“Local determination”, even if we could find it, does not challenge free will: Commentary on Marcelo Fischborn

References

• Alexander, P., Schlegel, A., Sinnott-Armstrong, W., Roskies, A. L., Wheatley, T., & Tse, P. U. (2016). Readiness potentials driven by non-motoric processes. Consciousness and Cognition, 39, 38–47.10.1016/j.concog.2015.11.011
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Balaguer, M. (2012). Free will as an open scientific question. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Banks, W. P., & Pockett, S. (2007). Benjamin Libet’s work on the neuroscience of free will. In M. Velmans & S. Schneider (Eds.), The Blackwell companion to consciousness (pp. 657–670). Malden, MA: Blackwell.10.1002/9780470751466.ch52
   Google Scholar
• Clark, A. (2001). Mindware: An introduction to the philosophy of cognitive science. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Clark, A. (2008). Supersizing the mind. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195333213.001.0001
   Google Scholar
• Deery, O., & Nahmias, E. (2016). Defeating manipulation arguments: Interventionist causation and compatibilist sourcehood. Philosophical Studies. Advance online publication. doi:10.1007/s11098-016-0754-8
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Deery, O., & Nahmias, E. (unpublished). The light-cone limit.
   Google Scholar
• Ekstrom, L. (2000). Free will: A philosophical study. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
   Google Scholar
• Fischborn, M. (2016). Libet-style experiments, neuroscience, and libertarian free will. Philosophical Psychology, 29, 494–502.10.1080/09515089.2016.1141399
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hoefer, C. (2016). Causal determinism. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Spring, 2016 ed.). Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/determinism-causal/
   Google Scholar
• Kane, R. (1996). The significance of free will. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Kim, J. (2000). Mind in a physical world: An essay on the mind-body problem and mental causation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Lages, M., Boyle, S. C., & Jaworska, K. (2013). Flipping a coin in your head without monitoring outcomes? Comments on predicting free choices and a demo program. Decision Neuroscience, 4, 925.
   Google Scholar
• Laumann, T. O., Gordon, E. M., Adeyemo, B., Snyder, A. Z., Joo, S. J., Chen, M. Y., … Peterson, S. E. (2015). Functional system and areal organization of a highly sampled individual human brain. Neuron, 87, 657–670.10.1016/j.neuron.2015.06.037
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Libet, B., Gleason, C. A., Wright, E. W., & Pearl, D. K. (1983). Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential). Brain, 106, 623–642.10.1093/brain/106.3.623
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• List, C., & Menzies, P. (in press). My brain made me do it: The exclusion argument against free will, and what’s wrong with it. In H. Beebee, C. Hitchcock, & H. Price (Eds.), Making a difference: Essays in honor of Peter Menzies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• List, C., & Pivato, M. (2015). Dynamic and stochastic systems as a framework for metaphysics and the philosophy of science. Retrieved from https://arxiv.org/abs/1508.04195
   Google Scholar
• Mele, A. R. (2010). Effective intentions: The power of conscious will. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Mele, A. (2013). Manipulation, moral responsibility and bullet biting. The Journal of Ethics, 17, 167–184.
   Google Scholar
• Nahmias, E. (2014). Is free will an illusion? Confronting challenges from the modern mind sciences. In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (Ed.), Moral psychology, Vol. 4: Free will and moral responsibility (pp. 1–25). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Nahmias, E., Shepard, J., & Reuter, S. (2014). It’s OK if “my brain made me do it”: People’s intuitions about free will and neuroscientific prediction. Cognition, 133, 502–516.10.1016/j.cognition.2014.07.009
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Nahmias, E., Coates, D. J., & Kvaran, T. (2007). Free will, moral responsibility, and mechanism: Experiments on folk intuitions. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 31, 214–242.10.1111/misp.2007.31.issue-1
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Pereboom, D. (2001). Living without free will. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9780511498824
   Google Scholar
• Popper, K. R., & Eccles, J. C. (1977). The self and its brain. New York, NY: Springer-Verlag.10.1007/978-3-642-61891-8
   Google Scholar
• Roskies, A. L. (2006). Neuroscientific challenges to free will and responsibility. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10, 419–423.10.1016/j.tics.2006.07.011
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Roskies, A. L. (2011). Why Libet’s studies don’t pose a threat to free will. In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (Ed.), Conscious will and responsibility (pp. 11–22). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Roskies, A. L. (2012). Don’t panic: Self-authorship without obscure metaphysics. Philosophical Perspectives, 26, 323–342.10.1111/phpe.2012.26.issue-1
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Schlegel, A., Alexander, P., Sinnott-Armstrong, W., Roskies, A., Tse, P. U., & Wheatley, T. (2013). Barking up the wrong free: Readiness potentials reflect processes independent of conscious will. Experimental Brain Research, 229, 329–335.10.1007/s00221-013-3479-3
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Schlegel, A., Alexander, P., Sinnott-Armstrong, W., Roskies, A. L., Tse, P., & Wheatley, T. (2015). Hypnotizing Libet: Readiness potentials with non-conscious volition. Consciousness and Cognition, 33, 196–203.10.1016/j.concog.2015.01.002
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Schultze-Kraft, M., Birman, D., Rusconi, M., Allefeld, C., Görgen, K., Dähne, S., … Haynes, J. D. (2016). The point of no return in vetoing self-initiated movements. PNAS, 113, 1080–1085.10.1073/pnas.1513569112
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Schurger, A., Sitt, J. D., & Dehaene, S. (2012). An accumulator model for spontaneous neural activity prior to self-initiated movement. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 109, E2904–E2913.10.1073/pnas.1210467109
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Soon, C. S., Brass, M., Heinze, H. J., & Haynes, J. D. (2008). Unconscious determinants of free decisions in the human brain. Nature Neuroscience, 11, 543–545.10.1038/nn.2112
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Soon, C. S., He, A. H., Bode, S., & Haynes, J.-D. (2013). Predicting free choices for abstract intentions. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., 110, 6217–6222.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Strawson, G. (1994). The impossibility of moral responsibility. Philosophical Studies, 75, 5–24.10.1007/BF00989879
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Tse, P. U. (2013). The neural basis of free will. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.10.7551/mitpress/9780262019101.001.0001
   Google Scholar
• van Inwagen, P. (1983). An essay on free will (Revised ed.). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Varela, F. J., Thompson, E. T., & Rosch, E. (1992). The embodied mind: Cognitive science and human experience (New ed.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
   Google Scholar