service R43116. Washington DC. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R43116.pdf
  • Roberts, B. (2003). China and ballistic missile defense: 1955 to 2002 and beyond. Alexandria: Institute for Defense Analyses.
  • Roberts, B. (2014). On the strategic value of ballistic missile defense. Proliferation Papers, 50, 1-35.
  • Roberts, B. (2015). The case for U.S. nuclear weapons in the 21st century. Stanford: Stanford Security Studies.
  • Saalman, L. (2013). The China factor. In A. Arbatov, D. Dvorkin, & N. Bubnova (Eds.), Missile defense: confrontation and cooperation. Carnegie Moscow Center.
  • Saalman, L. (2014). Prompt global strike: China and the Spear. Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies.
  • Sankaran, J., & Fearey, B. L. (2017). Missile defense and strategic stability: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) in South Korea. Contemporary Security Policy, 38(3), 321–344. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2017.1280744
  • Schneider, J. (2019). The capability/vulnerability paradox and military revolutions: Implications for computing, cyber, and the onset of war. Journal of Strategic Studies, 42(6), 841–863. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2019.1627209
  • Shi, Y. (2000). Meiguo guojia daodan fangyu jihua yu Zhongguo de keyou he yingyou duice [US National Missile Defense and China’s possible policy choices]. Haerbin gongye daxue xuebao [Journal of HIT, Social Sciences Edition], 2(3), 12–16.
  • Shi, Y. (2010). Aobama de dongya zhengce yu diqu goujian [Barack Obama’s East Asian policies and regional construction]. Heping yu fazhan [Peace and Development], 1, 31–66.
  • Silove, N. (2016). The pivot before the pivot: U.S. strategy to preserve the power balance in Asia. International Security, 40(4), 45–88. doi:https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00238
  • Steff, R. (2016). Strategic thinking, deterrence and the US ballistic missile defense project: From Truman to Obama. New York: Routledge.
  • Steff, R., & Khoo, N. (2014). Hard balancing in the age of American unipolarity: The Russian response to US ballistic missile defense during the bush administration (2001–2008). Journal of Strategic Studies, 37(2), 222–258. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2013.866556
  • Stokes, M. (2009). China’s evolving conventional strategic strike capability: The anti-ship ballistic missile challenge to US maritime operations in the Western Pacific and beyond. Project 2049 Institute.
  • Stokes, M. (2017, February 23). Testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission.
  • Talmadge, C. (2019). The U.S.-China nuclear relationship: Why competition is likely to intensify. Brookings Institution.
  • Tang, S. (2009). The security dilemma: A conceptual analysis. Security Studies, 18(3), 587–623. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410903133050
  • Twomey, C. (2015). China’s Offensive Missile Forces. Testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission.
  • Twomey, C. P., Chase, M. S., Kelleher, C., & Dombrowski, P. (2015). Regional missile defense from a global perspective. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
  • Twomey, C. P., Lavoy, P. R., & Stone, E. L. (2005). US-China Strategic Dialogue. Naval Postgraduate School.
  • Twomey, C. P., & Shelor, K. (2008). US-China Strategic Dialogue, Phase III. Naval Postgraduate School.
  • U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commission. (2017). 2017 Report to Congress of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Washington DC.
  • U.S. Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee. (2018). Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018, 115th Cong., 2nd sess.
  • U.S. Department of Defense. (2001). Nuclear Posture Review Report. Washington DC. U.S.
  • Department of Defense. (2010a). Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report. Washington DC.
  • U.S. Department of Defense. (2010b). Nuclear Posture Review Report. Washington DC.
  • U.S. Department of Defense. (2018a). Nuclear Posture Review Report. Washington DC.
  • U.S. Department of Defense (2018b). 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America. Washington DC.
  • U.S. Department of Defense. (2019). Missile Defense Review 2019. Washington DC.
  • U.S. Office of Secretary of Defense. (2019). Annual Report to Congress Military and Security Development Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019.
  • U.S. Office of Secretary of Defense. (2015). Annual Report to Congress: Military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China 2015.
  • U.S. Senate. (1998). “The Rumsfeld Commission Report,” Congressional Record, daily ed., 105th Cong. 2nd sess.
  • Van Evera, S. (1999). Causes of war: Power and the roots of conflict. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
  • Walt, S. (2013). Dealing with a Chinese Monroe Doctrine. The New York Times, 2.
  • Wang, Z. (2014). Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical memory in Chinese Politics and foreign relations. New York: Columbia University Press.
  • White House. (2001). Remarks by the President to Students and Faculty at National Defense University. 
  • White House. (2003). National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD 23. National Policy on Ballistic Missile Defense.
  • White House. (2019). Remarks by President Trump and Vice President Pence Announcing the Missile Defense Review.
  • Williams, H. (2019). Asymmetric arms control and strategic stability: Scenarios for limiting hypersonic glide vehicles. Journal of Strategic Studies, 42(6), 789–813. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2019.1627521
  • Wu, R. (2013). China’s anxiety about US missile defence: A solution. Survival, 55(5), 29–52.
  • Wu, X. (2013). Aobama zhengfu yu yataidiqu zhixu [The Obama administration and Asia Pacific Regional Order]. Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics], 8, 54–67.
  • Xin, Q. (2009). Dongya yitihua yu Meiguo de zhanlue yingdui [East Asian Integration and the Strategic Countermeasure of the US]. Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics], 6, 47–55.
  • Yang, S., & Liu, X. (2019, October 1). DF-17 ballistic missile makes debut at National Day Parade. Global Times.
  • Yarhi-Milo, K. (2014). Knowing the Adversary: Leaders, Intelligence, and Assessment of Intentions in International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
  • Yeo, M. (2019). China Unveils Drones, Missiles and Hypersonic Glide Vehicle at Military Parade. Defense News.
  • Yoichi, K. (2012, October 5). Interview with Wang Jisi: China Deserves More Respect as a First-class Power. The Asahi Shimbun.
  • Zhang, B. (2008). The Taiwan Strait and the future of China’s no-first-use nuclear policy. Comparative Strategy, 27(2), 164–182. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/01495930801944701
  • Zhang, B. (2015). China's Assertive Nuclear Posture: State Security in an Anarchic International Order. Routledge.
  • Zhang, H. (2012, July 15). China's nuclear weapons modernization: Intentions, drivers, and trends. A paper presented at Institute for Nuclear Materials Management, 53rd Annual Meeting, Orlando (Vol. 15).
  • Zhao, T., & Li, B. (2017). The underappreciated risks of entanglement: A Chinese perspective. In M. J. Acton, A. Alexey, D. Vladimir, P. Topychkanov, and B. Li (Eds.), Entanglement: Chinese and Russian perspectives on non-nuclear weapons and nuclear risks. (pp. 47–75). Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
  • Zhou, F. (2013). Meiguo de yatai tongmengtixi yu Zhoungguo de yingdui” [The US Asia-Pacific Alliance System and China’s policy options]. Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics], 11, 4–24.
  • Zhou, J. (2015). Dongmeng lilun yu meiguo “chongfanyatai” tongmeng zhanlue yingdui [Coping with America’s alliance strategy within the context of the re-balancing to Asia and the Pacific]. Dangdai yazhou [Journal of Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies], 4, 26–54.

Reprints and Corporate Permissions

Please note: Selecting permissions does not provide access to the full text of the article, please see our help page How do I view content?

To request a reprint or corporate permissions for this article, please click on the relevant link below:

Academic Permissions

Please note: Selecting permissions does not provide access to the full text of the article, please see our help page How do I view content?

Obtain permissions instantly via Rightslink by clicking on the button below:

If you are unable to obtain permissions via Rightslink, please complete and submit this Permissions form. For more information, please visit our Permissions help page.