References
- Adams, N. A. IV. (1996). Monkey see, monkey do: Imitating Japan’s industrial policy in the United States. Texas International Law Journal, 31(3), 527–560.
- Akimoto, D. (2021, December 16). What to expect from Japan’s ‘economic security legislation’: The Kishida administration has emphasized economic security, but what does it mean? The Diplomat. Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2021/12/what-to-expect-from-japans-economic-security-legislation/.
- Amador, J., & Cabral, S. (2016). Global value chains: A survey of drivers and measures. Journal of Economic Surveys, 30(2), 278–301. doi:10.1111/joes.12097
- Amsden, A. H. (1989). Asia’s next giant: South Korea and late industrialization. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Armstrong, S., & Urata, M. (2021, March 2021). Japan first? Economic security in a world of uncertainty. AJRC Working Paper. Australia-Japan Research Centre, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University, Canberra.
- Baldwin, D. A. (1985). Economic statecraft. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Bals, L., Kirchoff, J. F., & Foerstl, K. (2016). Exploring the reshoring and insourcing decision making process: Toward an agenda for future research. Operations Management Research, 9(3–4), 102–116. doi:10.1007/s12063-016-0113-0
- Carroll, T. & Jarvis, D. (Eds.). (2017). Asia after the developmental state: Disembedding autonomy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- China Business Network (Diyi caijing). (2022, January 17). 美国制造业会继续回流吗︱北大国际经济观察 [Meiguo zhizaoye hui jixu huiliuma Will reshoring to US continue?]. Retrieved from https://cacs.mofcom.gov.cn/cacscms/article/zjdy?articleId=171931&type=.
- China News Agency. (2022a, January 13). 商务部:2021年中国引资规模再创历史新高 [2021nian zhongguo yinzi kuimo zaichuang lishixingao China broke another record in attracting foreign capital]. Retrieved from http://www.scio.gov.cn/xwfbh/xwbfbh/wqfbh/47673/47722/xgbd47729/Document/1718952/1718952.htm.
- China News Agency. (2022b, January 25). 2022年, 中国外贸、外资、消费前景如何?[2022nian zhongguo waimao waizi xiaofei qianjing ruhe China’s prospects in foreign trade, FDI and consumption in 2022]. Retrieved from https://www.chinanews.com.cn/cj/2022/01-25/9661620.shtml.
- Cho, K.-W. (2017, July 6). In first half of 2017, THAAD retaliation caused $4.3 billion in losses for S. Korean companies. Hankyoreh. Retrieved from https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_business/801752.html.
- Curran, L., & Eckhardt, J. (2021). Why COVID-19 will not lead to major restructuring of global value chains. Management and Organization Review, 17(2), 407–411. doi:10.1017/mor.2021.18
- De Backer, K., Menon, C., Desnoyers-James, I., & Moussiegt, L. (2016). Reshoring: Myth or reality? OECD Science, Technology and Industry Policy Papers, 27. Paris: OECD Publishing. doi:10.1787/5jm56frbm38s-en
- Economist. (2021, June 12). Foreigners inside the Great Wall. Retrieved from https://www.economist.com/china/2021/06/10/foreigners-rush-inside-the-great-wall.
- Etzkowitz, H. (1994). Technology centers and industrial Policy: The emergence of the interventionist state in the USA. Science and Public Policy, 21(2), 79–87. doi:10.1093/spp/21.2.79
- European Union Chamber of Commerce in China. (2021, June 8). European Business in China: Business Confidence Survey 2021. Beijing: European Union Chamber of Commerce in China.
- Farrell, H., & Newman, A. L. (2019). Weaponized Interdependence: How global economic networks shape state coercion. International Security, 44(1), 42–79. doi:10.1162/isec_a_00351
- Fish, A., & Spillane, H. (2020, July 23). Reshoring advanced manufacturing supply chains to generate good jobs. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution.
- Fratocchi, L., Ancarani, A., Barbieri, P., Di Mauro, C., Nassimbeni, G., Sartor, M., … Zanoni, A. (2016). Motivations of manufacturing reshoring: an interpretative framework. International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management, 46(2), 98–127. doi:10.1108/IJPDLM-06-2014-0131
- Gereffi, G. (2014). A global value chain perspective on industrial policy and development in emerging markets. Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law, 24, 433–458.
- Haggard, S. (2018). Developmental states. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Herman, A. (2019). America needs an industrial policy. American Affairs, 3(4). Retrieved from https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2019/11/america-needs-an-industrial-policy/.
- Hirschman, A. O. (1945). National power and the structure foreign trade. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Igata, A., & Glosserman, B. (2021). Japan’s new economic statecraft. The Washington Quarterly, 44(3), 25–42. doi:10.1080/0163660X.2021.1970334
- Iida, K. (2017). Japan’s security and economic dependence on China and the United States: Cool politics, lukewarm economics. London: Routledge.
- Irwin, D. A. (2020, October 20). Memo to the Biden administration on how to rethink industrial policy. Peterson Institute for International Economics. Retrieved from https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/memo-biden-administration-how-rethink-industrial-policy.
- JBIC. (2021). わが国製造業企業の海外事業展開に関する調査報告 [Wagakuni seizo kigyo no kaigai tenkai ni kansuru chosa houkoku [Report on the overseas operations of Japanese manufacturing companies], 33. Retrieved from https://www.jbic.go.jp/ja/information/press/press-2021/1224-015678.html.
- Johnson, C. (1982). MITI and the Japanese miracle: The growth of industrial policy, 1925–1975. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Jones, R. W. (2000). A framework for fragmentation. Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, 00-056(2). Tinbergen Institute.
- Jun, I., & Moon, S. (2011). 한국의 해외진출기업 국내로의 U턴 결정요인 분석과 시사점: 중국, 베트남, 인도네시아 진출 기업을 중심으로 [hangugui haeoejinchulgieob gugnaeloui Uturn gyeoljeongyoin bunseokgwa sisajeom: jungkuk, vietnam, indonesia jinchul gieopul jungsimero [A study on the determinants of U-turn to South Korea and its implications: Focusing on foreign subsidiaries in China, Vietnam, and Indonesia]. GRI Review, Gyeonggi Research Institute, 13(1), 5–28.
- Kaneko, K., & Nakagawa, I. (2020, October 29). Wary of security issues, Japan’s government moves to shut China out of its drone supply chain. Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-china-technology/wary-of-security-issues-japans-government-moves-to-shut-china-out-of-its-drone-supply-chain-idUSKBN27F01L.
- Katada, S. N. (2020). Japan’s new regional reality: Geoeconomic strategy in the Asia-Pacific. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Keidanre. (2015, September 8). 平成28年度税制改正に関する提言 [Heisei 28 nento zeisei kaisei ni kansuru Teigen Policy recommendation related to changes in tax laws starting in 2016] Keidanren Policy and Action. Retrieved from https://www.keidanren.or.jp/policy/2015/075.html.
- Keohane, R. O., & Nye, J. S. (1989). Power and interdependence (2nd ed.). Boston, MA: Scott, Foresman.
- Kikuchi, H. (2018, February 26). 製造業の国内回帰に過度な期待は禁物 [Seizogyo no kokunai kaiki ni kadona kitai ha kinnmotsu Do not expect too much of manufacturing reshoring]. Research Focus, The Japan Research Institute Ltd., No. 2017-034.
- Kim, Y.-H. (2021). Interactions between Japan’s weaponized interdependence and Korea’s responses: ‘Decoupling from Japan’ vs. ‘decoupling from Japanese firms’. International Trade, Politics and Development, 5(1), 19–31. doi:10.1108/ITPD-11-2020-0082
- Kim, J. (2020, October 8). 리쇼어링 기업 지원정책의 문제점 및 개선방안 [Reshoring gieob jiwon jeongchaegui munjejeom mit gaeseonbangan [Problems and improvement measures of support for reshoring companies]. Seoul: National Assembly Research Service.
- Kim, K.-H. (2017, October 23). Korea’s reshoring policy far from effective. Korea Herald. Retrieved from http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20171023000618.
- Korean Law Information Center. (2013). Act on assistance to Korean off-shore enterprises in repatriation. Retrieved from https://www.law.go.kr/engLsSc.do?menuId=1&subMenuId=21&tabMenuId=117&query=%ED%95%B4%EC%99%B8%EC%A7%84%EC%B6%9C%EA%B8%B0%EC%97%85#.
- Lim, D. J., & Ferguson, V. A. (2022). Informal economic sanctions: The political economy of Chinese coercion during the THAAD dispute. Review of International Political Economy, 29(5), 1525–1548. doi:10.1080/09692290.2021.1918746
- METI. (2011, November 29). 平成23年度 3次補正予算「国内立地推進事業費補助金」の公募について [Heisei 23 nendo 3 ji hosei yosan kokunai ricchi suishin jugyo hojokin no koubo ni tsuite; Call for the subsidy for projects promoting domestic location in relation to the 3rd supplementary budget of Heisei 23]. Retrieved from https://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/3192126/www.meti.go.jp/information/data/c111128bj.html.
- METI. (2018, May 2). Industrial Competitiveness Enhancement Act. Retrieved from https://www.meti.go.jp/english/policy/economy/industrial_competitiveness_act/index.html.
- METI. (2021, February 21). Cabinet decision on the Bill for Partially Amending the Industrial Competitiveness Enhancement Act and other related acts. Retrieved from https://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2021/0205_002.html.
- METI. (2022, April 7). サプライチェーン対策のための国内投資促進事業費補助金 [sapurai chen taisaku no tameno kokunai toushi sokushin jigyohi hojokin; Domestic investment promotion subsidy for supply chain measures]. Retrieved from https://www.meti.go.jp/covid-19/supplychain/index.html.
- Miller, J. C., Walton, T. F., Kovacic, W. E., & Rabkin, J. A. (1984). Industrial policy: Reindustrialization through competition or coordinated action? Yale Journal on Regulation, 2(1), 1–37.
- Min, H., Moon, J., Kang, J., & An, Y. (2021). 리쇼어링 추진전략 과제 [Reshoring chujinjeonryak guaje Strategies for Reshoring]. KIET Issue Paper, Seoul: Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade.
- MOF. (2020, April 24). Rules and regulations of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act. Retrieved from https://www.mof.go.jp/english/international_policy/fdi/kanrenshiryou01_20200424.pdf.
- Mulder, N. (2022). The economic weapon: The rise of sanctions as a tool of modern war. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Mullen, J. (2017, March 3). China’s ‘unofficial’ sanctions rattle South Korea. CNN, Retrieved from https://money.cnn.com/2017/03/03/news/economy/china-south-korea-thaad-tourism-trade-sanctions/index.html?iid=EL.
- Nam, H.-W. (2020, May. 4). COVID-19 to lead to protectionism in global supply chain. Retrieved from https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/tech/2021/06/129_288886.html
- Nikkei Shimbun. (2012, October 20). 国内立地補助金、被災地外が9割超 [kokunai ricchi hojokin hisaichigai ga 9 wari cho: More than 90 percent of the subsidy for projects promoting domestic location spent outside of the disaster-affected area]. Retrieved from https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXNASFS1903L_Z11C12A0PP8000/.
- Nikkei Shimbun. (2022, November 16). 2次補正の半導体支援策、日米研究拠点に3500億円: 先端品生産へ4500億円 [dainiji hosei no handotai shensaku: nichibei kenkyu kyoten ni 3500 okuen: sentan hin seisann e 4500 okuen: Semiconductor policy in the 2nd supplementary budget: ¥350 billon for centers of R&D, and ¥450 billion for production of cutting edge products]. Retrieved from https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGKKZO65763180W2A101C2MM8000/.
- Noland, M., & Pack, H. (2003). Industrial policy in an era of globalization: Lessons from Asia. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.
- Norris, W. J. (2016). Chinese economic statecraft: Commercial actors, grand strategy, and state control. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Norton, R. D. (1986). Industrial policy and American renewal. Journal of Economic Literature, 24(1), 1–40.
- Pan, H., & Zhu, D. (2019). The ‘manufacturing reshoring’ strategy in the United States and its implications to China. Eurasian Journal of Economics and Finance, 7(3), 1–14. doi:10.15604/ejef.2019.07.03.001
- Park, Y.-B., & Lee, E.-J. (2019, August 28). Hyundai Mobis makes the biggest reshoring case via EV Battery system plan. Retrieved from https://pulsenews.co.kr/view.php?year=2019&no=672845.
- Park, E.-H. (2021, May 30). Hyundai motors sells Chinese plant after missile shield spat. Joongang Daily. Retrieved from https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2021/05/30/business/industry/Hyundai-Motor-China-Li-Xiang/20210530180500734.html.
- Pesek, W. (2015, April 19). Toyota delivers a blow to Abe’s ‘reshoring’ plan. Japan Times. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2015/04/19/commentary/japan-commentary/toyota-delivers-blow-abes-reshoring-plan/.
- Prime Minister’s Office. (2020, March 5). Council on investments for the future. Retrieved from https://japan.kantei.go.jp/98_abe/actions/202003/_00009.html.
- Reich, R. B. (1982, January–February). Why the U.S. needs an industrial policy. Harvard Business Review, 74–81.
- Science and Technology Daily. (2022, January 18). 2021年我国GDP突破110万亿 高质量发展取得新成效 [2021nian woguo GDP tupo 110wanyi gaozhiliang fazhan qude xinchangxiao China’s GDP broke 110 trillion and high quality development scored new results]. http://finance.people.com.cn/n1/2022/0118/c1004-32333881.html.
- Solingen, E. (Ed.). (2021). Geopolitics, supply chains, and international relations in East Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Solís, M. (2004). Banking on Multinationals: Public Credit and the Export of Japanese Sunset Industries. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Solís, M. (2021, March 24). Japan’s balancing act: Interdependence and economic security. Paper presented at ‘Japan, the United States, and the Future of World Order. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs, SAIS.
- Stentoft, J., Olhager, J., Heikkilä, J., & Thoms, L. (2016). Manufacturing backshoring: A systemic literature review. Operations Management Research, 9(3–4), 53–61. doi:10.1007/s12063-016-0111-2
- Sturgeon, T. J. (2000). How do we define value chains and production networks? MIT, Working Paper series/Industrial Performance Center, 2000/011. Retrieved from https://ipc.mit.edu/sites/default/files/2019-01/00-011.pdf.
- Tsutsumi, T. (2014). チャイナ・リスクと中国経済並びに中国における日本企業の動向 [Chaina risuku to chogoku keizai narabini chugoku ni okeru nihon kigyo no doko China risk and the trend of the Chinese economy and Japanese firms in China. In Japan Institute of International Affairs (Ed.), Chaina risuku to Chiiki keizai togo ni muketa torikumi China Risk and Moves towards Regional Economic Integration].
- UNCTAD. (2020a). World Investment Report 2020. Geneva: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
- UNCTAD. (2020b, June 16). COVID-19 will likely transform global production, says UN report. UNCTAD. Retrieved from https://unctad.org/news/covid-19-will-likely-transform-global-production-says-un-report.
- UNCTAD. (2021). World Investment Report 2021. Geneva: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
- UNCTAD. (2022, January 19). Global foreign direct investment rebounded strongly in 2021, but the recovery is highly uneven. UNCTAD. Retrieved from https://unctad.org/news/global-foreign-direct-investment-rebounded-strongly-2021-recovery-highly-uneven.
- Vekasi, K. (2019). Politics, markets, and rare commodities: Responses to Chinese rare earth policy. Japanese Journal of Political Science, 20(1), 2–20. doi:10.1017/S1468109918000385
- Wan, M. (2008). The political economy of East Asia: Striving for wealth and power. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
- Wan, M. (2016). Understanding Japan–China relations: Theories and issues. Singapore: World Scientific.
- Wan, M., & Zhang, H. (2019). China’s investment relations with Japan. In K. Zeng (Ed.), Handbook on the international political economy of China (pp. 113–131). Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.
- Weiss, L., & Thurbon, E. (2021). Developmental state or economic statecraft? Where, why and how the difference matters. New Political Economy, 26(3), 472–489. doi:10.1080/13563467.2020.1766431
- Woo-Cumings, M. (Ed.). (1999). The developmental state. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Yang, K. (2017). 한국 제조업 해외직접툦자의 특징분석 및 U턴 촉진방안[hangug jejoeob haeoejigjeobtujaui teugjingbunseog mich Uteon chogjinbangan [Analysis on South Korean Manufacturing companies having foreign direct investment and promotion plan for reshoring]. KERI Brief, 17(8), 1–27.
- Yeung, H. W. (2016). Strategic coupling. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.